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ABSTRACT
Balinese puris are the residences of the traditional ruling elite of Bali, the ksatria. The 
purls provided the rajas and the lesser political leaders in Bali until the challenge to Satria 
hegemony posed by Dutch colonialism. In Badung (South Bali), Dutch ascendancy was 
marked by the massacre known as the puputan Badung, in 1906, which wiped out most of 
the royal families of puri Denpasar and puri Pamacutan. After the puputan, puri Denpasar 
and Pamacutan were replaced by puri Satria and puri Kanginan-Pamacutan respectively.
Very few studies have been made of the Balinese puris in Badung, after the fall of puri 
Denpasar and Pamacutan so that the people of Badung themselves do not clearly understand 
the political role of these puris.
This thesis is an attempt to study the rivalry between the resurgent puri Satria and its 
main local antagonist, puri Pamacutan. The latter co-operated with the Dutch colonial 
authority, while the survivors of the Badung massacre rebuilt puri Satria as a centre of 
opposition to the Dutch.
The time frame (1906-1950) for this research reflects a period of turmoil and change in 
Bali, from the Dutch invasion (of South Bali), to the Japanese occupation, through the 
struggle for independence and the incorporation of Bali into the East Indonesian State to the 
eventual union with the Republic of Indonesia.
The major topic of interest will be the strongly contrasting roles played by the 
traditional leadership of the two puris in the maintenance of political hegemony through the 
first half of the twentieth century.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Aim and Scope of the Study
On 20 September 1906, the Balinese puri of Badung fell to Dutch control in a 
mass ritual, a puputan, in which the raja, his family and his supporters were killed. The 
last stand took place in the main square outside the gates of the puri. This puputan caused 
great changes in Balinese life in Badung triggering a period of transition from traditional 
to modern politics, society and culture. In this evolution, we can observe how the change 
took place in terms of puri, power, puputan and politics according to Balinese perception. 
This thesis examines these elements after the puputan in Badung.
This study is, therefore, concerned with the traditional Balinese governmental 
system, or puri, in Badung, South Bali. The role of Balinese puris or courts in the 
history and politics of twentieth century Bali has largely escaped scholarly notice. The 
study of the puri is of principal significance in understanding the dynamics of the current 
Balinese political scene which have been strongly influenced by the pattern of traditional 
Balinese politics. The patterns or characteristics of present Balinese politics cannot be 
radically separated from the earlier, because modern Balinese politics reflect 
characteristics of earlier Balinese politics.1
The temporal scope of this thesis is from 1906 to 1950. The period under study 
commences in 1906, the year in which puri Denpasar, the ruling Balinese puri in 
Badung, fell to Dutch control. The thesis ends in 1950, because in that year, Bali, which 
had been a part of the East Indonesian State, became a part of the Republic of Indonesia 
and the process of democratisation began.2 During this period we can see that although 
the Badung puris had lost their power, they still maintained their authority, thus it can be 
said that in that period the Balinese puris still played a dominant role in Balinese politics.
!The standard work, Babad Dalem, provides a picture of the functioning of traditional Balinese 
politics. See: Helen Creese, "Balinese Babad as Historical Sources: A Reinterpretation o f The Fall of 
Gelgel," in Bijdragen, Tot De Taal-, Land-, en Völkerkunde, 147, 1991, p. 240.
2For a detailed analysis of this process, See: I Gusti Ngurah Bagus, “Bali in the 1950s: The 
Role of the Pemuda Pejuang in Balinese Political Processes”, in Hildred Geertz (ed.). State and Society in 
Bali. (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1991), p. 202.
Along with Geertz's work,* 3 there have been other studies by western scholars, including 
Schulte Nordholt,4 Worsley,5 Wiener,6 Creese7 of traditional (pre-20th century) 
Balinese politics.
A brief outline of the arrangement of chapters and summary of the argument will 
now be given. Chapter I will describe the aim and scope of the study, the meaning of 
puri, and the role of status and power in Balinese politics.
In order to provide a background picture of the development of puri Satria and 
Pamacutan, a brief history of Badung will be recounted in Chapter II as the starting point 
for the later discussion. This chapter is a description of the history of the development of 
the Balinese puris that claim their descent from the Majapahit dynasty in the 14th century. 
Further, this chapter discusses the hegemony of the first puri in Samprangan (Gianyar), 
Klungkung, the authority of which later dispersed to other areas. Attention will also be 
focused on the growth of the puris in Badung in the 19th century to their decline in the 
first decade of the 20th century.
Chapter III will discuss the position of the puris after they fell to the Dutch. In this 
chapter the discussion will be focused first of all on post - puputan Badung and the role 
of Cokorda Alit Ngurah the son of the last raja of Badung, who was exiled to Lombok 
after the defeat of puri Denpasar. Secondly I will look at the policy of the colonial Dutch 
government, which began to introduce a western system of government, but also made 
use of the traditional Balinese ruling class in relation to colonial Dutch bureaucratisation. 
Cokorda Alit Ngurah's experience is an example of the implementation of this policy. The 
Dutch gave Cokorda Alit Ngurah a western education, so that he could become a Dutch 
official. Cokorda Alit Ngurah began his career as a clerk (1920) in the colonial
2
^Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980). For a detailed description regarding the role of rajas in Balinese political
conflicts, see: Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Bali in The 19th Century. (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia,
1991).
4IIenk Schulte Nordholt, Een Balische Dynastie: Hierarchie en Conflict in de Negara Mengwi 
1700-1940. (Haarlem: Multi Print Noord, 1988).
5p. J. Worsley, Bahad Buleleng: A Balinese Dynastic Genealogy. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1972).
6Margaret Joyce Wiener, "Visible and Invisible Realms: The Royal House of Klungkung and the 
Dutch Conquest of Bali", Ph. D. Unpublished Thesis. (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1990).
7llelen Creese, "The Problem of The Precolonial Balinese State", Paper presented in a Panel on 
Autonomous States in Southeast Asia and Korea at the 34th International Congress for Asian and North 
African Studies (ICANAS), August 1993.
bureaucracy. He later became police assistant (mantri politie) (1924), head of the 
irrigation society (sedahan agung) (1926) and regent or raja (1929). At the pinnacle of his 
career, Cokorda Alit Ngurah was appointed zelfhestuurder or autonomous ruler (1938). 
In addition, in this chapter I will examine the emergence of social and political 
organisations such as the Taman Siswa and Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR) in 
Denpasar. We will also see how the Balinese puris adapted to change.
Chapter IV deals with the role of puri Satria in the struggle against the Japanese, 
particularly when the pemudass attacked the Japanese on 13 October 1945. In this period 
both puris united in order to oppose the colonial and imperial system.
Chapter V is the discussion of the main theme of this thesis, in which the roles of 
the two rival puris, Satria and Pamacutan, are examined. Even after the coming of NIC A 
there were some changes in Badung. The Dutch dismissed the ruler of Satria as raja and 
handed over the authority to the Pamacutan faction. Many Satrians were imprisoned at 
that time. The descendants of puri Satria continued their struggle in prison, and upon their 
release, established the PNI which marked the beginning of the process of 
democratisation in Bali.
3
B. The Meaning o f Puri
Geertz and Schulte Nordholt use different terms in refering to the palace as a 
physical structure. Geertz uses the term negara while Schulte Nordholt prefers the term 
puri, though Geertz emphasizes that those terms have the same meaning.
The term puri (palace) is rather more commonly used than negara as 
such, but it has essentially the same multiple meaning.* 9
In this thesis puri is taken to mean both a physical structure and a system of 
political control. From Schulte Nordholt's account we can see how the puri played a
^The term pemuda is used in this thesis to mean both youths or the various youth groups of
Bali. In other words, pemuda meant youth, especially politicised youth; a member of movement of young
men fighting for the Republican cause in the Indonesian revolution. See: B.R. O' G. Anderson, Java in a
Titne of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p.
16. See also: Geoffrey Robinson, "State, Society and Political Conflict in Bali, 1945-1946", in
Indonesia. (Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1988), p. 1.
9Clifford Geertz, Negara...op. cit., p. 137.
central role in political control.10 In some parts of Southeast Asia, the term kerajaan was 
used in place of puri.J1 The dominant role of kerajaan o rpuri as a political centre was a 
general trend in Southeast Asian states.12 Jane Drakard13, suggests both of these terms 
refer to models of governmental patterns and are significant in order to expand our 
perceptions and to understand local political behaviour.
Schulte Nordholt gives a detailed description of the physical features of a Balinese 
puri, noting that the puri was a four - sided compound surrounded by a high wall. In 
Badung, there were only three great palaces, called puri agung, which developed during 
the 19th century: Pamacutan, Kasiman.and Denpasar (which later became known as 
Satria) 14 From Ronkel's account we know about the characteristics of puri Denpasar. 
The puri was surrounded by a wall, 200 m long and 175 m wide and 1.50 m thick.15 The 
puri of the raja sometimes housed over a hundred people. Around the main puri were 
located the smaller puris of the nobles. The puris were usually built according to Balinese 
traditional architecture.16
Actually, only some puris could be classified as great puri or puri agung. In the 
past the puri agung was where the raja resided. New puris emerged based on change in 
lineage or physical relocation. The inside part of a puri consists of a bale bengong or 
public hall, an ancak saji or front part of the puri, and a rangki where the raja worked to 
prepare ceremonies. This area was usually divided into several parts such as the senetan 
where the brother of the king stayed, the dunungan, where the concubines of the raja 
stayed, pemrajan or house temple and the pewaregan or kitchen.
4
10Henk Schulte Nordholt, "Macht, Mensen en Middelen: Patronen van Dynamiek in de Balische 
Politiek 1700-1940", Unpublished Thesis. (Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit, 1980), p. 23.
11 See: A.C. Milner, The Malay Raja: A Study of Political Culture in East Sumatra and The 
Malay Peninsula in The Early Nineteenth Century. (Michigan: University of Microfilms International, 
1977), p. 17.
12See: Milton Osbom, Southeast Asia: An Illustrated Introductory History (Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 1991), p.41. Herman Kulke, "The Early and The Imperial Kingdom in Southeast Asian History", 
in David G. Marr and A.C. Milner (eds.). Southeast Asia in The 9th to 14th Centuries. (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986).
13Jane Drakard, A Malay Frontier: Unity and Duality in A Sumatran Kingdom. (New York: 
Cornell University, 1990), vii.
14Interview with Anak Agung Putu Murya on 15 January 1993.
15See: PH. S. van Ronkel, "Dagverhaal van Eene Reis van den Resident van Bali en Lombok 
Vergezeld van den Controleur voor de Politieke Aanrakingen en de Poenggawa's Ida Bagoes Gelgel en 
Goesti Ktoet Djlantik naar Tabanan en Badoeng, van 17 Juli t/m 5 Augustus 1899", in Tijdschrift voor 
Indische Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde. ('s Hage: M. Nijhoff, 1901), pp. 154-155.
16 As a reference, see: Gegevens Betreffende de Zelfstandige Rijkjes op Bali. (Batavia: 
Landsdrukkerij, 1906). See: Henk Schulte Nordholt, "Temple and Authority in South Bali", in Hildred 
Geertz (ed.). State and Society ...op. cit., p. 147.
The outside part of a puri consisted of the bale kulkul or armory, a pasar (pkeri) or 
market, the wantilan or meeting hall and the waringin tree.17 The market played a major 
role in trade activities. The people sold rice, fruit, vegetables and fish. Generally, the 
market place surrounded the waringin (tree) which protected the people from the sun.18
However, as previously mentioned the puris were much more than the sum of 
their physical parts. As this study will show, the puris functioned as the centres of 
political power and subsequently as centres of resistance to foreign domination by the 
Dutch and the Japanese even in the absence of traditional leaders.
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C. Status and Power in Balinese Politics
Clifford Geertz examines how the ideology of caste status and its expression in 
grand court ceremonialism shaped the Balinese political system in the nineteenth century. 
According to Geertz, the power which the rulers held was "the accumulation of 
prestige" .19 Schulte Nordholt emphasizes that political power in Bali was based on 
certain fundamentals, namely the principles of family relationship, the system of 
supporters and also competition and conflicts. In addition, he argues that both palace and 
ceremony were important in the creation of the political culture of Balinese society.20 
Both of these institutions, the puri, where the raja resided and exercised political power 
and the upacara ,21 where the priest or bhagawanta exercised power, shared a close 
relationship with the common people. The relationships among these three social strata, 
the ruler (raja), the priest (bhagawanta)22 and the common people (rakyat), is described 
by I Wayan Mertha Sutedja as follows:
17See: M. van Geuns, Door Badoeng en Tabanan: Een en Ander Over Bali en Zijne Bewoners. 
(Soerabaia: Soerabajasch Handelsblad, 1906), p. 7.
18See: G. Krausse, "Pasarleven op Zuid Bali", Nederlandsch Indie, Juni, 4, (Amsterdam: 
Algemeen Geillustreerd Maandblad op Koloniale Gebied, 1919), pp. 3-12.
19Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State..., op. cit., p. 24.
20Henk Schulte Nordholt, "Macht...", loc.cit. Gullick argues that "The role of the raja in the 
polity did not depend on the possession or use of material power since the raja was the fount of honour 
and the focus of ceremony". See: J.M. Gullick, "The Condition of Having A Raja: A Review of Kerajaan 
by A.C. Milner", in Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1982), p. 123.
2 b an k er  Schaareman argues that there was a strong relationship between the king who 
organised the rituals (ceremony) and the common people in the villages. Danker Schaareman, Tatulingga: 
Tradition and Continuity: An Investigation in Ritual and Social Organization in Bali. ( Basel: Werpf & 
Co. AG Verlag, 1986), p. 41.
22In organising the kerajaan, a raja was assisted by priests who served as religious advisers. 
They held the title bhagawanta and included one Siwa priest and the Buddhist priest. The main task of the
The king without the priest is destroyed 
The priest without the king is broken 
The king without the people is dead.23
From this description, it can be seen that the raja and the bhagawanta held strong 
positions in traditional Balinese society. Even in an emergency situation, rajas got their 
advice from the priests. This was evident only in the pxz-puputan period, because after 
the collapse of the Balinese puris in Badung, the raja no longer received political advice 
from the priests but rather from the colonial Dutch officials.
Meanwhile, the people needed stability in their lives and protection against the 
disturbances of an uncertain existence. The common people accepted the raja as the 
symbol of the state24 and as a symbol of the cohesion of the state on which stability and 
order depended.
It seems clear, that the rajas, the priests and the common people were all involved 
in the puputan, because of the central power of the raja in the p u r i s t  The Indonesian or 
Balinese concepts of the power and the authority26 o f the raja are ancient Austronesian 
traditions. These indigenous concepts were strengthened by the process of Indianisation 
or Hinduisation included the heritage of the Austronesian language which took place in 
the Indonesian archipelago during the first centuries A .D ..27 In relation to this case, 
Gullick cites Max Weber's tripartite theory of the basis of authority:
6
bhagawanta was to lead the ceremony regarding the legitimization of the raja or the cremation ceremony 
of a raja who had died. For reference, see: E. Utrecht, Sedjarah Hukum International di Bali dan Lombok. 
(Bandung: Sumur Bandung, 1962), p. 79. Cf. V.E. Korn, Het Adatrecht van Bali. ('s-Gravenhage: N.V. 
Handelsdrukkerij "De Ster", 1924), p. 549.
231 Wayan Mertha Sutedja, Dasar-dasar Kepemimpinan Tradisional di Bali. (Denpasar: C.V. 
Sumber Mas Bali, 1978), p. 16.
24J.M. Gullick, "The Condition...", op.cit., p. 124.
25See: J.M. Gullick, "The Condition ...", ibid., p.114. And it is also significant to look at 
Geertz's account as follows: " The whole of the negara-court life, the traditions that organised it, the 
extractions that supported it, the privileges that accompanied it- was essentially directed toward defining 
what power was; and what power was was what kings were... ' This would make traditional Balinese 
political institutions the most highly perfected examples known of Southeast Asian divine kingship”. 
Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State..., op. cit., p. 124.
26Ralph Dahrendorf as well as Max Weber distinguish the concept of power and authority, 
"...power is merely factual relation, authority is a legitimate relation of domination and subjection. In 
this sense, authority can be described as legitimate power”. Ralph Dahrendorf, “Social Structure, Group 
Interests, and Conflict Groups”, in Celia S. Heller (ed.). Structured Social Inequality: A Reader in 
Comparative Social Stratification. (London: The Macmillan Company, 1971), p. 492.
27A s Stephen Lansing notes that although the Indianization took place in Bali, this does not 
mean "that Bali had been conquered or colonized by an Indian (or Southeast Asian Indie) kingdom. ...Bali 
was 'Indianized' by the power of Indian ideas--ideas given expression, for the most part, in works of art". 
For a detailed analysis, see: J. Stephen Lansing, "The 'Indianization' of Bali", in Journal o f Southeast 
Asian Studies, Vol. 14, No.2 (March, 1983), p. 415. See also his work: The Three Worlds o f Bali.
The raja was essentially a traditional ruler, whose authority was impersonal 
and rested on custom and tradition. Yet the personal qualities expected of a 
raja required that he should be something of a charismatic ruler also.28
7
The raja, conducted his policy based on the holy pattern or Asta Brata. As Friederich 
notes as follows:
A king is to have the accomplishments of the eight gods of the points of the 
compass-viz., Indra, Yama, Surya, Chandra, Anila, Kuwera, Baruna, Agni 
(according to Ramayana, lontar-leaf 181).29
All of these elements have shaped the idea of power in Balinese society, which 
centred on the raja, who resided in the puri and they have influenced Balinese politics up 
to the present day.30
D. The Main Issues
What happened to the Balinese puri in the face of Dutch colonial rule? In the 
process of modernisation, democratisation and social change, Balinese traditional society 
came into contact with new ideas and some processes of adaptation emerged.31 On the 
one hand, the Dutch encouraged the development of new perspectives in Balinese society 
thereby erasing traditional customary law. On the other hand they endeavoured to impose 
traditional authority as a bolster to new administrative and colonial practices.
These internal factors include cooperation and conflict. Some puris, particularly 
those which were affected by the puputan, chose to confront the Dutch.32 Other puris,
(Princeton: Praeger Scientific, 1983), pp. 15-49. According to Hobsbawm and Ranger, Balinese tradition 
is based on a process of ritualisation. See: Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger (eds.). The Invention of 
Tradition. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 4.
28See: J.M. Gullick, "The Condition of loc. cit.
29See: R. Friederich, The Civilization and Culture of Bali. Edited by Ernst R. Rost. (Calcutta: 
Susil Gupta (India) Private Ltd., 1959), p. 18.
30Robinson discusses the position of the puri as the most important source of conflict in Bali in 
the middle of the twentieth century. See: Geoffrey Robinson, "State, Society ...", op. cit., p. 7.
31 For further discussion regarding social conflicts in Balinese society, see: I Gusti Ngurah 
Bagus, "Surya Kanta: A Kawangsan Movement of The Jaba Caste in Bali", in Masyarakat Indonesia 
(Majalah Ilmu-ilmu Sosial Indonesia), Vol. II, No.2 (Jakarta: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, 
December 1975).
32See: Bre Redana and Raka Santeri, "Puri Sebagai Pusat Kekuasaan Dunia: Antara Puri Golkar 
dan Puri PDI", Kompas (Sunday, August 2, 1992), p.2. Besides the Balinese, we can also compare the 
involvement of the Javanese court in the period of revolution. See: George Larson, Prelude To 
Revolution: Palaces and Politics in Surakarta. (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1987), p. 49.
such as Gianyar and Karangasem, chose a strategy of cooperation and enjoyed a peaceful 
co-existence even though they were under the authority of the Dutch. Secondly, there 
were external factors such as the Dutch policy of recruiting the Balinese traditional elites 
into the Dutch bureaucratic system. It seems clear that the Dutch began to make use of the 
authority of the traditional Balinese ruling class in this system of indirect rule. The 
success of this system was helpful in establishing Dutch colonial bureaucracy in Bali. 
This same system was used by the Dutch in other parts of the Dutch Indies, to create a 
P a x-N eerla n d ica The Dutch had to be careful to appoint rulers who had authority, 
since if such a raja could be recruited by the Dutch, the people would be more inclined to 
support Dutch policy.
This thesis examines Balinese responses to the changing political situation in 
Badung in the post-puputan period, particularly from the early to middle twentieth 
century. Throughout this period two purls played a dominant role, the resurgent puri 
Satria and its main local antagonist, puri Pamacutan. The latter cooperated with Dutch 
colonial authority, while the puri Satria survivors of the Badung massacre rebuilt their 
puri (Satria) as a centre of opposition to the Dutch. The time frame for this research 
reflects a period of turmoil and change in Bali, from the Dutch invasion of South Bali, 
through the struggle for independence, to the introduction a new political system of 1950. 
This does not mean that periods before the year 1906 and after 1950 will be entirely 
excluded from this discussion, for the events or social phenomena of those periods are 
also worthy of analysis. The major topic of interest will be the strongly contrasting roles 
played by the traditional leadership in the two purls in the maintenance of political 
hegemony through the period of colonial domination and the early period of Indonesian 
independence.
A number of pertinent questions will be addressed in the thesis. How did power 
in these two purls after the puputan differ from the earlier system since the Dutch 
appointed the same rulers as rajas with the same titles? Did Badung rulers have a
8
33Sartono Kartodirdjo argues that "the Pax-Neerlandica refers to the period of Dutch colonial rule 
in Indonesia during which peace and order could be enforced throughout the archipelago; the so-called the 
pacification of many parts of the Outer Provinces had already come to an end". See: Sartono Kartodirdjo, 
The Peasant's Revolt of Bauten in 1888: Its Condition, Course and Sequel: A Case Study of Social 
Movements in Indonesia. ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), p.2.
particular role within the colonial (and imperial) system? Did these roles change over time 
and if so, why? What were the tactics and strategies used in confronting the colonial 
system? Why did these two puris play different roles in reaction to the colonial system, 
especially in relation to Dutch power? What was the relationship between the ruling class 
and the Dutch officials? How did the arrival of the Dutch change the traditional power of 
the raja?34 This thesis will also consider whether the changes which took place in that 
period allowed the puris to survive.
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E. The Sources
I have used both Dutch and Balinese sources in considering these issues. The 
main Balinese source is "Lintasan Babad Badung". This work written by Ida Cokorda 
Ngurah Agung, the eldest son of Cokorda Alit Ngurah last raja of Badung, is still in draft 
form. Agung's work gives an account of the emergence of the Badung rulers from the 
mid-17th century, until the 20th century when their descendants played a significant role 
in the development of nationalistic ideas in Bali. This source has not yet been used by any 
other scholar. It has been very useful as it shows how these Balinese rulers saw their role 
in the past.
In addition I have had access to the handwritten manuscript "Memoirs of Cokorda 
Ngurah Agung" which is also still in draft form. These memoirs give an account of the 
political role of Cokorda Ngurah Agung and his younger brother, Cokorda Bagus Sayoga 
from 1942 (the beginning of the Japanese occupation) to 1948. During this period 
Cokorda Ngurah Agung was exiled to Karangasem and then to Singaraja where he 
established the first branch of the Indonesian National Party (the PNI) in Bali.
For the view from the rival puri, puri Pamacutan, there are four books all written 
by members of the Pamacutan family: "Perang Patriotik Puputan Badung" (Patriotic War- 
Puputan Badung), "Sejarah dan Perjuangan Ida Cokorda Pemecutan Bersama Rakyatnya 
Menentang Kolonialisme Belanda" (History and the Struggle of Ida Cokorda Pamacutan
34Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung argues that nowadays the Balinese puris  only have social 
responsibility, see: "Istana-Istana Yang Bergoyang", in I Gusti Ngurah Wisnu Wardhana (ed.). Bali: Apa 
Kata Mereka . (Cita Budaya, 1991), p. 152. (The Collection of the Governor's Library, Denpasar).
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and his People to oppose Dutch Colonialism), "Sejarah Puri Pemecutan-Badung" 
(History of Puri Pamacutan-Badung) and "Mesuci Ngadegang Pengelingsir Pesemetonan 
Warga Puri Agung Pemecutan" (Religious Ceremony to choose the Leader of the Family 
of the Great Puri of Pamacutan). These sources as well have not yet been used by other 
scholars. All of these primary sources including those of puri Satria are very significant in 
reconstructing the roles of the Balinese puris in the twentieth century.
Other valuable sources are the newspapers which were published during the 
period of revolution in Bali such as Penindjau and Penjoeloeh Bali,35 Penindjau was 
published from 12 July to 31 July 1950, while Penjoeloeh Bali was published from 10 
September 1946 to 6 May 1947. These sources provide an eyewitness account of the 
situation during the period of revolution in Bali.
The principal Dutch sources used include H.J. Hoekstra, Nota van Toelichtingen 
Betreffende het in te Stellen Zelfbesturend Lands chap Badoeng and also Memoir es van 
Overgave Zuid Bali, particularly the reports of C.C. Krom (1914), V.E. Korn (1921), 
H.D. van Meyenveldt (1923), J.P. Verheul (1923) and H.J.E. Moll (1941). These 
memoires contain general reports regarding the geographical situation, population, 
government, agriculture, health, education and religion of Bali at regular intervals 
throughout this period. For other Dutch accounts of the time of revolution see the 
collection edited by S.L. van der Wal, P.J. Drooglever and M.J.B. Schouten namely, 
Officiele Bescheiden Betreffende De Nederlands-Indonesische Betrekkingen 1945-1950. 
This Dutch series offers various perspectives which are, at times, rather inconsistent with 
puri Satria. Nevetherless, it can be used for comparison in order to gain a more balanced 
view of events in Badung during the revolution.
The earlier 19th century historical setting is reconstructed from contemporary 
Dutch accounts including van Ronkel's account of his journey through Bali in 1899.36 
And also, van Geuns' account of Balinese history since the turn of the century.37
Besides the written sources, I have also used information from a number of 
interviews with key figures from both puri Satria and Pamacutan. Information about puri
35I would like to thank to Prof. Anthony Reid who drew my attention to these sources.
36h .J. van Ronkel, "Dagverhaal van Eene...", passim.
37M . van Geuns, Door Badoeng..., passim.
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Satria came from: Cokorda Ngurah Agung, Cokorda Bagus Sayoga and I Made Kara. 
The main sources of information for puri Pamacutan were: I Gusti Bagus Saputra, Anak 
Agung Putu Murya, Ida Bagus Ratja, Anak Agung Raka Candri, Anak Agung Ngurah 
Sangku. In order to understand the role of puris Satria and Pamacutan, it is also 
necessary to consider the role of puri Kasiman which was the central power in Badung in 
the 19th. A number of people were able to provide data about puri Kasiman including: 
Anak Agung Ngurah Bagus Ariman, I Ketut Dangga, I Wayan Reta, I Dewa Made Oka. 
For further information about the role of these three puris, I interviewed a number of 
leading pemudas including Ida Bagus Tantra, I Putu Serangan, I Nyoman Sarja Udaya, I 
Gusti Ayu Rapeg, I Made Pugeg, and I Nyoman Buleleng.
II. THE SETTING
The Balinese concepts of p u ri, status and power, Balinese history and the 
influence of Java have all played an interconnected role in the development of Balinese 
traditions.
In this chapter, I would like to trace the development of the Balinese puris from 
their emergence during the Majapahit dynasty in the 14th century, in particular that of the 
three puris in Badung - Denpasar, Pamacutan and Kasiman, their rise to power which 
reached its zenith in the 19th century and the subsequent loss of their political power to 
the Dutch.
A. The Early History o f Balinese Puris
To understand the Balinese court, people and political system in modem times, it 
is necessary to look at the evolution of the Balinese puri. From ancient times, Bali has 
been strongly influenced by Java. Most innovations arrived from Java via the western 
part of the island of Bali which was often called the "door" to Bali.
The Balinese believe their modem culture to have come from East Java during the 
Majapahit dynasty. This does not mean that there was no other culture in Bali, before the 
coming of the Majapahit rulers. The Pasek group trace their ancestry back to pre- 
Majapahit rulers.38 In addition the Bali Aga39 who claim to be descendants of the original 
Balinese inhabitants believe that they were never directly controlled by the puri based on 
the Majapahit model. The Bali Aga rejected the rule of the rajas and in order to show their 
independence refused to acknowledge the caste system.40
38James A. Boon, The Anthropological Romance of Bali 1597-1972: Dynamic Perspectives in 
Marriage and Caste, Politics and Religion. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 159. See 
also: Danker Schaareman, Tatulingga: Tradition and Continuity: An Investigation in Ritual and Social 
Organisation in Bali. (Basel: Wepf & Co., A.G. Verlag, 1986), p. 124.
39See: V.E. Korn, Het Adatrecht van Bali. ( ‘s-Gravenhage: N.V. Handelsdmkkerij “De Ster”, 
1924), p. 29.
40Fredrik Barth, Balinese Worlds. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), p.222 and
p. 228.
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The 14th century Javanese kakawin, Nagarakrtagama41 gives us some evidence 
as to how Majapahit culture spread to Bali. Creese notes that in the fourteenth century, 
Bali was a dependency of Majapahit. At that time, the Balinese ruler paid homage to the 
king of Majapahit and the Balinese brought regular monthly contributions of product-tax. 
In addition, the Balinese were said to conform with all Javanese customs.42 Balinese 
inscriptions written in Sanskrit and Old Balinese, such as those on the Blanjong stone, 
provide evidence of independent Indian influence in Bali before the tenth century. At that 
time the chancellery language changed from Old Balinese to Old Javanese and Javanese 
scripts were adopted. These changes, which mark the beginning of Javanese cultural 
domination, took place in conjunction with political changes that linked Javanese and 
Balinese dynasties.43
The main point is that modern post-18th century Balinese interpretations of their 
origins go back only to the time of the Majapahit conquest in the 14th century, in spite of 
all this earlier evidence. It can be seen that the Balinese themselves believe their ancestors 
were descended from the noble classes of Majapahit. The Babad Dalem ,44 a Balinese 
historical work that deals with the history of Bali from the 14th to 17th centuries mentions 
that Gajah Mada who was the prime minister (patih) of Majapahit during the reign of 
Hayam Wuruk (1350-1389) appointed Danghyang Kepakisan raja of Bali 45 This took 
place after the defeat of the king of Bedahulu, Maya Denawa.46 The new dynasty which 
was centred in Kepakisan's puri at Samprangan in present day Gianyar, greatly 
influenced the formation of Balinese culture.
From the Babad Dalem , we also know that the Majapahit raja gave a number of 
emblems of royalty to adorn the puri such as the kris "I Gaja-Dungkul"47 and vestments
41Th. Pigeaud, Java in The Fourteenth Century: A Study in Cultural History, 5 Vols. (The 
Hague: Nijhoff, 1960-3).
42 Helen Creese, "The Early Balinese Polity: Interpreting The Evidence", Paper presented at the 
Ninth Biennial ASAA Conference University of New England, July 6-9 1992), p. 9.
43Ibid., pp.6-7.
44Babad Dalem: Teks dan Terjetmhan. I Wayan Warna (trans.). (Denpasar: Dinas Pendidikan dan 
Kebudayaan Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I Bali, 1986).
45Clifford Geertz, The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980), p.14.
46H.I.R. Hinzler, “The Usana Bali as A Source of History”, in Taufik Abdullah (ed.). Papers of 
The Fourth Indonesian-Dutch History Conference 24-29 July 1983. (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University 
Press, 1986), p. 138.
47See: C.C. Berg, De Middeljavaansche Historische Traditie. (Santpoort: C.A. Mees, 1927), p.
139.
which purportedly gave supernatural power to the raja. This is a concept of power shared 
by both Javanese and Balinese cultures which was carried over to Balinese culture, that 
is, that regalia functioned as symbols of legal power.
Nevertheless, Kepakisan, the first raja of Samprangan faced rebellion from 
villages such as Batur, Songan and Culik which did not acknowledge the status of the 
pwr/48 In order to solve this problem, Gajah Mada presented more symbols of royalty to 
Dalem Ketut Kresna Kepakisan in the form of vestments and the kris "Ki, Lobar " 49
The raja, Dalem Ketut Kresna Kepakisan was accompanied by an entourage of 
high-level Javanese nobles such as Arya Kanuruhan, Arya Wang Bang, Arya Demung, 
Arya Kepakisan, Arya Tumenggung, Arya Dalancang, Arya Belog, Arya Manguri, Arya 
Pangalasan and Arya Kuta Waringin. Their titles, like that of the raja, were also 
hereditary. According to traditional Balinese sources, such as the Usana Jawa and Babad 
Dalem , the apical ancestor of Badung, Arya Damar, was one of those who came from 
Majapahit with Dalem Ketut Kresna Kepakisan.50
The Usana Jawa continues the story of the relationship between Arya Damar and 
the ruler of Bali. According to the Usana Jawa, the first raja, Dalem Ketut Kresna 
Kepakisan gave Arya Damar the title, "Arya Kenceng"51 and he was also given lands in 
Tabanan,52 but his status was still inferior to that of the raja of Gelgel. In the succeeding 
period, Arya Kenceng became a famous Arya and he had two son, Arya Yasan and Arya 
Bagus Alit.53 Arya Kenceng later distributed land to other Aryas, such as Arya Sentong 
in Pacung, Arya Beleteng in Pinatih, Arya Waringin in Kapal, Arya Belog in Kaba-Kaba, 
Arya Kepakisan in Abiansemal and Arya Binculuk in Tangkas.54
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48Besides Batur, Songan and Culik, Helen Creese also notes a number of other rebellious 
villages, including: Campaga, Kedisan, Abang, Pinggan, Muntig, Tludu, Cinatamani, Srahi, Manikaliyu, 
Bonyoh, Taro, Bayan, Sikawana, Tista, Garbawana, Got, Margatiga, Sekul Kuning, Garinten, Lokasrana, 
Puhan, Bulahan, Paselatan, Simbanten, Turamben, Watudawa, Juntal, Caratcut, Bantas, Kuebayem, Watu 
Wayang, Kadampal, Asti and Datah. See: Helen Creese, "The Early Balinese...", op. cit., p. 10.
49C.C. Berg, De Middeljavaansche..., loc. cit.
50C.C. Berg quotes from the Usana Jawa that when Arya Damar came to Bali he was 
accompanied by 5000 of his own followers and 10,600 of Gajah Mada’s followers. See: C.C. Berg, De 
Middeljavaansche ..., ibid., p. 135.
51"Silsilah Puri Denpasar dan Pemecutan" notes the name of Arya Kenceng (Bhatara Sirarya 
Kenceng). (The collection of Puri Satria, Denpasar). See also, "Babad Badung". (The collection of Centre 
for Documentation of Balinese Culture or Pusat Dokumentasi Kebudayaan Bali), p. 78.
52See also: James A. Boon, The Anthropological Romance ..., op. cit., p. 161.
53See: H.I.R. Hinzler, "The Balinese Babad", in Sartono Kartodirdjo (ed.). Profdes of Malay 
Culture: Historiography, Religion and Politics. Jakarta: Ministry of Education and Culture Directorate 
General of Culture, 1976, p. 41.
54 C.C. Berg, De Middeljavaansche..., op. cit., p. 133.
After Kresna Kapakisan died, he was succeeded by his son Dalem Samprangan 
(Ratu Anom). Ary a Kenceng’s son, Arya Yasan, succeeded his father as patih. A conflict 
developed between Dalem Samprangan and his p a tih ,55 when Dalem Samprangan 
ordered Arya Yasan to leave the puri to go to Majapahit for eight years. In his absence, 
Dalem Samprangan handed over Arya Yasan’s family and lands to the lord of Asak in 
Karangasem.56 It was not until a later generation that Arya Kenceng's family won back 
their status. During the reign of Dalem Bekung, a member of Arya Sentong's family, 
Arya Putu heard that Kenceng's descendant, Arya Bagus Alit, was living in Tabanan.57 
He informed the raja, and the raja then ordered Pragata to invite Arya Bagus Alit to take 
up his rightful place at court.
Although the details remain unclear, both Balinese traditional sources and Dutch 
interpretations agree that the rulers of both Badung and Tabanan were descended from 
Arya Damar (Arya Kenceng).58 Towards the end of the seventeenth century a serious 
rebellion broke out in the kingdom of Gelgel and, in 1686-1687, the main court moved to 
Klungkung.59 The name of Badung became famous in Balinese history at this time, 
when Jambe Pule, the lord of Badung joined in this struggle to overthrow the ruler in 
Gelgel.60 It is assumed that at that time Badung was only a small region because Gelgel is 
believed to have been the only kingdom in Bali. This period saw the end of the old 
political order and the beginning of a new.61 The other major kingdoms such as 
Karangasem, Buleleng, Tabanan and Mengwi, then emerged and spread over the
15
55C.C. Berg states that Arya Yasan who was one of Arya Damar’s son, was a Majapahit 
nobleman in Palembang. C.C. Berg, ibid., p.89. See also: Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan Babad 
Badung". Unpublished Paper. (Denpasar, 1983)., p. 3.
56C.C. Berg, De Middeljavaansche..., op.cit., p. 134.
57 Cokorda Ngurah Agung tells the same story with minor variations in "Lintasan...", op. cit., 
pp.1-3. A third, Javanese-centred version of Arya Damar can be found in N.J. Krom, Hindoe-Javaansche 
Geschiedenis. ( ‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1926), pp. 459-461.
58R. Friederich, Voorlopig Verslag van het Eiland Bali. (Extr. des Verhandelingen van het 
Bataviaasch Genootschap van Künsten en Wettenschappen, Vol. XXIII, 1850), p.22 and p. 25.
59IIelen Creese, "Balinese Babad as Historical Sources: A Reinterpretation of The Fall of 
Gelgel", in Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 147, (1991), p. 254.
60C.C. Berg, De Middeljavaansche...., op.cit., p.162.
61Helen Creese, "Balinese Babad ...", op. cit., p.237.
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countryside.62 This situation gave Mengwi a chance to increase its power63 and in 1700 
Badung became a part of Mengwi.
B. The Emergence ofPuris Denpasar, Kasiman and Pamacutan
Henk Schulte Nordholt argues that by 1700, Badung was not a part of 
Klungkung, but under the rule of raja Mengwi.64 The western part of Badung was ruled 
directly by the raja of Mengwi and the eastern part, the small kingdom of Pinatih, was 
ruled indirectly. Henk Schulte Nordholt adds that the raja of Mengwi installed Gusti 
Jambe as his vassal in Satria.65 Towards the end of the 18th century, there were conflicts 
between Gusti Jambe and his brother Gusti Ngurah Made Kaleran over the control of 
Badung. Gusti Jambe was killed by his punggawa, Gusti Ngurah Rai and Gusti Ngurah 
Made Kaleran was then appointed as ruler of Badung.66 Gusti Ngurah Made Kaleran 
moved to Kasiman and his title became Gusti Gde Kasiman. Sidemen, who quotes from 
J. Sieberg's account,67 notes that in 1779 Gusti Gde Kasiman (Gusti Ngurah Made 
Kaleran) seized power from Gusti Jambe in Pamacutan in order to strengthen his position 
against Mengwi. It seems that the Badung rulers were no longer satisfied being governed 
by Mengwi. This led to a successful rebellion against Mengwi organised by Gusti 
Ngurah Made Kaleran who then moved his puri to an area between Satria and Pamacutan.
62For a reference, see: P.J. Worsley, Babad Buleleng: A Balinese Dynastic Genealogy. (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), p .l. Cf. E. Utrecht, Sedjarah Hukutn Internasional di Bali dan Lombok: 
Pertjobaan Sebuah Studi Hukum International Regional Di Indonesia. (Bandung: Sumur Bandung, 1962), 
p.96.
63IIenk Schulte Nordholt, Een Balische Dynastie: Hierarchie en Conflict in de Negara Mengwi 
1700-1940. (Haarlem: Multi Print Noord, 1988), p.23.
64IIenk Schulte Nordholt, "Macht, Mensen en Middelen: Patronen van Dynamiek in de Balische 
Politick 1700-1840". Unpublished Thesis. (Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit, 1980), p. 64.
65Ibid.
66PII. S. van Ronkel, "Dagverhaal van Eene Reis van den Resident van Bali en Lombok 
Vergezeld van den Controleur voor de Politieke Aanrakingen en de Poenggawa's Ida Bagoes Gelgel en 
Goesti Ktoet Djlantik naar Tabanan en Badoeng," in Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en 
Volkenkunde. ( ‘s-Hage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1901), p. 138. According to Cokorda Ngurah Agung, Gusti 
Ngurah Rai was the same as Anak Agung Ngurah Rai. See: Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", op. 
cit., p. 75.
67Ida Bagus Sidemen quotes from Memorie van Overgave J. Sieberg (ARA) VOC.3389. See: Ida 
Bagus Sidemen, Sejarah Badung (1779-1906). (Badung: Pemerintah Daerah Kabupaten Daerah Tingkat II 
Badung, 1992), p.24.
This puri was called puri Denpasar68 from where Gusti Ngurah Made Kaleran ruled 
Badung as I Gusti Ngurah Sakti Pamacutan.69
The role of the raja in this period was as that of a patron who directed the policy 
of his kingdom, while the common people were his clients. Within the puri bureaucracy 
there were a number of puri families who held important positions such as punggawa.70 
In addition to the raja, there was also the raja muda who usually administered the 
customary law, dealt with religious issues and also served as an adviser to the raja.
In addition to the raja and raja muda, there was also the bhagawanta, or court 
priest, who came from the Brahmana caste. The task of this official was to lead religious 
ceremonies, for example the coronation of the raja, and also to advise the raja. 
Furthermore below the position of raja muda was the anglurah agung. Both the raja muda 
and anglurah agung were members of the raja's family. Below the position of anglurah 
agung were the punggawas and the mancas. The mancas were sometimes considered to 
be local 'rajas'.71 Below the mancas were the bendesas or perbekels. A perbekel was the 
leader of a village or desa which consisted of several banjars72 each of which was led by 
a chief of the banjar, the kelian hanjar. In the Badung bureaucratic system, the banjar was 
the smallest political division.
At the beginning of the 19th century, the raja of Badung was Gusti Ngurah Made 
Pamacutan and his cousin Gusti Gde Raka was his raja muda. Both Gusti Ngurah Made 
Pamacutan and Gusti Gde Raka were descended from Gusti Ngurah Pamacutan Sakti. In 
1805, Gusti Ngurah Made Pamacutan conquered the neighbouring district of Jembrana. 
Under the reign of Gusti Ngurah Made Pamacutan, Badung signed an agreement with the
17
6*Ibid., p.68.
69Ibid., pp.67-68.
70The term Punggawa has been known since 1350 A.D. when the Majapahit kingdom rose to 
power. See: Pigeaud, Java..., op. cit., p. 19. The word punggawa means 'chief, leader, official of high 
rank'. See: C.C. Macknight, "Changing Perspectives in Island Southeast Asia." in David G. Marr and 
A.C. Milner (eds.)., Southeast Asia in The 9th to 14th Centuries. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1986), p. 219.
71Ida Bagus Sidemen quotes from van den Broek, “Verslag Nopens het eiland Bali”, De 
Oosterling, I (1880), pp. 195-221. See: Ida Bagus Sidemen, Sejarah..., op. cit., p. 31.
72Birkelbach notes that "banjar are traditional village subgroupings which are formed to provide 
a wide varieties of socio-economic and religious services to their members. Membership, though legally 
voluntary, is socially mandatory. In the nineteenth century United States, quilting bees and barn-raisings 
represented banjar-style activities". Aubrey W. Birkelbach, Jr. "The Subak Association", in Indonesia, 
No. 16. (October 1973), (Cornell Modern Indonesia Project), p. 159. See also: J.J. Hollander, 
Handleiding bij de Beoefening der Land en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch Oost-Indie. (Breda: Van Broesse 
& Compagnie, 1898), p. 698.
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Dutch representative, van der Wahl in 1808.73 This agreement dealt with the Dutch 
protection of the Badung rulers, and the acknowledgement of these rulers by the Dutch. 
Under the term of this agreement, the raja of Badung allowed the Dutch to build camps 
and houses in Badung.74
Gusti Ngurah Made Pamacutan divided his realm among his three sons in 1810, 
three years before his death in 1813.75 The eldest son, Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan 
succeeded his father as raja of Denpasar in 1810 and ruled until 1817.76 His younger 
brother, Gusti Made Pamacutan,77 a descendant of Anglurah Pamayun who had been 
adopted by Gusti Ngurah Made Pamacutan was appointed as anglurah agung. His 
position was inferior to that of raja and raja muda. In the same year, Gusti Gde Raka 
renounced his position as raja muda in Badung. The third son of Gusti Ngurah Made 
Pamacutan, Gusti Jambe, became the raja muda of Pamacutan and succeeded Gusti Gde 
Raka. It can be said that after 1813 there were, in effect three rulers in Badung, with 
Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan as raja Denpasar, the highest.
When Gusti Ngurah Made Pamacutan died in 1813, there was disorder in 
Badung. Eventually, I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan became the overall ruler, while the 
two other rulers were given the duty to assist the raja with policy and administration, to 
collect taxes and to manage distant bureaucrats who tended to oppose central power. The 
aim of this division of power was to avoid internal conflict among the three rajas.
As in other puris in Bali, the appointment of the raja in Badung was based on 
hereditary status. Generally, a raja was succeeded by his eldest son or the son of a high 
caste wife. If there was more than one son, the raja would choose his favourite son, who, 
it was hoped, would also be a good administrator, to be the next raja. The heir had the 
responsibility of conducting the cremation ceremony for the dead raja. If the prince was 
still young, he would be represented by his mother or one of the noblemen chosen by the 
priests or by a council of nobleman or by the court punggawas, to rule as regent. A raja
73R. van Eck, “Schetsen van het Eiland Bali”, TNI, 9/1, 1880, pp. 205-207.
74C. Lekkerkerker, "Het Voorspel der Vestiging van de Nederlandsche Macht op Bali en 
Lombok", BKI, 79, 1923, p. 178.
75Alfons van der Kraan, "Human Sacrifice in Bali: Sources, Notes and Commentary", in 
Indonesia, No.40. (October). (Cornell: Southeast Asia Program, 1985), p.97.
76C. Lekkerkerker, " Het Voorspel...", op. cit., p. 206.
77A. K. Nielsen, Leven en Avonturen Oostijnjevaarder op Bali. (Amsterdam: Em' Queridos 
Uitgevers, Maatsch, 1928), pp.176-178.
who died could be replaced in several ways. In the meantime, however, political power 
was held by the noblemen of the raja's family.
Gusti Ngurah Made Pamacutan in puri Kasiman was not happy being subject to 
his younger brother, Gusti Jambe who was raja muda. Gusti Jambe, on the other hand, 
believed that his father's decision was equitable because Gusti Ngurah Made 
Pamacutan78 was just an adopted child who deserved a lower position.79
When Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan, the raja of Badung, died in 1817 he was 
succeeded by his nephew, Gusti Ngurah Denpasar who ruled until 1829.80 The raja 
muda at that time was Gusti Ngurah Pamacutan, a son of Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan's 
sister who resided in puri Pamacutan and ruled as raja muda from 1817-1840. He 
succeeded Gusti Jambe who did not have a son.81 Because he was often ill, Gusti 
Ngurah Denpasar did not manage his government very well, and soon his authority was 
taken over by the raja muda, Gusti Ngurah Pamacutan. In 1829, Gusti Ngurah Denpasar 
abdicated and as he did not have a son he trusted to rule after him, the raja muda Gusti 
Ngurah Pamacutan became raja of Denpasar. To fill the position of raja of Badung, Gusti 
Ngurah Pamacutan then appointed the anglurah agung of puri Kasiman, Gusti Made 
Pamacutan as raja.82 After the death of Gusti Ngurah Denpasar later that same year, Gusti 
Made Pamacutan then moved his puri to Badung in Denpasar. As a result Gusti Ngurah 
Made Pamacutan more commonly known as raja Kasiman, became the most powerful 
raja in Badung. The former rulers of the other two puris (Pamacutan and Denpasar) 
continued to exist under the authority of the raja of Kasiman. When raja Kasiman came to 
power in 1829, it was his ambition to conquer Badung.
Prior to the 1860s Badung politics were dominated by Ngurah Kasiman. This is 
clear from his agreement with the Dutch on July 26, 1841. This agreement was signed by 
Huskus Koopman, Gusti Gde Ngurah Kasiman and Gusti Ngurah Pamacutan who was
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78This is very confusing because many of the Badung’s rajas had the same name. Therefore, in 
this thesis, the names of these rajas are based on their puris, i.e. Gusti Gde Ngurah Kasiman rather than 
Gusti Ngurah Made Pamacutan. See the Genealogy Chart in Appendix B for a clearer picture of the reigns 
of the various rajas and their familial relationship.
79Ida Bagus Sidemen, Sejarah..., op. cit., p. 34.
80 Gusti Ngurah Denpasar was Gusti Gde Ngurah Pamacutan who was the son of his sister, see: 
Alfons van der Kraan, " Human...", op. cit., p. 97.
81 Ida Bagus Sidemen, Sejarah..., op. cit., p. 36.
82A.K. Nielsen, Leven en Avonturen..., op. cit., pp. 54-55.
accompanied by Gusti Gde Dangin and the priest, Pedanda Agung Somawati.83 With the 
conclusion of the agreement, in which the Badung rajas stated that their kingdoms 
belonged to the Dutch government, the rajas of Badung were not permitted to surrender 
their kingdoms to another European power, and the rajas of Badung were to allow the 
display of the Dutch flag in their region. C. Lekkerkerker mentions that this agreement 
did not deal with the abolition of the tawan karang (rights to salvage).84 It seems that 
Huskus Koopman himself was reluctant to abolish tawan karang,85 because its abolition 
was so strongly opposed by the Badung rajas. The draft of Baud's agreement however, 
clearly required the abrogation of tawan karang-80
In the same year (1841), the Dutch ship, 'Overijzel' ran aground on a coral reef in 
Serangan close to the Benoa coast and was plundered by the Buginese residents of 
Badung. After that event, the Dutch reprimanded Huskus Koopman, for failing to include 
the regulation abolishing tawan karang in his agreement with the Badung rajas on 26 July 
1841. Huskus Koopman returned to Bali to add a tawan karang clause to the agreement 
of 1841. On 28 November 1842, that agreement was signed by the Badung rajas Gusti 
Gde Ngurah Kasiman, Gusti Gde Ngurah Pamacutan and Gusti Gde Ngurah 
Denpasar.87
The goal of the Dutch policy was to achieve a monopoly in trade. This can be seen 
from the emergence of Kuta as the centre of the slave trade after the 16th century. The 
slave trade which reached its zenith in 1806 could not be continued after 1811, because of 
the arrival of the British who wrested power from the Dutch in the Netherlands Indies. 
The British outlawed the slave trade.
The Dutch recovered their power from the British in 1816 and for a time allowed 
the slave trade to continue clandestinely. Meanwhile, the British developed their trade
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83Surat-surat Perdjandjian Antara Keradjaan - Keradjaan Bali/ Lombok Dengan Pemerintah 
Hindia-Belanda 1841 s/d 1938. (Djakarta: Arsip Nasional, 1964), pp. 140-144.
84C. Lekkerkerker,"Voorlopig...", op. cit., p.311. Cf. E. Utrecht, Sedjarah Hukutn ..., op. cit.,
p. 172.
85Tawan karang was a regulation which provided that any ship which ran aground on the coast of 
Bali that meant that the raja and the people had rights to seize the goods of that ship. For detailed 
information about the tawan karang, see: E. Utrecht, Sedjarah Hukutn..., ibid., pp. 122-123. See also: 
V.E. Korn, Het Adatrecht...op. cit., p. 329. C. Lekkerkerker, Voorlopig Verslag..., op. cit., p. 201.
86Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Bali Pada Abad XIX. (Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University 
Press, 1989), p. 175.
87Ibid., p.l 89. See also: R. van Eck, "Schetsen van...", op. cit., p. 210.
activities between Europe and Australia which used Singapore as a centre of their 
activities after 1819.
The development of Singapore as the centre of British trade activities led to the 
development of Kuta as a port beginning around 1830. The Dutch believed that such a 
direct, strong relationship between Singapore and Kuta circumventing Javanese ports 
would not only influence trade activities in Java, but would also have the political effect 
of weakening Dutch power. This can be seen from the efforts of the British to spread 
their political influences in Bali and Lombok.
To maintain their sphere of influence over Bali and Lombok, the Dutch reached an 
agreement with the British and other European powers and through the NHM 
(Ne de Hands ehe Handelsmaatschappij) established a trading post in Bali.88 This branch of 
the NHM was established in Kuta on 1 August 1839. The rajas of Badung and 
Klungkung welcomed this company. At that time, the raja held a monopoly on trade with 
foreigners and appointed a trade leaseholder or syahbandar to organise the import and 
export of goods.89 The syahbandar had exclusive control over the import and export 
trade in the port. In addition, he collected the taxes that had to be paid by all traders who 
landed and gave upeti (tribute paid by subjects) to the puri every year.
The development of Kuta accelerated after Mads Lange was appointed by the raja 
of Badung as harbour-master (syahbandar) in 1839.90 The export of slaves91 and 
merchandise through Kuta was conducted by Lange with all of the trading activity
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88Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Bali Pada..., op. cit., p. 79. For a complete discussion of 
Badung-based trade in the 19th century, see: Alfons van der Kraan, "Trade, Rajas and Bandars in South 
Bali", in John Butcher and Howard Dick (eds.). The Rise and The Fall of Revenue Farming: Business 
Elites and The Emergence of The Modern State in Southeast Asia. (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1993) and for a detailed discussion of George King, see: Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Bali Pada .... ibid., 
pp. 110-114. See also: Alfons van der Kraaan, Lombok: Conquest, Colonization and Underdevelopment 
1870-1940. (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd., 1980), pp. 212-213.
89The involvement of rajas in trade activities was the general trend in Southeast Asian states. 
Anthony Reid analyses in detail the involvement of the raja in the case of Aceh. See: Anthony Reid, 
"Trade and The Problem of The Royal Power in Aceh. Three Stages: c. 1550-1700", in Anthony Reid and 
Lance Castle (eds.). Pre-Colonial State System in Southeast Asia. (Kualalumpur: Council of The 
Malaysian Branch of The Royal Asiatic Society, 1975), pp. 48-51.
9^See: Henk Schulte Nordholt, “The Lange Connection: a Danish Trader op Bali in the Middle 
of the 19th Century: Broker and Buffer”, in Indonesia, 32, 1981, pp. 16-47.
91P.L. Bloemen Waanders states that the Balinese became slaves through not paying their debts, 
or by marrying slaves or through women being sold into slavery by their husband. P.L. Bloemen 
Waanders, "Aanteekeningen Omtrent de Zeden en Gebruiken der Balienezen, inzonderheid die van 
Boeleleng", TBG, 1859, pp. 105-279. See also: A. van der Kraan, "Bali: Slavery and Slave Trade", in 
Anthony Reid (ed.). Slave, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia. (New York: University of 
Queensland Press, 1983), p. 321. See also: Ann Kumar, Surapati: Man and Legend. A Study of Three 
Babad Traditions. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), p.366.
controlled by the local elites.92 His task was to intercede between the Dutch and the 
Balinese puri. In other words, he acted as an official middleman.
On 8 June 1844, the Dutch closed the NHM because the company had suffered 
big losses in its trading activities. This was done in spite of the fact that the company had 
earlier contributed greatly to furthering Dutch political interests in Bali. The NHM 
warehouse was bought by Mads Lange. After he took over as syahbandar, Kuta became a 
sort of melting pot for European traders in Badung.93 He played a major role in 
developing relations between the Dutch and the Balinese rajas and proved successful in 
ending hostilities between the Dutch and the Balinese rajas in 1849. From 10-15 July 
1849, Lange served as a mediator at the peace talks between the Dutch and the South 
Balinese rajas.94 This agreement clarified the issue of sovereignty, brought the slave- 
trade to an end, prohibited the Balinese from surrendering their land to other Europeans 
and obligated the Balinese to help the Dutch in the event of war.95 Out of appreciation for 
his efforts on behalf of the Balinese, the raja of Kasiman gave Mads Lange the title 
"punggawa besar" or great punggawa.
Therefore, it can be seen that the development of trade activities in Badung at that 
time was greatly influenced by both Mads Lange and the raja of Kasiman. In this context, 
Alfons van der Kraan states that from 1829 to 1863,96 "Kesiman was the sole Raja of 
Badung and the dominant-..."97 Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung looks at the significant role 
of the raja of Kasiman, Gusti Gde Ngurah Kasiman, particularly his relationship with the 
Dutch at the end of the Kusamha war in 1849. Raja Kasiman was succeeded by his son,
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92C. Lekkerkerker, "Ilet Voorspel...", op. cit., p. 203.
93For a discussion of the involvement of Bali in the international trading activities, see: 
J.N.F.M. a Campo, Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij: Stoomvaart en Staatsvorming in de 
Indonesische Archipel 1888-1914. (Hilversum: Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam/ Uitgeverij Verloren, 
1992), p. 179.
94Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Bali Pada..., op. cit., pp.351-353.
95A.K. Nielsen, Leven ..., op. cit. , pp. 175-176.
96Alfons van der Kraan is mistaken in saying that the raja of Kasiman died in 1863. See: Alfons 
van der Kraan, “Trade, Rajas...”, op. cit., p.l 12. C. Lekkerkerker, A.K. Nielsen and Schulte Nordholt 
note that the raja of Kasiman died in 1861. See : C. Lekkerkerker, "Voorlopig ...", op. cit., p. 207. A.K. 
Nielsen, Leven en Avonturen..., op. cit., p. 65. Henk Schulte Nordholt, "Macht, Mensen...", op. cit., p. 
78 and p. 105.
97Alfons van der Kraan, "Trade, Rajas...", loc. cit. Creese notes that "Nineteenth century Dutch 
sources that largely reflect Raja Kesiman's story have generally been considered to be representative of 
Bali as a whole. Badung’s success during this period as been taken as further evidence of the inability of 
most of Bali’s rulers to conduct their political affairs in a state-like manner", see: Helen Creese, "The 
Problem of The Precolonial Balinese State", Paper presented in a Panel on Autonomous States in 
Southeast Asia and Korea at 34lh International Congress for Asian and North African Studies (ICANAS), 
August 1993, pp. 21-22.
Gusti Gde Ngurah Kasiman who proved to be a weak and ineffectual ruler and was 
therefore soon replaced by Cokorda Made Ngurah, raja of Denpasar who became raja of 
Badung. Gusti Gde Ngurah Kasiman was relegated to the position of Adipati Agung of 
Badung. In puri Pamacutan, princess Anak Agung Ratu Adi became raja and ruled with 
the assistance of her husband, Anak Agung Gde Oka, from puri Kanginan-Pamacutan.98
In 1863, the raja of Badung Cokorda Made Ngurah died and he was succeeded by 
his son, Cokorda Gde Ngurah Pamacutan who was acknowledged as raja by the Dutch 
on 7 September 1 8 64 ."  Cokorda Gde Ngurah Pamacutan ruled not only in puri 
Denpasar, but also in puri Pamacutan as there was no longer an independent ruler in puri 
Pamacutan. After the death of the raja of Kasiman, Gusti Gde Ngurah Kasiman, the raja 
of Denpasar, Cokorda Gde Ngurah Pamacutan appointed Anak Agung Ngurah Ketut 
from puri Satria to become raja of puri Kasiman with the title Anak Agung Ngurah Ketut 
Kasiman. He was succeeded by Anak Agung Ngurah Mayun who also assisted Cokorda 
Gde Ngurah Pamacutan in puri Denpasar.
In puri Pamacutan, Cokorda Gde Ngurah Pamacutan appointed his nephew, Anak 
Agung Gde Oka as a ruler in puri Pamacutan with the title, Cokorda Agung 
Pamacutan.100 In 1890, the raja of puri Denpasar, Cokorda Gde Ngurah Pamacutan died. 
He was succeeded by his son, Gusti Gde Ngurah Denpasar (Cokorda Alit Ngurah 
Pamacutan).101 A Dutch account reports that the Dutch acknowledged the status of Gusti 
Gde Ngurah Denpasar in the puri of Denpasar and the status of Gusti Ngurah Pamacutan 
in the puri of Pamacutan as joint rulers (Cokorda Kalih) of Badung on 12 February 
1891.102 In the same year (1891), war broke out between Badung and Mengwi.103 The 
raja of Klungkung, Dewa Agung supported the rajas of Denpasar, Pamacutan and
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98Anak Agung Putu Murya (et al.). "Sejarah Puri Pemecutan-Badung". Unpublished Paper. 
(Denpasar, 1992), p. 85. Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", op. cit., p. 114. This puri was called the 
puri Kanginan-Pamacutan, due to its location to the east of the main puri of Pamacutan, which was 
destroyed by the Dutch during the puputan.
"Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", ibid., p. 115.
100//?/r/., p. 117. After Cokorda Agung Pamacutan and Gusti Gde Ngurah Denpasar were killed 
by the Dutch when in the puputan. They were known as "Cokorda Mantuk ring rana", which means the 
rajas who were killed in the war.
l0 lIbid., p.126.
102See: Regeeringsalmanak voor Nederlandsch Indie, II, (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1900/ 1910).
103IIenk Schulte Nordholt, Een Balische..., op.cit. , p .l81.
Tabanan, who together defeated the raja of Mengwi.104 In 1898, the raja of Mengwi 
unsuccessfully attacked the puri of Badung.
The raja of Denpasar, Gusti Gde Ngurah Denpasar (Cokorda Alit Ngurah 
Pamacutan), died in 1902.105 Because his son was still young, Gusti Gde Ngurah 
Denpasar was succeeded by his brother Cokorda Ngurah Made Agung, who was also 
known as Gusti Gde Ngurah Denpasar.106 At that time, Cokorda Ngurah Made Agung’s 
power remained strong as did his relationship with the raja of Tabanan.107 This can be 
seen from his attendance of the cremation ceremony of the dead raja and the mesatia 
ceremony for two relatives on 25 October 1903. Mesatia is a ceremony which takes place 
upon the death of a raja. His wife and servant throw themselves into a fire to prove their 
loyalty to the deceased sovereign. They conducted this satia without being forced by the 
raja's family, but through this satia they wanted to show their loyalty to the dead raja by 
burning themselves together with the corpse of the dead raja.108 The presence of Cokorda 
Ngurah Made Agung in Tabanan was to encourage the decision of the raja Tabanan to 
conduct the satia ceremony. Cokorda Ngurah Made Agung believed that this ceremony 
did not violate the agreement between the Dutch and the South Balinese rajas which had 
been signed in 1849. By contrast, the Dutch considered satia to be barbaric and inhuman. 
But, at that time, the Dutch were unsuccessful in prohibiting the satia  ceremony. 
Consequently, after that ceremony, the Dutch ordered the raja of Tabanan to abolish the 
practice. This agreement was signed by the raja of Tabanan and the Resident of Bali and 
Lombok, J.Eschbach, on 20 January 1904.109
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C. The Dutch Seize Power in Balinese Puris in Badung
Until the beginning of the 20th century (before the puputan), the Dutch were 
unable to implement fully their political policy in Bali because of the strong influence of
104Adrian Vickers, Bali A Paradise Created. (Berkeley: Periplus Editions, Inc., 1989), p.75. 
105Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", op. cit., p.157.
106Ibid., p. 155.
107 As will be seen later, the Denpasar - Tabanan alliance was an important factor in the Balinese 
effort to stem the growth of Dutch power in Bali.
I08por a detailed picture, see: Alfons van der Kraan, "Human Sacrifice ...", op. cit., p. 117. 
109Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Bali Pada..., op. cit., p. 504.
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rajas who still exercised their power particularly in South Bali. The Dutch considered this 
situation unacceptable in terms of the goals of Pax-Neerlandica. Therefore, the Dutch 
planned to change this political system, by abolishing all of the Balinese kingdoms110 and 
putting their rajas under the power of the Dutch policy. This was a period of great change 
in Denpasar.
On 1 October 1904, Queen Wilhelmina appointed Johannes Benedictus van Heutz 
as Governor-General in the Netherlands Indies,* 111 an appointment intended to facilitate 
the establishment of the Pax-Neerlandica. The Dutch had already seen their chance to 
extend their control to Bali on 27 May 1904. A small ship, the Sri Komala, belonging to 
Kwee Tek Tjiang of Banjarmasin, went aground on the beach in Sanur and was 
plundered by the local Balinese. After the incident the owner of this ship went to the 
Resident of Bali and Lombok in Singaraja, J. Eschbach, and accused the people of Sanur 
of seizing his ship.112 J. Eschbach ordered the raja of Denpasar, Cokorda Ngurah Made 
Agung to pay 3000 ringgit (7.500 gulden) in compensation.113 The raja of Denpasar, 
however refused to pay anything at all.
As a result, the Dutch, under H.J.E.F. Schwartz, conducted an economic 
blockade of the Badung region. But it was not fully successful, because the raja of 
Tabanan encouraged Badung to oppose the Dutch and channeled goods to Badung from 
other ports. The raja's support had historical and political reasons. The ruling families 
were related and, as Korn notes, the rajas had a mutual defense agreement and also 
supported each other in the mesatia.114
Thus, while the Dutch prepared their troops to be sent to Bali in order to attack the 
Badung and Tabanan kingdoms, the Badung and Tabanan rulers were readying their own 
people to defend their kingdoms from Dutch attack.
The resolution of the Governor General regarding the military expedition to Bali 
was determined on 4 September 1906. Dutch troops arrived in Sanur on 12 September 
1906 under the leadership of Major General M.B. Rost van Tonningen and F.A.
"°Ibid., p. 507.
111 Ibid., p. 153.
112H. Craandijk, "Bali en Imperialism", LG., I, 1906, p. 836.
113See: I Gusti Bagus Saputra, "Perang Patriotik Puputan Badung". Unpublished Paper, p. 2.
114 See: V.E. Korn, Balische Overeenkomsten. ( ‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1922), pp. 
94-98. See: p. 24 and p. 25 above.
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Liefrinck.115 On 16 September 1906 the Dutch attacked puri Denpasar and puri 
Pamacutan from their ships off the Sanur coast. The raja of Badung, Cokorda Ngurah 
Made Agung recognised the Dutch attack as the consequence of his policy of refusing 
Dutch demands.
On 19 September 1906, the raja of Badung ordered a cremation ceremony for the 
dead raja, Cokorda Alit Ngurah Pamacutan (I Gusti Alit Ngurah's father), who had died 
in 1902. At the same time, in direct defiance of Dutch policy there was also a satia 
ceremony conducted by a Brahmin woman. Ida Ayu Supi threw herself onto the fire 
engulfing the coipse of the dead raja. Cokorda Ngurah Made Agung took the ashes of the 
dead raja and put them on his destar (head cloth) which he would wear on the succeeding 
day, for the puputand16 In this way, it was believed that his struggle and the struggle of 
the people of Badung would be given the blessing of the dead raja. Meanwhile, the Dutch 
had begun their attack on Badung and had surrounded the village of Sanur.
The raja of Badung, Cokorda Ngurah Made Agung was very sad about the 
victims of the Dutch attack. The raja himself decided to conduct a puputan on the 
following day. The aim of the puputan was to defend the truth and the raja of Badung 
asked the puri families and his people if they would freely take part in the puputan. The 
puri families and their followers agreed and strongly supported the raja's decision to 
conduct a puputan.117
The concept of puputan has both political and religious meanings. Politically, it 
means that defeat is not followed by surrender, but must be followed by the spirit of war 
to the death. In a religious context, it means that if people are killed in battle, they will 
enter paradise. As Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung recounts, before going into the war, the 
people of Badung were sprinkled with holy water or tirtha pengentas so, if they were 
killed, their souls would enter "Wisnu Loka" (Heaven).118
The puputan occured in Taensiat, north of puri Denpasar at 11 a.m. on 20 
September 1906. The people of Badung defending the area, led by Gusti Gde Ngurah
115Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Bali Pada..., op. cit., p. 600.
l l6 Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", op. cit., p. 169.
1X1 Ibid.
118See: I Ketut Ardhana, "Kerajaan Badung Dalam Konteks Kolonial Belanda 1827-1906". 
(Denpasar: Universitas Udayana, 1991), p. 50.
Denpasar, were defeated by the Dutch Eleventh battalion. The death of the raja of 
Denpasar, Cokorda Ngurah Made Agung meant the fall of the puri of Denpasar and the 
people of puri Denpasar then withdrew to puri Pamacutan, where they once again met 
with and were defeated by the Dutch. After the fall of puri Pamacutan there was a mesatia 
ceremony.
Like Gusti Gde Ngurah Denpasar, before going out to face the Dutch Gusti 
Ngurah Pamacutan commanded that all buildings of the puri be burnt. Raja Gusti Ngurah 
Pamacutan then met with the punggawas and the families of puri Pamacutan. There was 
a different form of resistance in puri Pamacutan than in puri Denpasar. The Dutch 
defeated the people of the puri of Denpasar very easily, because they remained in a big 
group so that the the Dutch army could concentrate their fire on this single group. In puri 
Pamacutan however, the people ofBadung divided into small groups. As in puri 
Denpasar,119 the defenders included women and children. The raja's group consisted of 
many people. They continued to advance directly into the Dutch gun fire. The raja of 
Pamacutan, Gusti Ngurah Pamacutan was killed in the attack. Tessel Pollman who quotes 
from W.O.J.N. Nieuwenkamp, 'Leven en Werken' described the scene at the time as 
follows:
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The conquering of the south is a bloody affair, and its pinnacle is the 
puputan by the raja of Badung. In this ritual of large-scale murder and 
suicide, the raja and hundreds of relatives, all dressed in white, kill each 
other and themselves before the eyes of the colonial soldiers. Amazed and 
shocked, the soldiers see the corpses falling upon each other or the victims 
exposing their bodies to the colonial army for the final, killing bullet. 
Afterwards, when the large heap of corpses is cleared away and the palace 
of the raja is burning, the soldiers loot the treasures.120
As they saw it, the rajas died in order to defend the truth. The rajas and their 
people solved their problem in their way, honourably, in a puputan.
D. The Fate o f Descendants Puri Denpasar and Pamacutan
The fall of Badung in 1906 and Klungkung in 1908 signalled great changes in 
Bali. Other influential Balinese puris such as Karangasem and Gianyar had been under
1 lf^ I Gusti Bagus Saputra, "Sejarah dan Pcrjuangan Ida Cokorde Pemecutan Bersama Rakyatnya 
Menentang Kolonialisme Belanda”. Unpublished Paper, pp. 52-53.
120Tessel Pollman, "Margaret Mead's Balinese: The Fitting Symbols of the American Dream", 
in Indonesia, No.49 (April 1990), (New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program), p.4.
28
Dutch rule for some time, Buleleng since 1848, Karangasem since 1896, and Gianyar 
since 1900.121 From that time on, the Dutch began to introduce a western administrative 
system in all parts of Bali. In order to operate this system the Dutch began on the one 
hand to recruit the traditional Balinese elites and on the other hand to reinstate the 
descendants of the former Balinese rulers. They intended to apply the same policy to 
South Bali.
In puri Denpasar, I Gusti Alit Ngurah, the 10 year old heir of puri Denpasar who 
had survived the puputan became a military internee. His father, Cokorda Alit Ngurah 
Pamacutan had died in 1902 and was cremated by his Satria family on 19 September 
1906,122 one day before the Badung puputan in Denpasar. His mother was Anak Agung 
Ayu Ketut Ngurah who came from puri Serongga, Gianyar. I Gusti Alit Ngurah himself 
was born in puri Denpasar on 31 December 1896. After his father’s death in 1902, the 
Badung kingdom was ruled by his uncle, Cokorda Ngurah Made Agung. Therefore, I 
Gusti Alit Ngurah was taken care of by his mother and his uncle, Gusti Gde Ngurah 
Denpasar (Cokorda Ngurah Made Agung).
Before the puputan, the raja of Denpasar, Gusti Gde Ngurah Denpasar suggested 
that the puri noblemen evacuate I Gusti Alit Ngurah, his mother and some servants from 
the puri. As the raja was uncertain about the situation at the time and he was worried 
about who would continue his lineage in the event of a puputan, I Gusti Alit Ngurah was 
evacuated towards the western part of Badung (Krobokan), and then to Seminyak, (Kuta) 
with his mother, Anak Agung Biang Ngurah, two of his step-brothers, Anak Agung 
Made Ngurah and his wife and Anak Agung Sagung Made and his mother, and also their 
servants (I Made Tombong from geria Serongga, I Made Rai Gobleg, I Nyamblah, I Nal, 
I Nedeng and his wife). In Seminyak, they lived in a house whose owner still had family 
relationship with the former puri in Denpasar.122
While the puputan virtually wiped out the leadership of Badung, in each of the 
two main puris (Denpasar, Pamacutan) a legitimate heir survived. Although only children
121Itle Anak Agung Gde Agung, Bali Pada..., op.cit., p.670.
122Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...”, op. cit., p. 168.
12 I^ Gusti Ngurah Rai Mirsha (et al.), Cokorda Alit Ngurah: Dari Pembuangan di Lombok 
Sampai Revolusi Fisik di Bali (1907-1950). (Denpasar: Pusat Dokumentasi Kebudayaan Bali, 1989), p. 
23.
at the time of the puputan, they grew up to become the focus of Balinese political thought 
and aspirations during the 1920s and 1930s and on into independence.
Another survivor of the puputan was Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan who later 
became the leader of puri Pamacutan. He could claim descent from Pamacutan (see: 
Figure B). Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan became a key figure from puri Pamacutan 
who competed against the equally key figure of puri Denpasar. After 1930, this puri was 
called puri Satria, and I Gusti Alit Ngurah was given the title "Cokorda Alit Ngurah".
Just before the puputan, the leader of puri Kasiman, Anak Agung Ngurah Mayun 
Putera was killed and puri Kasiman was without a leader. His wife, Jero Subi was 
pregnant and after surviving the puputan she gave birth to a son, Anak Agung Ngurah 
Made Kasiman, who later became a notable leader of puri Kasiman.
After the puputan, I Gusti Alit Ngurah was ordered by the Dutch to return from 
his refuge. By that time puri Denpasar had been destroyed by the Dutch using cannon 
from Sanur.124 The remaining buildings of puri Denpasar were used by the Dutch as 
government headquarters and a military camp. When I Gusti Alit Ngurah and his mother 
returned, they stayed in puri Belaluan - Kanginan to await the decision of the Dutch as to 
their fate. Three months later, I Gusti Alit Ngurah and his family were exiled to 
Lombok.125
The collapse of the puris left the way open for the Dutch to move in and take 
complete control of Badung and implement their policy of Pax-Neerlandica. The Dutch 
success in maintaining their control can be attributed to the lack of effective opposition 
leadership prior to the Japanese occupation during the second world war as will be 
discussed in Chapters IV and V.
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^Subsequently, puri Denpasar ceased to exist both as a physical structure and as a political 
entity. In the 1930s the heir to puri Denpasar, I Gusti Alit Ngurah, built the new puri of Satria in its 
place.
125Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", Chapter VI, op.cit., p.2.
III. PU R I UNDER THE DUTCH C O LO N IA L BUREAUCRACY
This chapter will analyse the Balinese puris in Badung after the puputan in the 
early part of the twentieth century. The fall of puris Denpasar, Kasiman and Pamacutan in 
1906, marked the beginning of great changes in Badung. The Dutch began to introduce 
European education which led to a change in the Balinese perception concerning the 
concept of status which had formerly been based on the caste system, that is on ascribed 
status. By then the caste system played a crucial role in determining social status in Bali. 
However, after the arrival of the Dutch, status was also determined by their achieved 
status which the Dutch education system conferred on them. The importance of this 
"double" status can be seen in the example of I Gusti Alit Ngurah. The heir of puri 
Denpasar was educated in Lombok in a Dutch school and became a Dutch official within 
the context of the Dutch bureaucratic system. As a native Balinese educated by the Dutch, 
I Gusti Alit Ngurah and people like him became intermediaries between the Dutch and the 
traditional Balinese.
The Dutch conquered puri Denpasar in 1906 and puri Klungkung in 1908. Both 
of these puputans represent dramatic and heroic events. 126 Both rajas in Badung, 
Cokorda Denpasar and Cokorda Pamacutan, were killed in the puputan127 and their puris 
were destroyed by the Dutch. The Dutch cleared the remaining buildings of puri Denpasar 
and built a new western-style building in which the Dutch officials lived. Other buildings 
which had been located in front of puri Denpasar were levelled to the ground and the 
Dutch made this area a square. The former noblemen, who previously had lived there
126For a detailed account of Puputan Klungkung, see: Margaret Joyce Wiener, "Visible and 
Invisible Realms: The Royal House of Klungkung and the Dutch Conquest of Bali", Ph.D. Unpublished 
Thesis. (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1990), pp. 435-438. Anthony Reid argues: "The puputan 
was sanctioned by tradition as the honourable end for the defeated ksatriya. In this case, it also marked 
with dramatic suddenness the end of traditionally-inspired resistance to western domination". See: 
Anthony Reid, Heaven's Will and Man's Fault: The Rise o f the West as a Southeast Asian Dilemma. 
(Bedfork Park/ South Australia: School of Social Sciences, The Flinders University of South Australia, 
1975), p. 15. However, it seems to me that the continued resistance of the Balinese people, focussed on 
the puris and in effect led by the “children of the puputan” represented an alternative means of traditionally 
- inspired resistance.
127The formal reports note that there were somewhere between 400 and 7000 people killed in 
that puputan. H.H. van Kol, Driemaal Dwars door Sumatra en Zw erfochten door Bali. (Rotterdam, 
1924), p. 402.
were moved outside this area. Where puri Pamacutan once stood, the Dutch built an army 
barracks. 128
The physical destruction of the puris in the early 20th century was not 
synonymous with their political demise for as long as a legitimate heir survived, there 
existed the possibility for the puri to re-emerge from the ashes of its destruction. The 
heirs and their born-again puris served as the focus of Balinese political aspirations at 
least until independence.
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A. Post - Puputan Badung: The Reform o f The Governmental System
After the fall of Badung, the Dutch established a new governmental system in 
South Bali based on the system they had already established in Buleleng, North Bali in 
1882. The two regions were united under a governor known as the Resident of Bali and 
Lombok who governed from Singaraja. Before the Dutch established this residency, Bali 
had been included in the Residency of Besuki, Java.
In legal matters, the Resident was assisted by the indigenous court or landraad. 
This body was made up of experts in legal matters and dealt with all civil cases between 
the Dutch on the one hand and Balinese, Chinese, and Arabs on the other. Under the 
position of Resident was the Assistant Resident. The Residency of Bali and Lombok was 
divided into three districts: North Bali, South Bali and Lombok. North Bali district was 
ruled directly by the Resident. 129 The South Bali district was governed by an Assistant 
Resident based in D enpasar,^^  while the district of Lombok was controlled by an 
Assistant Resident based in M ataram.l^l North Bali district consisted of the subdistricts 
of Buleleng and Jembrana and the South Bali district consisted of six subdistricts that 
corresponded to the former kingdoms of Tabanan, Badung, Gianyar, Bangli, Klungkung
l^ I d a  Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan Babad Badung" Unpublished Paper. Chapter VI, 
(Denpasar, 1983), p. 5.
129ILJ.E. Moll, "Memorie van Overgave van den Aftredend Resident van Bali en Lombok". 
(1941), p. 51. See also: H. Beeuwkes, "Memorie van Overgave van den Resident van Bali en Lombok". 
(October 1932), p. 40.
130V.E. Korn, "Memorie van Overgave van den Onderafdeeling Badoeng, (Gouvernement Groote 
Oost, Bali en Lombok, Zuid Bali, Badoeng)", (Mei 1921), p. 74.
131In Lombok, under an Assistant Resident there were also some controllers (controleurs) after 
this island was seized by the Dutch in 1894. See: "Behoort bij missive van den Resident van Bali en 
Lombok dd. 20 November 1905, No. 4490/ 27".
and Karangasem. The task of the Assistant Resident was to implement the policy of the 
Resident.
There was no raja in Badung, South Bali, after the puputan . Badung was 
governed directly by the Dutch from Denpasar through the Assistant Resident, H.J.E.F. 
Schwartz. The position of the Assistant Resident was the highest position of the Dutch 
bureaucratic system in South Bali. Under the Assistant Resident was a controller or 
controleur, who was a European regional-level civil servant. 132 The controller was a 
representative of the Dutch at the subdistrict level and assisted with the tasks of the 
Assistant Resident. J. de Haan was the first Controller in Badung (Denpasar) after 1907 
and S.K. Wieling was a Assistant Controller (Aspirant-Controleur).^3 At this time, the 
Dutch had not yet appointed a Regent in Badung. In fact a regent was not appointed until 
23 years after the puputan. (see: chapter II). Therefore, as there was no Regent, the Dutch 
appointed 14 punggawas and 1 sedahan agung, who served under the Controller. 134 The 
punggawa was the administrative head of district. The sedahan agung was the head of the 
irrigation associations (Subak). The punggawas were all members of the rajas' families. 
Their respective administrative districts were as follows:
Gusti Alit Raka Poegoer, Punggawa of Denpasar 
Gusti Alit Raka Medang, Punggawa of Pamacutan 
Gusti Alit Raka, Punggawa of Kasiman 
Gusti Alit Raka Woengoe, Punggawa of Kuta 
Gusti Alit Raka Gendjot, Punggawa of Pedungan 
Gusti Made Groepoeg, Punggawa of Panjer 
Ida Bagus Ngurah, Punggawa of Sanur
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132See: Regeeringsalmanak, 1907. C.C. Krom, "Gouvernement Groote Oost, Bali en Lombok, 
Badoeng". (April 1914), p. 26. See also: "Zelfbestuur op Bali", in De Indische Gids, II. (Aflevering VII- 
XII). (Amsterdam: J.H. De Bussy, 1922), p. 173.
133It would seem that, Ida Bagus Sidemen is mistaken when he says, that S.K. Wieling was the 
first Controller in Badung. See: Ida Bagus Sidemen (et al.). Sejarah Badung 1779-1906. (Badung: 
Kabupaten Daerah Tingkat II Badung, 1992), p. 206. According to Regeeringsalmanak voor Nederlandsche 
Indie. J. de Haan was the first Controller (Controleur) in Badung and S.K. Wieling was the Controller 
candidate (Adspirant-Controleur). S.K. Wieling succeeded J. de Haan as controller of Badung in 1909. See: 
Regeeringsalmanak voor Nederlandsch Indie, II. ( Batavia: Landsdrukkerij 1900-1910). Cf. I Made 
Sudjana, "Birokrasi Tradisional dan Kolonial di Bali dan Lombok Pada Masa Hindia Belanda: 1900-1910. 
(Pejabat, Jabatan Serta Tempat Kedudukannya)". (Jakarta, 18 Mei 1988), p. 21. A second error occurs, 
when he says that the Dutch appointed a Regent in Badung, 13 years after the puputan. This is not true. 
The Dutch appointed a Regent in Badung, 23 years after the puputan, in 1929. See: "Besluit Gouverneur 
General Nederlandsch Indie, ddo. 8 Juli 1929, No. 23".
134 On 2 November 1907.
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Gusti Gede Balu, Punggawa of Peguyangan 
Gusti Rai Catring, Punggawa of Gadji 
Dewa Gede Kale, Punggawa of Kapal 
Gusti Made Oka, Punggawa of Mengwi 
Gusti Nyoman Tjono, Punggawa of Sibang 
Gusti Gde Agung, Punggawa of Abiansemal 
Gusti Putu Mayun, Punggawa of Blahkiuh.
Gusti Ngurah Made Togog, Sedahan Agung.
Under the position of punggaw a  was the perbekel. The p erbekels  were 
administrative officials above the village headmen. From Agung's account^^ we can get 
a clear picture of how the Dutch reappointed those who were serving as perbekels before 
the puputan  to be perbekels in the colonial period. The Dutch also appointed police 
assistants (mantri politie) for four districts. Denpasar consisted of the districts of 
Denpasar, Pamacutan and Sanur. Benoa consisted of the districts of Panjer and Kuta. 
Kapal consisted of the districts of Mengwi and Gaji and Carangsari consisted of the 
district of Blahkiuh and sub-district of Carangsari. 136
Thus as can be seen, the Dutch policy of making use of traditional ruling classes 
in Bali and throughout the Netherlands Indies ensured a certain political continuity or at 
least preserved the illusion of political continuity. In Bali, this practice further ensured 
that although the future raja was in exile, the Balinese political system continued to 
function more or less as it had prior to the puputan thereby providing a structure the raja 
could take control of upon his return from exile.
B. The Reform o f The Educational System And Its Influence on The Growth o f Balinese 
Nationalism
The Dutch not only reformed the structure of the Balinese government, but also 
began to establish schools. The aim of this policy was to encourage the development of 
the colonial bureaucratic system. Within one year of the puputan, the Dutch had already
135Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", op. cit., p. 4.
136C.C. Krom, "Gouvernement Groote...", op.cit.,p. 29.
established schools for indigenous people such as those in Bubunan (Singaraja), Gianyar 
and Denpasar. There was some question as to how an educational system could be 
implemented in Bali. At that time, there was a difficulty in getting teachers who had to be 
brought from Java. According to Stenis, the Resident of Bali and Lombok, the opening 
of schools was welcomed by the Balinese. 137 putra Agung is still doubtful about Stems' 
report. 138 He explains that when the schools first opened in Bali, it was difficult to get 
students. The elders did not want their children to go to school, and the children were 
afraid to go to school. The Dutch, however, strongly encouraged attendance. Cokorda 
Ngurah Agung notes as follows:
It should be noted that at that time, there were few people who wished to 
go to school. Parents had still not grasped the significance of going to 
school, and preferred to see their children working in the fields and 
developing their hobby of cock-fighting. 139
In addition, there were a number of triwangsa (noblemen), who refused to have their 
children educated in schools, due to the fear that there would be an infraction or violation 
of dresta, that is the Balinese code of etiquette (social intercourse) followed by all classes. 
An important aspect of the dresta code is the concept of susud, namely the demotion in 
one’s class status through an infraction of the code. Putra Agung notes that the triwangsa 
class believed that the Dutch school system was too free. Its structure did not accomodate 
the rules and regulations governing class relations which were an integral part of the 
dresta code. As an example of the rules governing behaviour, Putra Agung refers to the 
use of language based on rank which made social interaction rather complicated.
Putra Agung also gives another example using the simple children's game of leap­
frog. This game could easily lead to an infraction of the dresta. For instance if a sudra 
jumped over a Brahmana or Ksatria, the Brahmana or Ksatria would become susud, that 
is their caste status would be demoted to that of sudra.140
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137L.U. van Stenis, "Mcmorie van Overgave van het gewest Bali en Lombok". (April, 1919), 
pp. 117-118. See also: V.E. Korn, "Mcmorie...", op. cit., p. 41.
l38Agung’s view is based on an interviewee's account. See: Anak Agung Gde Putra Agung, 
"Dampak Pendidikan Terhadap Perubahan Sosial di Bali”. Unpublished Thesis. (Yogyakarta: Universitas 
Gadjah Mada, 1983), p. 50.
139Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", Chapter VI., op. cit., p. 13. 
l40Putra Agung refers to the law which orders the moralistic relationship between triwangsa and 
sudra or jaba, titled, Agama: Balische Wet boek. (1909), pp. 610-62. See: Anak Agung Gde Putra Agung, 
"Dampak Pendidikan..." op. cit. , pp. 51-55.
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The Dutch gave the jaba the chance for an education in the hope of one day being 
able to use them to implement their policies. This system gave the jaba the opportunity to 
improve their status. 141 At the same time, the Dutch also established Chinese schools 
such as Tionghoa Hwee K w an^2 an(j teacher training courses (Normaal-cursus) in Bali 
for those who would later be appointed as teachers in the Second Class Native School 
{Tweede Klasse Inlandsche Scholen).
Until 1913, the Dutch government continued to make every effort to get more 
students from the triwangsa caste. The Dutch understood that the position of the 
triwangsa caste was very dominant in Balinese social and religious life and therefore the 
common people respected them. In addition, the social ties between the triwangsa and the 
common people were very strong. Thus, the Dutch believed that it was very important to 
recruit the triwangsa into the colonial government in order to rule the common people 
more effectively. Only in this way could the Dutch succeed in implanting their influence 
in Balinese society. Balinese not only from the jaba but also from the triwangsa began to 
acknowledge the significance of the Dutch educational system. The rise of the jaba  to 
positions of power within the Dutch government, motivated the triwangsa caste to seek 
their education in Dutch schools. In addition, the Dutch language was considered very 
important as a tool for the Balinese to assimilate Dutch ideas, not only from a 
governmental point of view, but also in terms of social and cultural interests.
In 1913, the Dutch established the Tweede Inlandsche School and the Holländisch 
Inlandsche School (HIS) or Dutch Native School. The Dutch began to establish stringent 
criteria for student admissions, particularly in the HIS. The triwangsa class was given 
the highest priority 143 which made it more difficult for the jaba  to pursue an education. 
Although they still had the opportunity for an education, several criteria had to be met for 
example the jaba  was required to provide a statement of acknowledgment from a
14lAnak Agung Gde Putra Agung, "Lahimya Ide-ide Pembaharuan Dalam Organisasi Sosial di 
Bali", Basis. (Yogyakarta: Maret, 1972), pp. 184-185.
142G.T. de Bruijn Kops, "Nota van Overgave van het Bestuur over de Residentie Bali en 
Lombok", (1909), pp. 16-17.
143At that time, the Dutch paid a lot of attention to the caste system. In calculating the number 
of people in Badung the Dutch divided them according to their caste. Brahmana: 3. 64 %, Ksatria: 7. 72 
%, Wesya: 12. 36 % and the Jaba: 76.28 %. See: H.D. van Meyenveldt, "Gouvernement Groote Oost, 
Bali en Lombok, Zuid Bali, Badocng. Memorie van Overgave van de Onderafdeling Badoeng" (December, 
1926), p. 6. Cf. J.P. Verheul, "Gouvernement Groote Oost, Bali en Lombok, Zuid Bali Badung, 
Memorie van Overgave van de Onderafdeling Badoeng", (Mei 1923), p.19.
triwangsa saying that the jaba would be able pay their school fees. 1^4 By contrast, the 
triwangsa were exempt from any such criteria. Therefore, it seems that the triwangsa got 
more benefits than the jaba  from the Dutch educational system. As a result, the Dutch 
encouraged the triwangsa as their aspirations were in line with Dutch interests. This 
situation gave the triwangsa an opportunity to recover some of their pre-colonial power. 
The big challenge for the Balinese triwangsa therefore was to persuade the common 
people for the sake of stability not to oppose Dutch policy. The triwangsa perceived they 
could achieve their intended goals more safely if a stable situation could be created and 
maintained.
Putra Agung argues that the aim of education for the Balinese was to provide 
teachers among the Balinese themselves, and to provide human resources for the 
indigenous Balinese bureaucracy as well as the local Dutch bureaucracy. This process 
produced a new group in Balinese society, called the modern Balinese elite. 145 jn 
addition, he emphasizes that for political reasons, fearing influence from the outside on 
the emergence of the national consciousness, the Dutch wanted to prevent the migration 
of Javanese teachers to Bali to fill administrative posts.
Therefore, the Dutch began to increase the number of schools in Bali. This can be 
seen from L.J.J. Caron’s accountl46 as follows:
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The number of schools in Bali between 1926 - 1929
144I.G.K. Ranoeh, "Kemana Anakkoe Koesekolahkan?", in Djatajoe, No.7, II (Singaradja, 25 
February, 1938), pp.242-247. For a detailed information regarding the demotion of caste in Bali, see: Gde 
Panetje, Aneka Catatan Tentang HukumAdat Bali. (Denpasar: Guna Agung, 1989), pp.15-18.
145Anak Agung Gde Putra Agung, "Lahimya Idee-...", op.cit., pp.183-189.
146ELS: Europeesche Lagere School (European Primary School), HIS: Hollandsch Inlandsche 
School (Dutch Native School), Tweede Klasse Scholen: Second Class Native School and Volks Scholen: 
People’s (Vernacular) School. F= Female and M= Male. See: L.J.J. Caron, "Memorie van Overgave van 
den Resident van Bali en Lombok", (Augustus, 1929), pp. 94-97.
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School Sub-District Schools at 
1 October 
1926
Schools 
at 1 June 
1929
Teachers
1926
Students
1926
M F
Teachers
1929
Students
1929
M F
E .L .S . Buleleng 1 1 2 23 16 2 31 14
H .I.S . Buleleng 1 1 7 127 15 7 174 25
Badung 1 1 7 201 24 9 158 36
Klungkung _ 1 _ _ . 3 100 9
Tweede Buleleng 8 8 28 758 28 31 1265 109
Klasse Jembrana 2 2 9 243 15 9 337 37
School Badung 3 5 12 355 29 17 727 122
Tabanan 5 6 20 577 40 21 839 106
Gianyar 2 3 9 326 16 11 402 44
Klungkung 3 3 13 419 20 14 526 92
Karang-
Asem
2 2 7 213 11 7 299 27
Volks Buleleng 15 16 24 1029 41 33 1479 67
Scholen Badung 20 22 36 1365 74 42 1854 252
Tabanan 20 22 38 1732 70 47 1995 235
Gianyar 9 12 14 718 26 24 941 132
Klungkung 6 23 11 522 24 39 1743 195
The significant growth in the number of students and teachers between 1926 and 
1929 can be attributed both to the success of the Dutch in building more schools and 
providing school leavers with jobs and to the greater acceptance by the people of Bali of 
the Dutch educational system. By increasing the number of schools in Bali, the Dutch 
believed that there would be many Balinese who could be recruited into the Dutch 
bureaucratic system. After the children of the Balinese ruling class finished primary 
school in Bali, the Dutch permitted them to continue their education in Java. In 1927, the
number of Balinese who were continuing their education beyond primary school in
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Java147 was as follows:
The number of Balinese who were continuing their education beyond 
primary school.
Schools
MULO
AMS
Kweekschool
Ambachtschool
NIAS
OS VIA in Java 
Hogere Kweek School 
OSVIA in Makasar, Celebes
Number of Students 
36 
1
9 
8 
4 
4 
1
10
The descendants of the former rulers in Bali were very interested in the Dutch schools. As 
we shall see later, in Chapter IV, the raja of puri Satria, I Gusti Alit Ngurah also had his 
sons educated in the best Dutch schools in Java.
The Dutch policy to introduce the education system to the Balinese led to the 
process which marked a period of great change in Bali. The Dutch reforms in education 
had stimulated the emergence of new Indonesian initiatives as factors in the development 
of new ideas of status and modernisation. This process can be seen at the spread of the 
nationalist ideas to Bali which were introduced by the Javanese.
These efforts led directly to the emergence of ideas of Indonesian nationalism in 
Bali, which had not previously existed. In addition, various organisations were 
established, not just social organisations, but also political organisations, which became a
l 47Anak Agung Gde Putra Agung, “Dampak Pendidikan...”, op. cit., p. 34.
means of channelling efforts and spirits towards the struggle for the rights of the common 
people. 14&
By 1920, the Balinese pemudas had begun to recognise the importance of 
contacting the Javanese pemudas in order to develop a national consciousness in Bali. 
The nationalist organisation Budi Utomo was established in Denpasar and Putu Kaler 
became its leader in 1920.149 The main activity of this organisation was to stamp out 
illiteracy by means of special, 'ABC' courses. In addition, this organisation also provided 
reading and writing courses and gave information about how to develop the national 
consciousness. 150
There were also several neo-traditional Balinese schools, for example, 'Setiti Bali' 
which was founded in 1917 and 'Suita Gama Tirtha' founded in 1921.151 Suita Gama 
Tirta was founded by I Gusti Putu Jelantik who was a member of Raad van Kerta in 
Singaraja. The aim of this organisation was to purify the Hindu religion and also to 
reform traditional Balinese customs.
In Denpasar, I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan, Nyoman Pegeg, Ketut Cetog, 
Ngatman, Sudiman and Popila established the Ganesha Study Club. The aim of this 
organisation was to conduct discussions regarding the ideas expressed by Sukarno and 
Hatta in their books and pamphlets. These discussion groups were usually held every 
Saturday. 152 The Dutch prohibited this organisation because it encouraged the 
development of a national consciousness and eventually it was forced to disband.
In 1930, the Balinese pemudas introduced a national education system, called 
Taman Siswa or Garden of Pupils, founded by Ki Hadjar Dewantoro.153 it was 
organised in Bali by I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan I Ketut Cetog, I Nyoman Pegeg, Dr. 
Murdjani and Sudiman. In 1933,1 Nyoman Pegeg succeeded in establishing the Taman
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148See: Njoman Wirjasutha, "Verslag dari Lezing tentang: Penjakitnja Perkoempoelan di Bali", 
Djatajoe, Nomor: 6, 25 Januari, III. (Soerabaia: Modem Cannalan, 1939), pp. 175-177.
149Ida Bagus Rama, "Struktur Organisasi Perjuangan Dalam Revolusi Fisik di Bali 1945-1950". 
Unpublished Thesis. (Denpasar: Fakultas Sastra Universitas Udayana, 1981), p. 80.
150"Gempilan Sejarah: Mereka Merintis Kemerdekaan di Bali", Edisi HUT Propinsi Dati I Bali, 
Warta Perda, Nomor: 29. (Denpasar: Biro Humas Sekwilda Tingkat I Bali, 1992), p. 6.
15lNjoman Wirjasuta, "Verslag....", loc.cit.
152I Nyoman Juana, "Peranan Organisasi Taman Siswa Dalam Pergerakan Nasional di Bali 
1933-1943". Unpublished Thesis. ( Denpasar: Fakultas Sastra Universitas Udayana, 1987), p. 52.
^ B en ed ict R. O' Gorman Anderson, Java in A Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 
1944-1946. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 470.
Siswa school as a branch of Majelis Luhur Taman Siswa in Yogyakarta. The Taman 
Siswa organisation was operated by I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan, Ketut Cetog, I 
Nyoman Pegeg, Sudiman and Popila. At that time, the office of this organisation was 
located in a house behind the Bali Hotel in Denpasar. The school was opened with 6 
students, one from Sumatra, one from Java and four students from Bali.
At Taman Antara, the middle school level of Taman Siswa, they studied Dutch 
language for one to two years. Their teachers, Ki Kotot Sukardi, Ki Ridwan, Ki 
Suryokusumo and Ki Puspito, all came from Java and it seems that nationalist ideas were 
spread through these teachers. After this organisation was accepted by the people of 
Badung, it spread to other areas of Bali. A branch of Taman Siswa organised by Dr. 
Murdjani, Gusti Ngurah Sindu and Gusti Ngurah Putu Mataram, was established in 
Jembrana in 1936. Other branches were established in Karangasem in 1939 and in 
Tejakula, Singaraja in 1940. Until 1941, the Taman Siswa schools (primary and high 
schools) were also supplemented by the Taman Indria (infant school) and the Taman 
Dewasa, which enroled students at post-high school level.
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C. The Heir o f Puri Denpasar in Exile
Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung notes, that three months after the puputan, I Gusti 
Alit Ngurah and his family were exiled to Lombok. The Dutch obviously wanted the 
legitimate heir of Cokorda Alit Ngurah Pamacutan as far removed from the centre of his 
potential influence and support as possible, and in Lombok at that time a national 
consciousness had not yet emerged as it had in Java after the establishment of Budi 
Utomo in 1908.
His exile began on 7 January 1907. A small boat took him and his family to a 
Dutch ship, which carried them to Ampenan, Lombok. I Gusti Alit Ngurah was 
accompanied by his mother, Anak Agung Biang Ngurah, two of his step-brothers, Anak 
Agung Made Ngurah and Anak Agung Sagung Made. Anak Agung Made Ngurah's wife 
and Anak Agung Sagung Made's mother also accompanied them. In addition, there were 
a number of servants (panjaks) including: I Made Tombong from geria Serongga, I Made
Rai Gobleg, I Nyamblah, I Nal, I Nedeng and his wife. 1^4 Ouwerling, the Controller of 
Badung only noted the names of three people who were exiled to Lombok namely Gusti 
Alit Ngurah himself, Gusti Alit Karta and Sajoe Made Gemblong who were the children 
of the former raja of Badung, Gusti Agung Alit Ngurah. 155
They arrived in Ampenan later that same day. They were welcomed by the Gusti 
Patih, I Gusti Putu Geria, and they went to the capital city of the Lombok kingdom in 
Taman Mayura, Cakranegara.
Lombok had been under Dutch rule since 1894 and the Dutch had already set up a 
western education system. Although I Gusti Alit Ngurah was a military internee, the 
Dutch allowed him to get his education in a Dutch school, in the hope that he would 
assimilate with Dutch ways and forget what happened in the puputan. He completed 
primary school (sekolah rakyat) in class III in the second class of government school in 
Mataram, Lombok in September 1909.
As a war internee from 1907 to 1916,1 Gusti Alit Ngurah was paid f.25/ month 
by the Dutch which was insufficient to support him and his family. His cousin, Anak 
Agung Gde Meregeg, travelled from Denpasar to Lombok to bring extra financial 
support. Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung argues that the Dutch wanted to exile I Gusti Alit 
Ngurah to isolate him from the source of his power - Badung. 156 This was due to the 
Dutch view that I Gusti Alit Ngurah was a potentially dangerous figure head who should 
not be returned to Denpasar. 157 jn addition, the Dutch believed that in Balinese 
perception I Gusti Alit Ngurah had sakti (supernatural power) which could be used to 
lead the resistance. Therefore, the Dutch deliberately kept him poor so he was unable to 
support a large household much less support a large number of followers.
When I Gusti Alit Ngurah was fifteen years old and still in exile he was married to 
his cousin, Anak Agung Sagung Oka. She and her mother, Ni Gusti Made Rapeg, came 
from Jro Abiantimbul, Intaran Sanur.158 From this marriage I Gusti Alit Ngurah had two
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155See: "Behoort bij missive van den Resident van Bali en Lombok dd. 2 Maart 1911 No.32. 
Geheim No. 4" (Denpasar, 27 February 1911).
l^ Id a  Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", op. cit., p. 2.
157"Behoort bij missive v a n ......", loc. cit.
158Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", op. cit., p. 8.
daughters, Anak Agung Ratu Mas, born in 1911, and Anak Agung Ratu Manik, born in 
1913.
Prior to 1915, the Dutch wanted to transfer all of the political internees from Bali 
who were in South Maluku (Banda) and Lombok, including I Gusti Alit Ngurah, to 
Parigi. However, the people of Badung, including many influential members of the puri 
demanded that I Gusti Alit Ngurah be returned to Bali. The Governor-General had I Gusti 
Alit Ngurah released in October 1917159 and he was finally allowed to return to Bali. He 
and his family left Ampenan, Lombok for Benoa, Bali on 15 October 1916 accompanied 
by Ida Ketut Kelingan.
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D. Cokorda Alit Ngurah: Raja o f Badung
After I Gusti Alit Ngurah returned to Denpasar he stayed in puri Belaluan- 
Kanginan, because puri Denpasar had been destroyed. 160 The people of Badung still 
considered him an influential figure, because he was the heir of the former raja of Badung 
- the source of his hereditary claim to the Badung throne. The Dutch were anxious to 
recruit the heir of the former raja. He had powerful resources as a member of the 
traditional elite and as he had been educated in Dutch schools it was expected that he 
would work within the Dutch bureaucratic system. Therefore, I Gusti Alit Ngurah like 
many other triwangsa, had a double status. This led to a gradual change in the concept of 
status for the Balinese themselves from that of an ascribed status based on heredity to that 
of an achieved status, which was the result of a formal (Dutch) education.
The Dutch believed that I Gusti Alit Ngurah due to his strong influence on 
Badung society, would be able to bind the interests of the people of Badung with those of 
the Dutch. By the time I Gusti Alit Ngurah returned to Bali in 1917, the Dutch had had 
eleven years to consolidate their control over the area. However, realising Ngurah's 
potential danger as figure head around whom anti-Dutch forces might rally, the Dutch
159See: "Extract uit het Register der Besluiter van den Gouvemeur-Generaal van Nederlandsche- 
Indie, den 8 stand September 1916, No. 38".
160Cokorda Ngurah Agung notes that I Gusti Alit Ngurah stayed there until 1933, when he 
moved to puri Satria. See: Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", Chapter VI, op. cit., p. 10. See: 
map: C.
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moved quickly to present this. As it was imperative that I Gusti Alit Ngurah be kept under 
firm control, he was offered a menial job in the colonial administration. Although I Gusti 
Alit Ngurah still considered it impossible to cooperate with the Dutch because of the tragic 
events of the puputan, the bad economic situation required that he provide funds to 
support his family and to finance Balinese Hindu ceremonies. The economic position of 
the puri at that time had changed dramatically from the pre-puputan period. After the 
defeat of the puri, the Dutch had seized all of the puri's lands. Thus, the puri had lost its 
traditional source of revenue.
Although he was aware of the poor condition under which the people of Badung 
lived, I Gusti Alit Ngurah was not in a strong position to organise the rakyat because he 
was unable to exercise any political and economic autonomy. Between 1907 and 1917 
only a few people of Badung had been employed by the Dutch. Most major officials were 
recruited from Buleleng. The people hoped I Gusti Alit Ngurah would be able to protect 
their interests with respect to the Dutch. Moreover, the Dutch occupied the puri where he 
and his family lived.
In this way, the Dutch were able to control I Gusti Alit Ngurah and his people's 
loyalty. In this way, they hoped to manipulate the people of Badung through their own 
raja.
Due to his inexperience and the fact that the Dutch did not completely trust him, I 
Gusti Alit Ngurah was appointed to the relatively low position of head of public works 
CBouw Werkplaats) in 1918; his task was to organise transportation matters. Two years 
later, on 4 November 1920,161 he was appointed a clerk in the Assistant Resident's 
office in Singaraja. His task was to record the results of the cases which were conducted 
in the court and his salary was f.20.162 He held this position from 1920 to 1924. In 
recognition of I Gusti Alit Ngurah’s ability, he was later appointed police assistant 
(mantri politie)163 0f South Bali by the Resident of Bali and Lombok on 24 February
161Number: 972. See: Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", Chapter VI, op. cit., p. 10.
162"Diensttijd dari Tjokorda Alit Ngoerah Zelfbestuurder van het Landschap van Badoeng 
Gouvernement ddo. 3 Mei 1940". See also: "Besluit Residen Bali dan Lombok ddo. 4 Nopember 1920, 
Nomor: 972".(The collection of puri Satria Denpasar).
l63Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", Chapter VI, op. cit., p. 11. Michael William 
notes that the position of police assistant (mantri politie) was established in the 20th century in Java. 
See: Charles William, Communism, Religion, and Revolt in Banten. (Ohio: Ohio University Center for 
International Studies, 1990), p.64.
1925.164 From 1925 to 1926 his salary was f.50.165 As police assistant his job was to 
guard the prisoners and to look for any internees who escaped from the prison in Batang, 
Klungkung.166 At this time he built his purl in Carangsari and he established a friendship 
with the manca of Carangsari, I Gusti Ngurah Pacung and his son, I Gusti Ngurah Rai, 
who was to become a key figure of the pemudas, particularly in the period of revolution
in Badung. 167
On 7 September 1926, I Gusti Alit Ngurah was appointed Sedahan Agung (the 
head of all irrigation associations or Subak) in Badung and he returned to puri Belaluan - 
Kanginan. As Sedahan Agung, he organised agricultural affairs and was responsible for 
the collection of taxes from the people of Badung. These taxes were first collected by 
villagers who then turned them over to the heads of the irrigation-association or subak 
(pekaseh ) or kelihan subak, who then submitted these taxes to the Sedahan Agung. The 
Sedahan Agung then turned them over to the head of the tax office. If the harvest failed, 
the Dutch also provided tax relief. 168 Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung mentions that aside 
from being Sedahan Agung, Cokorda Alit Ngurah was also a member of Raad Kerta and 
the chief of the land revenue office (Landrente) in Badung. 169 jn Denpasar, the Raad van 
Kerta was appointed by the Controller and consisted of three members including one 
Brahmana priest and two jabas (kaula). The function of the Raad van Kerta was to 
discuss the rights of the Balinese. 170
Eleven years later, after having proven himself a capable and trustworthy 
administrator, I Gusti Alit Ngurah was finally appointed Regent (bestuurder) of the 
district of Badung in the lower levels of the Dutch bureaucracy on 8 July 1929.171 The
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16‘7In Kasiman, Anak Agung Ngurah Made Kasiman was appointed by the Dutch as Punggawa 
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also: Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", Chapter VI, op. cit., p. 12.
170See: C.C. Krom, "Gouvernement Groote...", op. cit., pp. 29-30.
171 He was appointed by the Governor General of the Dutch East Indies on 8 July 1929. See: 
"Besluit Gouverneur General Ncderlandsch Indie, ddo. 8 Juli 1929, No. 23". Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, 
"Lintasan...", Chapter VI, loc. cit.
ceremony installing I Gusti Alit Ngurah as Regent was conducted in pura Desa and a 
further ceremony was conducted in pura Pedarman Agung in pura Satria.172 I Gusti Alit 
Ngurah took the following oath before Dutch officials:
I swear that I am truly devoted to His Majesty, the Dutch king, who is my 
ultimate superior king, and I ask others to witness that I surrender my will 
to the command of His Excellency the Governor General in the 
Netherlands Indies who represents the Dutch king. 173
Rai Mirsha argues that by taking this oath of fealty, I Gusti Alit Ngurah himself 
acknowledged and recognized that his position was inferior to that of a colonial Dutch 
official. However, his inherited status as raja, with its attendant political, social, cultural 
and religious duties, responsibilities and obligations made him, in the eyes of the 
Balinese, a much more significant presence. It is not surprising that the Dutch at last made 
an effort to take advantage of Alit Ngurah’s status. His appointment as Regent placed him 
directly below the Dutch Assistant Resident. In that same year, I Gusti Alit Ngurah 
received the title, "Cokorda" and became Cokorda Alit Ngurah. 174
Once I Gusti Alit Ngurah was appointed Regent, it was not difficult for him to 
organise the people of Badung, because the social ties between the puri and the common 
people were still strong. The people of Badung still adhered to traditional ways in rituals 
and ceremonies, and the majority of them still lived in an agricultural society.
On 3 October 1929, Cokorda Alit Ngurah received the Order of 5 Stars and Order 
of the White Elephant from the king of Siam, Prajadhipok, when the king celebrated the 
fifth year of his reign. He also accepted a kris from the Prince of Solo, when the prince 
visited Bali. 175 Thus, we can see how Cokorda Alit Ngurah received recognition from 
foreign rulers in appreciation of his traditional status. As a result of his enhanced prestige 
Cokorda Alit Ngurah soon felt the need to have his own puri. Therefore, in 1930 he built
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Gusti Ngurah Rai Mirsha (et al.). Cokorda Alit Ngurah: Dari Pembuangan di Lombok Sampai Revolusi 
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his puri (puri Satria) close to pura Satria about 1 km to the north of the former puri of
Denpasar.176
In order to encourage cooperation among the Regents in Bali, the Assistant 
Resident of Bali established the Council of Regents (Regentbond) in Kerta Gosa, 
Klungkung on 7 March 1931.177 The aim of this body was to standardise government 
regulations in all parts of Bali, as Balinese customary law was still in effect in each 
district. The meeting was attended by all Regents, Controllers and the Assistant Resident. 
By forming this organisation, the Dutch tightened their control over the government 
throughout the country. Within the Council of Regents, the Balinese rajas discussed the 
implementation of Dutch policy, the application of the educational system and also the 
renovation of the largest temple in Bali, the great temple in Besakih, Sad KahyanganX8
Cokorda Alit Ngurah, although a Dutch official, worried about the fate of his 
people. When taking decisions as Regent, he had to consult the Dutch government, so 
that final decisions taken usually did not necessary reflect the interests of the people of 
Badung.
As Regent of Badung, Cokorda Alit Ngurah supported numerous self-help 
organisations for example the Taman Siswa. The Taman Siswa educational system was a 
blend of Dutch and indigenous educational systems that stressed national consciousness. 
Therefore, the Dutch repressed this organisation. To show his disapproval of Dutch 
repression of Taman Siswa, Cokorda Alit Ngurah stopped going regularly to his office, 
so that the Dutch officials began to pick him up and take him to work. It seems that 
Cokorda Alit Ngurah had also begun to oppose openly colonial Dutch policy.
After the Dutch began to suppress the Taman Siswa, Cokorda Alit Ngurah 
supported the establishment of other such organisations. However, due to Dutch 
repression, recruiting people for these social organisations was very difficult. Another
176See : map: C.
177 At that time, the Regent of Buleleng called that organisation Nata Saisnoe, while the Regent 
of Gianyar called it Wasita Praboe. These names were difficult to understand for the common people 
because they were in the Kawi language. The Regent of Karangasem then suggested that Kerta Negara be 
used as the name of the organisation and everyone agreed. Kerta Negara means "the prosperous state". 
See: I Nyoman Sukiada, "Kerajaan Karangasem Di Bawah Kekuasaan Belanda 1908-1942". Unpublished 
Thesis. (Yogyakarta: Universitas Gajah Mada, 1984), p. 114. H. Beeuwkes mentioned this organisation 
as a union of the local rulers, "de vereeniging van Bestuurders". H. Beeuwkes, "Memorie van Overgave 
van den Resident van Bali en Lombok", (October 1932), p. 61.
178I Nyoman Sukiada, "Kerajaan Karangasem...", loc. cit.
difficulty was that people tended to ignore these new organisations. This can be seen from 
Agung’s account:
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Generally in Bali the people did not know about politics. Radio and 
newspaper were still strange at that time. The relationship between Java 
and Bali was at the first stage, so that the Balinese were still backward 
compared with their friends in Java. The movement organisations were 
not well - known by the people. There were only the associations 
organised by the teachers. Those associations acted only in the realm of 
education and published the monthly magazine called 'Bali Dharma 
Laksana'. The first congress was held in puri Denpasar, in 1936. That 
was the first step towards progress for the people in Bali. 179
From Agung's account we see that I Gusti Alit Ngurah encouraged those 
organisations by providing places or funds for their operation. For instance, Cokorda Alit 
Ngurah allowed his puri in puri Satria to be used for the Second Bali Dharma Laksana 
Congress. 180 Cokorda Alit Ngurah was invited by the Committees of Bali Dharma 
Laksana to give a speech on how to raise the consciousness of the people in order to 
liberate them from the Dutch. In addition, he also provided his puri in Peguyangan^l for 
social and educational activities. By allowing puri Satria to be used as a centre of social 
and cultural activities, Cokorda Alit Ngurah secretly supported the nationalist movement 
not only in this period, but also in the period of revolution in Badung. (See: Chapter V). 
This differs from the usual interpretation. As we see from Hanna's account:
The Republican leaders in Jakarta resented the fact that the Balinese had 
not very actively participated in the violent phases of the revolutionary 
struggle but had collaborated with the Dutch and had greatly benefited
thereby.
In 1938, in response to agitation for autonomy, 183 the Dutch introduced a new 
government system called, zelfbestuur (self-government). With the implementation of this
179Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", Chapter VI., op. cit., p.21.
l80I Made Kodhana, " Notulen Conggres B.D.L. Jang Kedoea", Djatajoe, No.2, 25 September, 
III. ( Soerabaia: Modem Cannalaan, 1938), pp. 104-106.
1 8 l I Made Kodhana, "Oleh-oleh Secretaris Hoofdbestuur pada Perdjalanan Ke 
Pegoejangan(Dcnpasar)", in Djatajoe, No. 3-4, 25 November, III (Soerabaia: Modem Cannalaan, 1938), 
p. 58.
182see: Willard A. Hanna, Bali Profile: People, Events, Circumstances 1001-1976. (New York: 
American Universities Field Staff, 1976), p. 110. I would argue however that this proposition is not 
completely true as will be shown in the following pages. Furthermore, I will show that not all Balinese 
rulers cooperated with the Dutch. In Badung, for example efforts against the Dutch were led by puri Satria.
18?This was an obvious attempt by the Dutch to defuse a potentially explosive political 
situation. The Volksraad led by Sutardjo Kartohadikusumo had sent a petition in October 1936 to the
system, it seems that in Bali and throughout the Netherlands Indies there were now two 
government systems. The government of the Dutch officials and the Balinese traditional 
bureaucratic system controlled by the Dutch. The aim of the zelfbestuur system in Bali 
was to organise the governmental administrative system around the rajas. To that end, the 
Dutch appointed all of the former Regents as autonomous rulers or Zelfbestuurder. On 30 
June 1938, all of these Regents took an oath in the great temple of Besakih and also 
signed a short declaration of obedience to the Netherlands Indies government. 184 
According to a Dutch account, the statement read as follows:
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First, that the district of Badung is a part of the Netherlands Indies and 
therefore exists under the authority of the Netherlands, that I have therefore 
always been the loyal subject of Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands 
and The Governor General from whom I accept the Regency of the district of 
Badung.
Second, that I will not contact any foreigners. The enemies of the Dutch are 
also my enemies, the friends of the Dutch are also my friends.
Thirdly, I will fulfil and defend all of the regulations of Badung on behalf of 
the Queen of the Netherlands Indies and the Governor General of the 
Netherlands Indies. 185
As of 1 July 1938,1^6 Bali was divided into eight districts (paralleling the former 
kingdoms) consisting of Buleleng, Jembrana, Tabanan, Badung, Gianyar, Bangli, 
Klungkung and Karangasem. A zelfbestuur der (autonomous ruler) responsible to the 
Resident was appointed for each district. The appointment system was still based on the 
traditional hereditary system and the traditional titles for each ruler were still used, namely 
the zelfbestuur der of Bangli, Gianyar and Jembrana, were called Anak Agung, the 
zelfbestuurder of Klungkung, was called Dewa Agung, the zelfbestuur der of Karangasem 
was called Anak Agung Agung, and the zelfbestuurder of Badung and Tabanan were 
called Cokorda.187 The eight zelfbestuur der s were Cokorda Alit Ngurah in Badung, 
Anak Agung Ngurah in Bangli, Anak Agung Putu Jelantik in Buleleng, Anak Agung 
Agung Anglurah Ketut Karangasem in Karangasem, Anak Agung Ngurah Agung in
Queen. It was a moderate request for eventual self-government for Indonesia within the Dutch 
commonwealth. See: Bernhard Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century. (London: Pall Mall 
Press, 1971), p. 72.
184Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", op.cit., p.20.
185See: "Overeenkomsten met de Zelfbestuur Bali/ Lombok, No: A-2903".
186According to "Staatsblad No. 165 and 281, 1938".
187I Gusti Ngurah Rai Mirsha, Cokorda..., op.cit.,p.36.
Gianyar, Anak Agung Bagus Negara in Jembrana, Dewa Agung Oka Geg in Klungkung 
and I Gusti Ngurah Wayan in Tabanan.
Cokorda Alit Ngurah was also known as Cokorda Negara Badung, or 
Zelfbestuurder van Landschap Badung A88 His new status had little relevance as far as 
the people of Badung were concerned. However, it did mean that he had attained a 
measure of trust in the eyes of the Dutch.
Although the Dutch gave each district the authority to organise its own 
administration, this did not mean that the bestuurder (the raja) could make policy. 
Ultimate authority was still held by the Resident. The zelfbestuurders could not really 
solve their problems, particularly those of an economic nature. Under this system, the 
people believed that they were controlled not only by the Dutch government but also by 
the traditional rulers. On the one hand the people of Badung had to pay taxes to the raja 
and on the other hand, they had to deliver agricultural produce to Dutch officials.
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E. I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan: Punggawa o f Denpasar
In 1934, the Dutch appointed I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan from puri 
Pamacutan as punggawa to assist Cokorda Alit Ngurah as raja. 189 He was the first 
political appointee since the puputan. Just as the Dutch used I Gusti Alit Ngurah in puri 
Satria, the Dutch also made use of the leader of puri Pamacutan to recruit the people from 
both puris to serve Dutch interests. In the 1930s, I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan began 
to play a major role in establishing social organisations. As the leader of puri Pamacutan, 
he tried to organise the people of Badung and raise their national consciousness. He tried 
to awaken a spirit of rebellion in them to oppose Dutch colonial policy. This was made 
possible because I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan had great influence not only over his
188Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", loc.cit.
189Anak Agung Raka Candri notes that I Gusti Ngurah Gede Pamacutan’s had very little formal 
education, because he did not pass the Sekolah Rakjat. This prevented I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan 
from later becoming the head of BKR (Badan Keamanan Rakyat) in Badung. See: Chapter IV. Interview 
with Anak Agung Raka Candri on 18 February 1993.1 Gusti Ngurah Gede Pamacutan became Punggawa 
in Denpasar from 1934 to 1945. Interview with Anak Agung Putu Murya on 15 January 1993. See also: 
"Mesuci Ngadegang Pengelingsir Pesemetonan Warga Puri Agung Pemecutan". (Denpasar: Panitia Karya 
Abiseka Pengelingsir Puri Agung Pemecutan, 1989), p. 5. In Kasiman I Gusti Ngurah Made Kasiman 
served as Punggawa of Kasiman from 1927 to 1954. Interview with Anak Agung Bagus Ariman on 27 
December 1992. The Dutch account noted that only puri Denpasar and puri Pamacutan Kanginan retained 
their former significance. See: "Opgave van de voomaamste Grija's, Poeri’s en Djro’s op Bali", p.2.
large and ubiquitous family but also over the people of Badung in general. He worked to 
forge strong ties among the various gerias (the palaces of the Brahmana caste): geria Beji, 
geria Gede (Tegal), geria Pemedilan, geria Padangsumbu, geria Sari and geria Karang 
(Tampakgangsul) in order to increase the power and influence of Pamacutan which had 
been substantially weakened by the puputan of 1906. Therefore, it can be said that I Gusti 
Ngurah Gde Pamacutan wanted to reestablish the traditional ties with the gerias, to 
strengthen the social and political relationship between the puri and the gerias. He also 
sought to improve relations with other ethnic groups such as the Bugis in Suwung and 
Serangan and the Muslims of Kepaon.190 in short, perhaps in contrast to Cokorda Alit 
Ngurah, I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan worked very hard to enhance his power.
In addition, I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan was also involved in the renovation 
of a temple, the pura of Dalem Penambangan Badung. This pura represented a strong tie 
between the puri and the common people. Together with its many local family temples 
(pelinggih paibon)}^  1 it served as a social and political centre as well as religious centre. 
Due to intcrcaste marriage, a special relationship had developed between the ruling family 
of Pamacutan and the rakya t.^  2 More and more families were drawn, through marriage, 
into the extended family of the puri and thus became its strongest supporters. In fact, the 
Dutch saw the relationship between the ruling elite and the common people as political 
and therefore dangerous rather than social or religious. As the Resident of Bali and 
Lombok noted:
The temple of Tambahan Badung is a temple, which is the charge of the 
Goesti family of Pamacutan and looked at from this point of view, I am of 
the opinion that the order given by the youthful I Gusti Ngurah Gde to the 
administration of the temple Tambahan Badung, may be regarded as an 
expression of Balinese nationalism, perhaps also of anti-Dutch feeling.193
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190Anak Agung Putu Murya (et al.), "Sejarah...", op. cit., p. 98.
191The pura of Dalem Penambangan Badung consists of 17 family temples (pura ibu) including: 
Ibu Agung, Ibu Candi, Ibu Bongan, Ibu Meranggi, Ibu Jembrana, Ibu Tameng, Ibu Rurung, Ibu Pupuan, 
Ibu Mekel Bukit, Ibu Relating, Ibu Peranigata, Ibu Tinggi and Ibu Sari. See: Anak Agung Putu Murya 
(et al.). "Sejarah...", op. cit., p. 55. All of them were called Ibu, because all they all paid homage to the 
families' matriarchal ancestors. Pura Ibu means “mother temple”, see: Fredrik Barth, Balinese Worlds. 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1993), p.35. 
l92Ibid., p. 57.
193 This report from the Resident of Bali and Lombok, G.A.W.Ch. de Haze Winkelman to the 
General Governor in Buitenzorg on June 29, 1934. See: "Ministerie van Kolonien. Per. Rep. 1914", p.3. 
Pura Tambahan Badung is now known as pura Penambangan Badung.
The social and religious functions of the pura centred on genealogical searches 
and ritual ceremonies such as Mekiyis or Melis prior to Nyepi's Day, the Balinese 
Hindu New Year's Day.
Due to their significance in the lives of the Balinese, the puras became a means of 
influencing the population and hence politically significant to the puris which controlled 
them. The rulers of Satria always stressed the fact that the puras of Desa and Satria 
belonged to the people of Satria as opposed to the people of Badung and it was puri Satria 
which paid for the temple ceremonies. 194 Similarly, puri Pamacutan claimed pura Dalem 
Penambangan Badung as a symbol of their power. In this way the puras of Pamacutan 
and Satria served as a unifying force for the various rakyat.
From this description, we can clearly see that both puris used the pura as symbols 
of their status. 195 The Pamacutan family asserted that the importance of Pamacutan was 
greatly enhanced by the existence of such an important social and religious symbol within 
its boundaries. This provided both the puri and the people of Pamacutan with a sense of 
significance and perhaps even superiority over their less fortunate neighbours. Later, 
however, this status had political side effects which led to inter -puri rivalries as we shall 
see in Chapter V.
51
194Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", Chapter V, op. cit., p. 154.
195A detailed analysis concerning political power, symbols and rituals, see: Henk Schulte 
Nordholt, State, Village and Ritual in Bali: A Historical Perspective. (Amsterdam: V.U. University 
Press, 1991), pp. 3-6.
IV. PURI: WAR, OCCU PATIO N  AND IND EPEN D EN CE
This chapter discusses the situation of puris  in Badung leading up to and 
including the arrival of the Japanese. In this period the people of Badung faced major 
changes in their society. The Japanese changed Balinese political orientation from the 
Dutch to the Japanese. Whereas Bali as a Dutch colony was oriented first towards the 
Netherlands Indies and ultimately towards the Netherlands, the Japanese notion was to 
redirect this thinking towards a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere {Dai Tod). After 
the Japanese surrender and the Indonesian proclamation of independence, further changes 
took place including Balinese self rule. But this did not last long, because the Japanese 
did not immediately hand over their power to the Balinese. The Japanese were unwilling 
to give up their weapons to the Balinese and instead awaited the arrival of SEAC 
(Southeast Asia Command). However, the leaders of puri Satria, Pamacutan and 
Kasiman and the pemudas planned to attack the Japanese camps in Denpasar, if they did 
not surrender peacefully to the Balinese.
In this period, puri Satria, Pamacutan and Kasiman formed a united front to 
oppose the Japanese and, together with the Badung pemudas, to defend the existence of 
the Republican government in Bali. However, their efforts to get weapons by attacking 
the Japanese camps were not successful and as a result, the key political figure of puri 
Pamacutan, I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan, proposed a puputan. His proposal was 
rejected by the leaders of the Badung pemudas, I Gusti Ngurah Rai, I Gusti Ngurah 
Pindha, and the leader of puri Satria, Cokorda Bagus Sayoga. Outnumbered, Pamacutan 
agreed to delay the puputan, but he resented the pemuda refusal to cooperate and later 
turned against them: he collaborated with the Japanese and then the NIC A in opposition to 
the Republic government.
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A. The Key Figures o f Puri Satria Before the Arrival o f the Japanese
Until the Dutch were driven out of Bali by the Japanese army in 1942, Cokorda 
Alit Ngurah remained Zelfbestuurder of Badung.196 His relation to the Dutch during this 
period was rather ambivalent. The Dutch policy was to prevent the emergence of 
Indonesian nationalism in Bali. This policy was implemented by the Balinese leaders of 
puri Satria, Pamacutan, Kasiman and the modern educated Balinese. On the one hand 
Cokorda Alit Ngurah was a strong supporter of Indonesian nationalism in Bali. On the 
other hand in his official position as Zelfbestuurder , it was his duty to support and 
implement Dutch policy. The Dutch efforts enervated the Balinese spirit of nationalism 
which in turn disappointed Cokorda Alit Ngurah.
The Dutch were still unsure as to how they should handle Cokorda Alit Ngurah. 
Although Cokorda Alit Ngurah allowed his puri to be used as a pem uda  base of 
operations the Dutch were reluctant to use force to restrain him. If they were patient 
Cokorda Alit Ngurah might continue his efforts to awaken Balinese nationalism. By 
contrast, if the Dutch used force, they would face the opposition of the people of Badung 
who still had strong ties with their raja. In addition, the Dutch were confronted with an 
uncertain international situation. The Netherlands had already been defeated in Europe 
and now faced attack in Southeast Asia.197
The Dutch military forces and their KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger), 
were forced to rely heavily on the Prayoda (Balinese youth) which had originally been 
established as a national police force by the rajas and legitimised by the Dutch in 1936.198 
Heshusius notes:
19^I Gusti Ngurah Rai Mirsha, (et al.) Cokorda Alit Ngurah: Dari Pembuangan di Lombok 
Satnpai Revolusi Fisik di Bali (1907-1950). (Denpasar: Pusat Dokumentasi Kebudayaan Bali, 1989), p. 
39.
197Anthony Reid, The Indonesian National Revolution 1945-1950. (Victoria: Longmann 
Australia Pty. Ltd., 1974), p.34.
198Geoffrey Robinson who bases his statement on an interview is mistaken, when he says that 
the Prayoda was formed by the Dutch in 1938. See: Geoffrey Robinson, "State, Society and Political 
Conflict in Bali, 1945-1946", in Indonesia., No. 45. (Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1988), p. 20. The 
Prayoda in Bali was legitimised by the Dutch in 1936, but this organisation had already been formed by 
the Balinese rajas. (Interview with Cokorda Bagus Sayoga on 27 December 1992). Its name comes from 
parayuda which means the troops. See: Nyoman S. Pendit, Bali Berjuang. (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 
1979), p. 19. This can be seen in the following sources : C.A. Heshusius states that the Dutch formed 
the Prayoda in 1936. See: C.A. Heshusius, KNIL: Een Fotodocumentaire over het Dagelijks Leven van 
Koloniale Leger in Nederlands-Indie. (Leiden: De Haan/ Unieboek BV, 1986), p. 135. Second, R. 
Djajoesman's account states: In 1935,1 Gusti Ngurah Rai was accepted as a student in the Dutch Military 
School (Militaire Cadet School). Two years later, (1937), he finished his education in Gianyar-Bali as 
Lieutenant Prayoda. Thus, it is impossible that if the Prayoda was established in Bali in 1938. See: R.
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The Prayoda corps was the last one to be established on the island in 1936 
with similar goals and organisation as the older Madura corps. With the 
exception of the Balinese corps, all corps received a standard.199
The original aim of the Prayoda was to maintain peace and order on behalf of 
Balinese rajas. Branches were formed in Gianyar, Karangasem, Singaraja and 
Denpasar.200 It seems that the Prayoda became more popular after being established in 
those areas. In Badung, for example this organisation attracted the attention of the manca 
of Mengwi who allowed his son, I Gusti Ngurah Rai to enlist in the Prayoda in 1936.201 
As mentioned in the previous chapter,202 I Gusti Ngurah Rai was the son of I Gusti 
Ngurah Pacung who was manca in Mengwi when Cokorda Alit Ngurah was serving as 
police assistant {mantri politie) of South Bali in Denpasar. At this time, Cokorda Alit 
Ngurah was close friends with I Gusti Ngurah Pacung and his son, I Gusti Ngurah Rai. 
In 1937, I Gusti Ngurah Rai finished his education in Gianyar203 as Lieutenant II 
Prayoda, and then continued his education in the Dutch Military School or Corps 
Opleiding Voor Reserve Officieren in Magelang204 after which the Dutch assigned him as 
the chief of Prayoda in Sekeh, Tuban.205
Until the closing years of Dutch rule in Badung, Cokorda Alit Ngurah's attitude 
remained ambivalent. Cokorda Alit Ngurah believed that he would continue as raja as 
long as the Dutch ruled. Therefore, he also prepared his successor by educating his sons 
in the Dutch school so they would be better prepared to succeed him as a raja. After his 
eldest son, Cokorda Ngurah Agung,206 graduated from the HIS in Denpasar in 1935, he
Djajoesman, "Biografi I Goesti Ngoerah Rai", in Madjalah Sedjarah Milder Angkatan Darat, No. SA-7. 
(1960), p. 62.
199See: C.A. Heshusius, KNIL: Een Fotodocumentaire .... loc.cit. For more on the Corps of 
Madoera, see: P.G. Mantel, De Verdediging van Nederlandsch-Indie, No. 623. (Breda: De Koninklijke 
Militaire Academie, 1930), pp.88-89.
200I Ketut Sudiri Penyarikan, Pahlawan Nasional Kolonel Anumerta I Gusti Ngurah Rai, 
(Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Proyek Biografi Nasional, 1977), p.25.
2011 Gusti Ngurah Rai was bom on 30 January 1917. According to Babad Pacung, he was a 
descendant of Arya Sentong, one of Javanese aryas placed in Bali by Gajah Mada in 1343. See: Ida Bagus 
Rama, "Struktur Organisasi Perjuangan Revolusi Fisik di Bali 1945-1950". Unpublished Thesis 
(Denpasar: Fakultas Sastra Universitas Udayana, 1981), p.47. See also: R. Djajoesman, "Biografi...", 
loc. cit.
202See: Chapter III.
203R. Djajoesman," Biografi...", loc. cit.
204See: I Gusti Ngurah Pindha, Gempilan Perjuangan Phisik Pasukan lnduk Ngurah Rai. 
(Denpasar: PT Upada Sastra, 1990), p. 12.
205Interview with Cokorda Bagus Sayoga on 27 December 1992.
206Cokorda Alit Ngurah married with Anak Agung Sagung Oka in 1911. He had 3 children with 
her. Cokorda Ngurah Agung was bom in puri Belaluan-Kanginan, Denpasar in 1921. See: "Asal-Oesoel
was permitted to continue his education at the Extended Lower Instruction School or 
MULO (.Meer Uitgebreid Lagere Onderwijs) in Yogyakarta. In 1939, Cokorda Ngurah 
Agung finished his education there, and later returned to Bali. Another son, Cokorda 
Bagus Sayoga, after finishing his education at HIS Denpasar in 1939, continued at 
MULO, Surakarta from 1939 to 1940.
On his return to Bali, Cokorda Ngurah Agung was asked by his father to continue 
his education at the Secondary Training School for Native Officials or MOSVIA 
(Middelbare Opleidings School voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren) in Magelang, Central Java. 
MOSVIA was not a school for the common people, but rather a leading school which was 
established by the Dutch in order to educate the indigenous elites to become officials such 
as punggawas in the Dutch bureaucracy.207 Candidates had to be descendants of the 
ruling class and were expected to demonstrate their loyalty to the Dutch.208 Cokorda 
Ngurah Agung began to study in MOSVIA, Magelang in 1939 in preparation for his 
expected succession. In Magelang, he no doubt gained some first-hand knowledge of the 
Indonesian nationalist movement.
Meanwhile, Dutch apprehension regarding the uncertain political situation became 
a reality. Dutch defence policy in Bali and in all of the Netherlands Indies was severely 
hampered by lack of troops and weapons and by the lack of support on the part of their 
colonial subjects. Holland was under German occupation and therefore of no help. 
British forces were severely over stretched and the Americans had not yet entered the war 
in force. Thus, one by one, the islands of the Netherlands Indies fell to the Japanese. 
Jakarta was surrendered (without a fight) earlier than many other places. Dutch 
headquarters was in fact in Bandung, which surrendered on 8 March 1942. But in Timor, 
Sulawesi and elsewhere the fighting went on longer.209
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dari Tjokorde Ngoerah Agoeng dilahirkan di Denpasar Landschap Badoeng (Zuid Bali) pada tahun 1921". 
(The collection of puri Satria). His two daughters Anak Agung Ratu Mas and Anak Agung Ratu Manik, 
were bom in Lomtxik during Cokorda Alit Ngurah's exile there from 17 January 1907 to 1 October 1916. 
With Anak Agung Ayu Raka he had a son, Cokorda Bagus Sayoga and with Anak Agung Putu Adi he 
had yet another son, Anak Agung Gde Agung. See: I Ketut Ardhana, "Biografi Cokorda Ngurah Agung". 
(Denpasar: Universitas Udayana, 1989), p.9.
207See: Heather Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite. (Singapore: Heinemann 
Educational Books, 1980), p. 121.
208I Ketut Ardhana, "Biografi...", loc.cit.
209Anthony Reid, The Indonesian National..., op. cit., p. 10.
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With the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 the Japanese expanded their 
attacks. This situation forced the Dutch in the Netherlands Indies to conduct military 
training for all students in the Dutch schools, including the MOSVIA. As a result, full­
time military training replaced normal education. The Dutch made use of the MOSVIA 
students in a vain attempt to prevent the Japanese invasion of Java. This militia was 
divided into two parts: first, the security division, Hulp Politie (the Dutch militia) and 
second, the air protection division, called LBD or Lucht Bescherming Dienst.
In an interview,210 Cokorda Bagus Sayoga recalled that due to the threat of war, 
Cokorda Alit Ngurah was worried about his sons studying in Java. As a result, he 
recalled his sons, Cokorda Ngurah Agung and Cokorda Bagus Sayoga in 1941 although 
they had not finished their studies.
Cokorda Bagus Sayoga was allowed to return in 1941. However, the Dutch 
ordered Cokorda Ngurah Agung to remain in Java where he was soon conscripted into 
(Hulp Politie),211 In Denpasar, Cokorda Bagus Sayoga was given a job in the Dutch air­
force (LBD) from 1941-1942.1 Made Kara, another Badung pemuda and a supporter of 
puri Satria also worked there.212 While, Cokorda Bagus Sayoga was working for the 
LBD, he met Lieutenant I Gusti Ngurah Rai, chief of Prayoda in Sekeh, Tuban. Before 
the arrival of the Japanese, I Gusti Ngurah Rai often came to puri Satria to discuss the 
political situation with Cokorda Alit Ngurah and Cokorda Bagus Sayoga. I Gusti Ngurah 
Rai explained to the Balinese leaders that the chief of the Dutch troops in Bali and 
Lombok, J.B.Th. König himself was worried about the ability of the Dutch to withstand 
the Japanese army.213
Cokorda Bagus Sayoga recalled that at that time, Cokorda Alit Ngurah advised I 
Gusti Ngurah Rai not to resist the Japanese. The Prayodas were outnumbered and 
outclassed. Cokorda Alit Ngurah himself knew that it would be impossible for them to 
defeat the Japanese. Therefore, Cokorda Alit Ngurah suggested that I Gusti Ngurah Rai 
try to persuade J.B.Th. König to avoid resisting the Japanese.
210Interview with Cokorda Bagus Sayoga on 27 December 1992.
21 ^ ee: "Memoirs of Cokorda Ngurah Agung", Unpublished. (The collection of puri Satria), 
P-1-
212Interview with I Made Kara on 16 February 1992.
213Interview with Cokorda Bagus Sayoga on 27 December 1992. See also: Geoffrey Robinson, 
"State...", op. cit., p. 20.
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B. Puri Satria and Puri Pamacutan During The Japanese Occupation
The Japanese advance down the Malay peninsula to Singapore took place in 
December 1941. This meant that the way to the Netherlands Indies was open. On 14 
February 1942, a Japanese force appeared off Bali, and the Japanese army landed First at 
Sanur on 18 February 1942214 and several weeks later, occupied Java as well.215
Cokorda Bagus Sayoga recalled that on 17 February 1942, Cokorda Alit Ngurah 
ordered him to fetch the key to the Assistant Resident's office in Denpasar from Anak 
Agung Raka Peguh, the Assistant Resident's secretary. The aim was to show that the 
Badung people under the leadership of Cokorda Alit Ngurah welcomed the coming of the 
Japanese. Thus it was necessary to carry on as normal. He wanted to open his office in 
case the Japanese needed information regarding government matters. In addition, it seems 
that Cokorda Alit Ngurah wanted the Japanese army to allow him to continue in his 
position as nominal head of Badung. The Japanese faced little resistance. The Dutch had 
believed that SEAC would prevent the landing of the Japanese army. When they failed to 
do so and the Japanese invaded, the Dutch destroyed vital equipment such as power 
plants and telephone facilities, so that these resources could not be used by the Japanese 
military.
The chief of the Prayoda, I Gusti Ngurah Rai, immediately dispersed the 
members of the various Prayoda divisions and ordered their members either to return to 
their homes or to help establish guerilla forces in the mountains.216
Three months after the landing of the Japanese army, the situation in Bali changed 
when authority was switched from the Japanese army (Rikugun) to the Japanese navy 
CKaigun).217 At this time, the Japanese divided the region of Indonesia into two parts, 
Java and Sumatra were under the Japanese army, while Kalimantan and Eastern
214W.A. Hanna, Bali Profile: People, Events, Circumstances 1001-1976. (New York: American 
Universities Field Staff, 1976), p.107.
215J.C.N. van Heum, "The Battle of Bali", in Asiatic Review, Vol. 39 (April 1943), p.188.
216 See also, Geoffrey Robinson, "State...", loc. cit.
217I Gusti Ngurah Rai Mirsha (et al.). Cokorda Alit Ngurah..., op. cit., p. 46.
Indonesia were under the Japanese navy which was centred in Makasar. The Japanese 
administration which was soon set up emphasised that the aim of the Japanese was to free 
the Balinese from Dutch rule. The following three months were a time of disorder, as the 
Japanese began to organise their Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Their goal was 
to free the area from foreign European domination and establish Japanese hegemony.218 
Therefore, the Japanese ordered the people to continue working as before in order to 
create a peaceful and prosperous atmosphere. This led to some support of the Japanese on 
the part of the people of Badung.
Theodore Friend states that when the Japanese arrived in Netherlands East India 
in 1942, the Javanese and other Indonesians welcomed them as "liberators."219 The 
Zelfbestuurder of Badung, Cokorda Alit Ngurah also stated that he encouraged the 
coming of the Japanese as the "liberators", who would set the Balinese free from the 
colonial Dutch. There were several reasons why Cokorda Alit Ngurah supported the 
Japanese. First, he believed that it was impossible for the Dutch to defeat them and in 
order to save himself he switched allegiance. Second, he also believed Japanese promises 
to free the Balinese from the Dutch. Likewise, one of the youth organisations at that time 
in Badung, The Sublime Indonesia People's Youth Organisation or PPRIM (Persatuan 
Pemuda Rakyat Indonesia Midi a) which had been established in 1940, also encouraged 
the coming of the Japanese.220 The members of this organisation were primarily from 
puri Satria. The Satrian youth were strong supporters of the raja. As I Gusti Alit Ngurah 
supported the coming of the Japanese, the pemudas followed his lead.
With so few officials, the Japanese were forced to depend on the former 
Balinese rajas, noblemen and teachers in order to reestablish the former administrative
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218Suzuki Seihei, "Education in Bali 1943-1944", in Anthony Reid and Oki Akira (eds.). The 
Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942-1945. (Monograph in International Studies 
Southeast Asia Series No. 72). (Ohio: Ohio University, Center for International Studies, Center for 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), p. 159.
219See: Theodore Friend, The Blue-Eyed Enemy: Japan Against the West in Java and Luzon, 
1942-1945. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p.7. The majority of the Indonesian masses 
were influenced by pro-Japanese sentiments. See: Ken’ichi Goto, "Indonesia in The Greater East Asia Co- 
Prosperity Sphere", Paper presented to the International Conference, Stirrup, Sail & Plough: Continental 
and Maritime Influences on Japanese Identity on 20th September to 23rd September 1993 (The Australian 
National University), p. 1.
220Proyek Penelitian dan Pencatatan Kebudayaan Daerah, Sejarah Daerah Bali. (Jakarta: 
Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1978), p. 136.
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system. In other words, a system of indirect rule was used which made use of the 
rajas. The Japanese reorganised Bali in the following fashion:
1. Bali became Syu Sunda Minseibu, with its capital located in Singaraja.221 
The civilian government was headed by a Chookan or Governor. While 
military power was held by the Sirei, head quartered in Denpasar. The 
position of Chookan was the same as that of the Resident in the period of 
the colonial Dutch. The Chookan ruled Bali and Lombok.
2. The Japanese divided Bali into two military districts: Hokubu Baliken and 
Nambu Baliken. Hokubu Baliken was the same as the former Residency of 
North Bali (.Afdeeling Bali Utara) while, Nambu Baliken was the same as 
the former Residency of South Bali (.Afdeeling Bali Selatan). The head of 
the Hokubu Baliken and the Nambu Baliken was called the Ken Kanrikan.
3. The raja of each regency (formerly kerajaan) was under the supervision of 
a Bun-ken Kanrikan. The position of Bun-ken Kanrikan was the same as 
that of Controleur during the Dutch colonial period.
4. The rajas and their subordinates such as the chief of districts {punggawas), 
perbekels and kelihans were permitted to administer the government. At 
this time, the raja was called Shucho (indigenous ruler) and the Dutch title 
of Zelfbestuurder was no longer used.222 The punggawas were retained to 
assist the rajas. The title of punggawa was changed to Guncho ( the chief 
of districts). Below the position of the Guncho was the Soncho (perbekel) 
who was assisted by the kelihans in communicating with the common 
people.22^
221 "Bali remained directly under the Ceram Minseibu until the Lesser Sunda Minseibu was 
established with its capital in Singaraja (Bali) in 1944". See: Anthony Reid and Oki Akira (eds.). The 
Japanese Experience ..., op. cit., p. 143.
222After the invasion of the Japanese, it seems that although the Japanese had replaced the title 
Zelfbestuurder of Badung with Syucho this title was not so popular amongst the Balinese. The Balinese 
preferred the title raja and each raja ruled over a district called Swapraja. Therefore, Cokorda Alit Ngurah 
was no longer the Zelfbestuurder of Badung, but rather the Raja of the Swapraja of Badung. See: Cokorda 
Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", op. cit., p. 23.
223Anak Agung Gde Putra Agung, Sejarah Revolusi Ketnerdekaan Daerah Bali. (Jakarta: 
Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Direktorat Jenderal Kebudayaan Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai 
Tradisional, Bagian Proyek Penelitian, Pengkajian dan Pembinaan Nilai-nilai Budaya Bangsa, 1992/ 
1993), p. 13, Cf. Rika Umar, Mr. I Gusti Ketut Pudja: Riwayat Hidup dan Pengabdiannya. (Jakarta: 
Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional Proyek Inventarisasi dan 
Dokumentasi Sejarah Nasional, 1986), pp.13-14. See also: I Made Sudjana and I Ketut Ardhana (et al.). 
"Dampak Pendudukan Jepang di Bali" (Denpasar: Universitas Udayana, 1991), p. 34.
Therefore, we can see that the Japanese still made use of the previous bureaucratic 
system, although some levels were changed. The Japanese occupation forces in Bali 
acknowledged the existence of the /?wr/-centred kingdom. And the raja assisted by various 
officials, was still given authority in matters of religious and customary law (adat). This 
did not mean however, that the raja had any real power, because the Japanese government 
put their own officials, called Bun-ken Kanrikan, in every kingdom (kerajaan) to control 
the rajas.
In other words, a raja was no more than a Japanese official who represented both 
Japanese and Balinese interests. In addition, the other traditional rulers such as 
punggawas, perbekels and kelihans were still made use of by the Japanese government. 
The former rajas who were appointed by the Japanese government were: Anak Agung 
Putu Jelantik in Buleleng, Anak Agung Bagus Negara in Jembrana, Cokorda Ngurah 
Gde in Tabanan, Cokorda Ngurah Ketut in Badung, Anak Agung Ngurah Agung in 
Gianyar, Anak Agung Ketut Ngurah in Bangli, I Dewa Agung Oka Geg in Klungkung 
and Anak Agung Agung Anglurah Ketut Karangasem in Karangasem.224
Besides the civil government, the Japanese formed a military government under 
the authority of the Supreme Chief of the Japanese military (Sirei). Its headquarters were 
located in Denpasar. The Japanese began to force military discipline on the common 
people. For instance, before meetings attended by the Guncho (punggawa) or Soncho 
(perbekel), they had to conduct a particular ceremony, called the ritual for citizens 
Ckokumingirei), during which the Japanese national flag was raised. After that there was a 
moment of silence, called kioe djojohai, out of respect for the Japanese prince (Tenno 
Heika). In addition, on the 8th of each month the Balinese celebrated Taisho Hotabi, a 
day to demonstrate loyalty and respect for the Japanese government.
The Japanese schools were: Senior High School (Hutsu Chu Gakko), Junior 
High School ( Katto Chu Gakko), Teacher's School (Kyo in Yo Seidyo), Teacher's 
School B (Sihan Gakko), and Teacher's School A ( Katto Sihan Gakko).22  ^The aim of 
these schools was to establish the idea of a Greater East Asia in the minds of the people. 
Thus, while the structure of the educational system remained Dutch, what was taught in
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224Anak Agung Gde Putra Agung, Sejarah Revolusi..., op. cit., p. 13. 
225Ibid., p. 18.
the schools was fundamentally Japanese. This was one way the Japanese had of 
spreading their ideology among the Balinese people who would therefore become more 
integrated with the Japanese. The Japanese also made use of the existing education 
system. However, the Japanese closed the Taman Siswa, because they believed that its 
purpose was to awaken Indonesian nationalist consciousness.
The Japanese banned the reading and speaking of Dutch, in fact, it was ordered 
that all Dutch books be burnt. Listening to news from illegal radio broadcasts was also 
forbidden. Every morning the students were made to say the oath of allegiance to the 
Japanese prince in Japan (Tenno Heika).226
From this description we can see how the Japanese tried to influence the Balinese 
way of life. But this Japanese effort led to Balinese antipathy towards the Japanese. Even 
I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan, punggawa of Pamacutan was opposed to the closure of 
Taman Siswa, a school he had helped establish.
Although, the key figures of puri Satria were recruited into the Japanese 
bureaucratic system, this did not mean that they did not try to resist the Japanese secretly. 
The former raja of Badung, Cokorda Alit Ngurah used his authority to organise a 
resistance movement among the people of Badung. In 1942, his son, Cokorda Bagus 
Sayoga was appointed as an official in the finance division in the Governor’s (Minseibu) 
office in Singaraja. Later, the same year, he became a manca (a punggawa1s assistant) in 
Mcngwi. Due to his position as manca, Cokorda Bagus Sayoga was automatically also 
chief of the youth corps (Seinendan). At this time, Kapal was administratively part of the 
Mengwi region, so that if Cokorda Bagus Sayoga conducted an inspection, he also went 
to Kapal to inspect the youth corps there. This situation gave Cokorda Bagus Sayoga the 
opportunity to get to know I Gusti Ngurah Rai, who was one of the officials of the rice 
company (Mitsui Bushan Kaisha) in Kapal. The Japanese had formed this rice company 
and also the trading company (Mitsui Norin) and the stock raising company (Taiwan 
C hikusan ), in order to deal with the worsening economic situation. The war was 
beginning to have an impact on Japanese supply lines and food was in short supply. 
Thus, the Japanese forced the people to collect food for Japanese troops. Cokorda Bagus
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Sayoga who was a manca in Mcngwi was given a task by the Japanese to collect rice 
from the people of Mengwi to be delivered to the Japanese. The rice was then sent to the 
Japanese government in Lombok to satisfy the Japanese needs there, so that in Bali there 
was a shortage. This led to widespread hunger in Bali. Cokorda Bagus Sayoga together 
with I Gusti Ngurah Rai hid rice so that it would not be seized by the Japanese and then 
distributed this rice to the people of Penarungan and Mambal, Badung.227 The Japanese 
found out about Cokorda Ngurah Agung's activities, and in 1944, moved him from 
Mengwi to the finance division in the Controller's office in Denpasar, so that it would be 
easier to control his activities.
The eldest son of Cokorda Alit Ngurah, Cokorda Ngurah Agung, returned to Bali 
from Java shortly after the Japanese invasion. After arriving in Denpasar, he was ordered 
by Cokorda Alit Ngurah to serve in the Police office, and later he was moved to the Law 
Court (Raad van Kerta) in order to become familiar with the duties of a judge.228 In 
1943, the Minseibu ordered each raja to appoint one of his sons as assistant.229 
Accordingly, in Badung, Cokorda Ngurah Agung was appointed as an assistant of the 
Regent in Denpasar on 1 January 1943.
Cokorda Ngurah Agung described how difficult life was during the Japanese 
occupation:
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During the Japanese occupation the atmosphere both in Bali and in 
Badung was of war. The harvest was taken by the Japanese for the war 
effort. People could only afford to eat nasi campuran without much rice 
in it. Other products were not available. Clothing could not be expected 
from the government. The coarsest cloth, made in Bali, was used by the 
Balinese. Therefore, it is not strange, that many families had but one 
piece of cloth which they exchanged with each other.230
At the local level, both puri Satria and puri Pamacutan were controlled by 
Japanese officials. The Japanese believed that both of those puris were central bases for 
the pemudas in Badung. The Japanese even established a base close to puri Satria. Their 
aim was to control the activities of the raja of Badung, Cokorda Alit Ngurah, who was
227Interview with Cokorda Bagus Sayoga on 27 December 1992.
228See: "Memoirs of loc. cit.
229According to Japanese Government Decree, No. 44 dated January 1, 1943. (1 Ichigatsu 
2603). See: "Memoirs of ...", loc.cit.
2^°Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan Babad Badung", Unpublished Paper, Chapter VI. 
(Denpasar, November 1992), p. 23.
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required to report to the Japanese government. He was suspected of being a leader of the 
pemudas and they wanted to know precisely what sort of political activities were being 
organised by the raja of Badung. Nevertheless, Cokorda Alit Ngurah encouraged the 
Badung pemudas under the authority of his sons to continue the struggle against the 
Japanese. The underground activities of the Badung pemudas which included hiding rice 
and organising the people for resistance, and refusing to collect the rice for the Japanese, 
were led by Cokorda Ngurah Agung, Cokorda Bagus Sayoga and I Gusti Ngurah Gde 
Pamacutan.231
Meanwhile, the Japanese in order to be able to mobilise better national opinion to 
implement government policy in Java formed the Central Advisory Council (Chuo Sangi- 
in) on 15 August 1943. Additionally, at the local level, the Japanese formed councils 
(Syu Kaigi). Its members were called Syu Kaigi-in. In addition, the Japanese also formed 
the Fatherland Defence Force or PETA (Pembela Tanah Air) on 3 October 1943.232 
Nugroho Notosusanto noted that in Singaraja, Bali the Japanese opened an officer 
training centre on 6 April 1944. Training was carried out in Banyumala, Singaraja. The 
members of PETA were divided into three battalions (Daidans) with Lieutenant Mishima 
as the chief of Daidan Negara in Jembrana, Lieutenant Kawate as the chief of Daidan 
Kediri in Tabanan, and Lieutenant Yamasaki as the chief of Daidan Gunaksa in 
Klungkung. Cokorda Ngurah Agung notes that the PETA had raised the political 
consciousness of the Balinese people. PETA was enormously influential, because the 
leaders of the PETA came from the leading Balinese ruling families.
In Badung, Cokorda Ngurah Agung's cousin, Anak Agung Ngurah Gde Pugeg 
was appointed chief of the PETA, and was given the title, Dai Dancho or battalion 
commander. The aim of PETA was to defend the fatherland, so that its functions focused 
primarily on military training. 233
Besides that, the pemuda corps were mobilised directly into the Japanese military, 
Javanese navy (Heiho), police (Jumpo), youth corps (Seinendan), vigilance corps
2311 Ketut Ardhana, "Biografi...", op. cit., p. 27.
2-^ * 2Anthony Reid points out that PETA was an embryo volunteer Indonesian army with its own 
officer corps. See: Anthony Reid, The Indonesian National..., op. cit., p. 34. See also: M.C. Ricklefs, A 
History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1300. Second edition (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1993),
p.206.
233"Memoirs of...", op. cit., p. 3.
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(Keibodan) and 'voluntary' labourers (Romusha).234 After Japanese military training, the 
pem uda  leaders received the title Shu dancho or section commander. Some of the 
pemudas who received this distinction include: Anak Agung Ngurah Kusumayuda, son 
of I Gusti Ngurah Made Kasiman and a leading figure of puri Kasiman, and other leading 
Badung pemudas including I Gusti Ngurah Pindha, Ida Bagus Japa, I Made Pugeg, I 
Nyoman Sueca, I Ketut Dangga, I Gusti Putu Tiaga, I Gusti Made Oka, Sugianyar, and I 
Nyoman Suraja.
The leaders of puri Satria and Pamacutan were unable to prevent the Japanese 
repression of the people of Badung. They soon understood that Japanese rule was at least 
as cruel and harsh as that of the colonial Dutch. The disorder caused by the Japanese 
occupation contributed to the further development of a national consciousness which had 
already begun to emerge in the 1920s and 1930s. Cokorda Bagus Sayoga believe that the 
characteristics of the Japanese were not so much different from the Dutch, because the 
aim of both the Dutch and the Japanese was to advance their own goals. Cokorda Bagus 
Sayoga began to use puri Satria as a base for the nationalist struggle. In 1943, he and 
Cokorda Ngurah from Singapadu and I Gusti Putu Wisnu together with I Gusti Ngurah 
Rai, chief of Mitsui Bushan Kaisha rice company established the Anti - Fascist Movement 
or GAF (<Gerakan Anti Fascist).235 I Gusti Ngurah Rai was appointed as the leader of 
this movement and the activities of this organisation were centred in Kapal, although the 
leaders of the GAF always consulted with Cokorda Alit Ngurah in puri Satria.236 This 
movement was also supported by the Balinese pemudas who were former members of 
Parindra.237 The activities of the GAF were secret. The aims of the GAF were, First, to 
explain to the people of Badung that the propaganda of Japanese was not true, secondly, 
to demolish the warehouses constructed by the Japanese, and thirdly, to collect the 
weapons which had belonged to the former KNIL.23^
From this description, we can see that the Balinese (colonial) civil administration 
officials were co-opted into the Japanese bureaucracy, and the Balinese rajas continued to
234Proyek Penelitian dan Pencatatan Kebudayaan Dacrah, Sejarah Daerah ..., op. cit., p. 49. Cf. 
Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", Chapter VI, op. cit., p. 24.
233Intcrview with Cokorda Bagus Sayoga on 27 December 1992.
2361hid.
237Proyek Penelitian dan Pencatatan Kebudayaan Daerah, Sejarah Daerah ..., loc.cit.
23XI Ketut Ardhana, "Biografi ...", op. cit., p. 28.
make use of their position to undermine the Japanese oppressors, just as they had under
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the Dutch.
C. The Puri Perception o f the Proclamation o f Independence
The national consciousness which had already emerged in the 1920s and was then 
heightened and mobilized by the Japanese,239 reached its zenith following the 17 August 
1945 proclamation of independence. This period marked a great change in Bali, because 
the Balinese began to understand the meaning of independence. They believed that only 
through their own leaders both at the national and local levels could the goals of 
independence be achieved.
Following the proclamation of independence, Ida Bagus Pudja represented Bali at 
the meeting of the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence or PPKI 
(Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia) held in Jakarta on 18 August 1945.240 He 
had been working in the office of the Resident of Bali and Lombok since 1935241 and 
was considered by the Republican government in Jakarta to be one Balinese leader who 
was well-versed in the government matters of Lesser Sunda. In addition, he was a 
general adviser (giyosei komon) to the Lesser Sunda government during the Japanese 
occupation. After the proclamation, Sukarno appointed Ida Bagus Putra Manuaba242 as 
the chief of the Regional Indonesian National Committee or KNID (Komite Nasional 
Indonesia Daerah) Lesser Sunda243 and Ida Bagus Pudja as the Governor of Lesser 
Sunda, an area consisting of Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores and Timor.244
I Gusti Ketut Pudja arrived in Bali on 23 August 1945 bearing the letter regarding 
the appointment of Ida Bagus Putra Manuaba as the chief of KNID and the news of the
239See: Benedict R. O’ Gorman Anderson, Java in A Time of Revolution: Occupation and 
Resistance 1944-1946. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 24.
240See: Rika Umar, Mr. I Gusti Ketut Pudja..., op. cit., pp. 35-36
241//;/d., pp. 13-16 and pp. 62-63.
242Ida Bagus Putra Manuaba, previously was appointed by the Japanese as an adviser (San'yo) to 
the government of Lesser Sunda. See: "Riwayat Hidup Ida Bagus Putra Manuaba 1908-1984". (The 
collection of Pusat Dokumentasi Kebudayaan Bali), pp. 4-5.
243Ida Bagus Putra Manuaba was appointed as the chief KNID located in Singaraja on 18 
August 1945. Ibid., p. 5.
244 I Gusti Ketut Pudja was appointed as the Governor of Lesser Sunda on 22 August 1945. See 
also: Benedict R.O' Gorman Anderson, Java in A Time ... op. cit., pp.85-86.
proclamation of independence. Ida Anak Agung Gde Agung246 argues that after I Gusti 
Ketut Pudja arrived in Bali, he did not hold a mass meeting to announce the news of the 
proclamation, but rather he held a secret meeting on 10 October 1945 with the Balinese 
rajas about the future structure of independent government in Bali. First, each district 
would have its own KNID which, together with the rajas would govern at the local level. 
Second, a Indonesian National Committee or KNI ( Komite Nasional Indonesia) would 
be set up which would govern at the regional level together with the Governor of Lesser 
Sunda. From this, we can see that I Gusti Ketut Pudja recognised that the Balinese rajas 
still had strong authority and that he as Governor would need their help and support to 
legitimise his position as Governor of Lesser Sunda. Despite the declaration of 
independence and the appointment of a new Governor, it was the Japanese who were in 
control in Bali for six months. G. Robinson depicts the situation in Bali during this time 
as:
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... a time of intense political activity and violence after the defeat of the 
Japanese, and prior to the return of the Dutch KNIL... This period of 
slightly more than six months constitutes a critical juncture in Bali's social 
and political history. During these few months the terms of Balinese 
political discourse were fundamentally and irrevocably changed, mass 
political and military mobilisation occurred on an unprecedented scale, and 
new political and social conflicts emerged while old rivalries became more 
visible and often more acute.246
According to the Potsdam agreement, all of the regions which were ruled by the 
Dutch before the Second World War were to be taken over by the South East Asia 
Command (SEAC),247 represented in Indonesia by the Allied Forces Netherlands East 
Indies (AFNEI). In Indonesia AFNEI had several tasks, namely, to accept the surrender 
of the Japanese military, to free the prisoners of war, to disarm the Japanese and return 
them to Japan, to maintain peace until the establishment of a civilian government, to 
collect information and to bring war criminals to trial. 248
245Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Dari Negara Indonesia Timur Ke Republik Indonesia Serikat. 
(Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1985), pp. 43-44.
246G. Robinson, "State...", op. cit., p. 1.
242"Sejarah Pemerintah Daerah Bali". (The collection of Pusat Dokumentasi Kebudayaan Bali),
p. 26.
24^Panitia Peringatan Serangan Umum Kota Denpasar 11 April 1946: Mempertahankan 
Proklamasi 17-8-1945, Serangan Umum Besar-besaran Terhadap Kota Denpasar II April 1946, p. 6. Cf. 
Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Dari Negara ..., op. cit., p. 4.
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The Netherlands Indies was one state in the South East Asia Command block. 
After the Second World War ended, the Dutch assumed that Indonesia would be returned 
to the former Dutch Indies and refused to acknowledge the 17 August 1945 proclamation 
of independence.^^ The SEAC began to land their troops in some regions of Indonesia 
between September and October 1945.250 Australian troops landed in Borneo, East 
Indonesia and parts of the Lesser Sunda Islands. Meanwhile, British troops landed in 
Sumatra, Java, Bali and Lombok. In Jakarta, British troops headed by Sir Philip 
Christison landed in 1945. Anthony Reid notes that the landings of British troops in 
Jakarta took place on 30 September and that the landing of British troops in Semarang 
took place on 20 October and in Surabaya on 25 October, 1945.251 British troops 
centred in Surabaya landed in Bali under the leadership of Major General Mansergh. 
These SEAC forces landed in Pabean (North Bali) on 25 October 1945.252 Further 
SEAC troops landed in Bali on 18 February 1946.253
After the surrender of the Japanese to the SEAC on 14 August 1945, the Japanese 
ordered the Japanese battalions or Daidans in Negara, Tabanan and Klungkung to break 
up the PETA. As a result, all of the former Balinese PETA were forced to give up their 
weapons to the Japanese government and go home. Some joined the former underground 
movements such as ESSTI (Eka Setia Setiti) which had been formed in 1944. The aim of 
this organisation was to enable the pemudas to study self-defence (bela diri) and also to 
provide security for each neighbourhood (banjar). Furthermore, training in the traditional 
art of self-defence (pencak silat) was centred in Denpasar. The ESSTI which consisted of 
the former Balinese PETA regretted having to surrender their weapons and tried to join 
other organisations to form a united front so that it would be easier to seize weapons from 
the Japanese battalions (Daidans).
Meanwhile, there were also Japanese soldiers who surrendered to the pemudas 
rather than to the SEAC. As seen in Virginia McLean Thompson's account:
249"Sejarah Pemerintah Daerah ...", loc. cit.
250Anthony Reid notes that the SEAC landed in Kupang on 11 September, Banjarmasin on 17 
September, Makassar on 21 September, Ambon on 22 September, Menado on 22 October, Pontianak on 
16 October 1945. See: Anthony Reid, The Indonesian National..., op. cit., p. 46.
251xim  Penyusun Monografi Daerah Bali, Monografi Daerah Bali. (Jakarta: Proyek 
Pengembangan Media Kebudayaan Departcmen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan R.I., 1976), p. 14.
252rrim Penyusun Monografi Daerah Bali, Monografi Daerah..., loc. cit.
253panitia Peringatan Serangan Umum, Serangan..., op. cit., p. 7.
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As elsewhere in Southeast Asia the Japanese in Bali suffered after 
V.J.Day a severe loss of morale and a split in their ranks between 
supporters of the local independence movement and followers of the 
Allies' orders. Comparatively few Japanese deserted or turned over their 
arms to the pemoedas, Laskar Rayat, Pesindo and TRI groups which 
were formed in Bali (in imitation of their Javanese prototypes) after the 
independence of Indonesia was proclaimed on August 17, 1945).254
A few Japanese soldiers not only joined with the pem udas, they also took 
Balinese names. For example Hera Utji, the deputy commander of the Japanese navy 
Lesser Sunda (Sirei)255 became Nyoman Sayan, Taira Taiza became Nyoman Buleleng, 
Djoto Hoso Taka Habi became Made Sukri, Hito Haso Matani became Wayan Sukra and 
Hito Haso Haraki became I Ketut.256 It seems that they changed their names to convince 
the pemudas that they supported the Balinese struggle for freedom.257 In addition these 
Japanese also promised to fight against the Dutch. This served to encourage the pemudas 
who supported the spirit of the puri Satria and Pamacutan in their struggle to prevent the 
return of the Dutch.
The leader of the pemudas, I Gusti Ngurah Rai, informed the raja of Badung, 
Cokorda Alit Ngurah of the news of the Japanese surrender to the Allies. Cokorda Alit 
Ngurah suggested that in order to defend the existence of the Republic of Indonesia, it 
was necessary to organise a united front.
Meanwhile, the Governor of Lesser Sunda, I Gusti Ketut Pudja encouraged the 
pemudas to demand that the Japanese rulers replace the Japanese flag with the Indonesian 
flag, Japanese time with Indonesian time, lift the curfew and hand over the administration 
to the Indonesians.258
To support the Balinese struggle, the Republican government in Jakarta sent a 
few students from the Japanese High School of Medicine (Ika Daigaku) to Bali. Three of 
those students, Dr. Sukardjo, Dr. Hamzah and Ridwan, held a meeting in Kayumas Kaja 
to discuss issues concerning the proclamation of independence and also President 
Sukarno's decree of 23 August 1945 which stated that it was important to form an
254Virginia McLean Thompson, "Bali on Verge of Decision", in Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 16, 
No. 8 (April 1947), p. 87.
255I Gusti Ngurah Pindha, Gempilan..., op. cit., p.3.
256Anak Agung Gde Putra Agung, Sejarah Revolusi..., op. cit., p. 28 and p. 56.
257Interview with I Nyoman Buleleng on 15 February 1993.
258Nyoman S. Pendit, Bali .... op. cit., pp. 75-76.
Indonesian National Committee or KNI (Komite Nasional Indonesia), and People's 
Security Organisation or BKR (Badan Keamanan Rakyat). The participants demanded 
that the government announce the news of independence and also take over power from 
the Japanese army. Thus, it seems the Javanese pemudas had some influence on the 
resurgence of the Balinese pemuda organisations.
In order to know the real situation in Java and also to report on the situation in 
Bali, several pemuda leaders including I Made Wijakusuma, I Nyoman Pegeg, Burhan 
and Ridwan went to Java in September 1945. Made Wijakusuma stopped in Surabaya in 
order to make contact with other pemuda groups from the Youth of the Republic of 
Indonesia or PRI (Pemuda Republik Indonesia). Meanwhile, other Balinese pemudas 
went to Jakarta to meet President Sukarno at Gedung Gajah. At that time, Bali consisted 
of eight kingdoms (kerajaans), but the puri Satria pemuda believed that only the raja of 
Badung, Cokorda Alit Ngurah had clearly shown support for the proclamation of 
independence. This was evident in the attitude of Cokorda Alit Ngurah when he 
suggested that I Gusti Ngurah Rai support the Republican struggle, while other rajas did 
not fully respect the Republic government in Bali.
After the return of I Made Wijakusuma from Surabaya at the end of September 
1945, the pemudas held a meeting in Denpasar on 13 November 1945 which was 
attended by the Indonesian Youth Generation or AMI (Angkatan Muda Indonesia).259 It 
was decided at the meeting to unify the youth organisations into the Indonesian 
Republican Youth or the PRI, based on the organisation of the same name in Surabaya. 
In Denpasar, the key figure of Badung pemudas, I Made Wijakusuma, was appointed as 
its chief and Cokorda Ngurah Agung was named deputy. The aim of the PRI was to 
circulate the news regarding the proclamation of independence in Bali. Thus the pemudas 
of Badung united with their leaders in puri Satria to form a common front. Outside 
Badung, in Gianyar for example, a similar phenomenon did not take place. Instead the 
pemudas opposed their rajas.
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259AMI became the Indonesian Socialist Youth or Pesindo (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia) on 13 
November 1945 under the leadership of Gede Puger. See: Anak Agung Gde Putra Agung, Sejarah 
Revolusi..., op. cit., p. 33.
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A conflict emerged between the leaders of puri Satria and the Badung pemudas 
on the one hand who supported the proclamation of independence within the body of the 
PRI, and the other Balinese rajas who opposed the Republican government on the other. 
Due to this conflict, Cokorda Ngurah Agung notes that after the beginning of the 
revolution, the Badung pemudas under the leadership of puri Satria tried to control the 
sons of the raja of Gianyar, Anak Agung Gde Agung and Cokorda Gde Raka Sukawati, 
neither of whom supported the struggle of the pemudas.26° This was the main reason 
why, finally Anak Agung Gde Agung formed the State Defence Youth or PPN ( Pemuda 
Pembela Negara) in opposition to the PRI.261 The word "negara", did not refer to the 
Republic but rather to the kingdom of Gianyar. This body was established in November 
1945.262 Cokorda Ngurah Agung recalled that the defence manoeuvres sometimes 
passed through the region of Badung, infuriating the Badung pemudas,263
In Klungkung, when the pemudas raised the Indonesian flag, the raja of 
Klungkung believed they wanted to denigrate his status and overthrow him. He therefore 
established a rival organisation, the State Security Body or BKN (Badan Keamanan 
Negara) in the middle of November 1945. The word "negara" here, refereed to the 
kingdom of Klungkung rather than to the Republican government. The leaders of this 
organisation were the raja of Klungkung, Cokorda Ngurah Gudar, Anak Agung Rai 
Debegan and Wayan Ukir. Similar events also occurred in puri Karangasem. The raja of 
Karangasem formed Anti-Free Indonesia or AIM {Anti Indonesia Merdeka). The raja of 
Karangasem, even stated that he openly supported the Anti-Free Indonesia movement. 
This organisation which was formed earlier around April 1946, was led by the raja of 
Karangasem, Gusti Bagus Jelantik and Gusti Gde Dangin.264
The above discussion shows that the raja of Badung, Cokorda Alit Ngurah, did 
not have the support of the other Balinese rajas, although, previously they had promised 
to support the Republic in Bali. Therefore, the big challenges came not only from outside 
Bali (the Dutch and the Japanese), but also from inside Bali itself (the Balinese rajas). The
260»Memoirs of op. cit., p. 6.
261 See: Patah Tumbuh Hilang Berganti: Kumpulan Riwayat Hidup Pahlawan PKRI Gianyar. 
(Gianyar: Markas Cabang Legiun Veteran RI, 1979), p. 138.
262Nyoman S. Pendit, Bali..., op. cit., pp. 79-81.
263"Memoirs of...", loc.cit.
264Nyoman S. Pendit, Bali..., loc. cit.
establishment of anti-Republican movements in Bali, weakened thepemudas' cause, and 
consequently the Badung pemudas' leaders, I Gusti Ngurah Rai, I Gusti Putu Wisnu, I 
Made Wijakusuma tried to give a clear explanation of the meaning of independence to the 
other Balinese rajas.
At the end of September 1945 upon the arrival of the chief of the KNID, Ida 
Bagus Putra Manuaba, from Jakarta a general meeting was held in Singaraja. At that 
meeting, the Governor of Lesser Sunda, I Gusti Ketut Pudja announced the news of the 
proclamation of independence and also the proposed structure of the new Republic of 
Indonesia government.265 Despite these announcements the Japanese did not surrender to 
the Governor. Therefore, it can be seen that the Japanese in Bali did not recognise the 
Republican government. This made it very difficult for I Gusti Ketut Pudja to form a local 
government.
Due to these difficulties, the announcement of the news regarding the declaration 
of independence was made at a mass meeting on 17 October 1945. The announcement 
was made by a representative from Jakarta, Kaprawi, who came to Denpasar. Earlier 
Kaprawi had consulted with the raja of Badung, Cokorda Alit Ngurah and the chief of the 
KNID Badung, I Gusti Putu Mertha, about whether or not to announce the news of the 
declaration of independence. Cokorda Alit Ngurah supported the effort in the hope that 
the people of Badung would now understand that they were free, and that together with 
the Republican government they would continue the fight against the Japanese who had 
not yet surrendered.266 Cokorda Ngurah Agung depicts the situation in Badung at that 
time as follows:
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After the beginning of the independence of our state the streets in the city 
of Denpasar were never quiet. The cry "freedom" spilled from the lips of 
its residents. The government of swapraja Badung continued, although we 
did not know who was in charge. I held the reins of the government of 
Badung, because my father (the raja of Badung) was suffering from a 
chronic disease. Fortunately nothing important happened during that time. 
The governments of the rajas from top to bottom followed the dynamics of 
the societies in their regions. They even encouraged their comrades in the 
city of Denpasar.267
265Ida Bagus Rama, "Struktur...", op. cit., p. 73.
266In the Balinese perception, the fact that the Japanese still held authority through their 
military government and still held onto their weapons meant that they had not yet surrendered, ie. the 
Japanese were still in control.
267"Memoirs of...", op. cit., p. 5.
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From Agung's account above we can see how the people of Badung began to 
realise that their state had become independent. The cry "freedom" became ever more 
popular among the people of Badung. Perhaps Cokorda Alit Ngurah's "illness" was due 
in part to the shock of the rapid change affecting Bali. Independence and the appointment 
of I Gusti Ketut Pudja as the Governor of Bali and Ida Bagus Putra Manuaba as Head of 
KNID left Cokorda Alit Ngurah with much reduced power and influence. Indeed, the 
other rajas too were in a state of confusion. Unsure what to do, they followed the lead of 
Denpasar, to their eventual regret. Therefore, Cokorda Ngurah Agung marks the 17th of 
October 1945 as the political awakening of the pemuda Badung.268
This state of affairs however, was only temporary. With the return of the Dutch, 
the rajas' support for independence wilted and only Cokorda Alit Ngurah among the rajas 
continued the struggle for independence.
268Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", Chapter VI, op. cit., p. 25. I Ketut Ardhana, 
"Biografi...", loc. cit.
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D. Puri Pamacutan and Puri Satria: Their Role From BKR to TKR
On 23 August 1945 President Sukarno announced the formation of the People's 
Peace-keeping Body or BKR in all parts of Indonesia. In Badung, the BKR was formed 
on 14 October 1945. The leader of puri Pamacutan, I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan, who 
had been already appointed punggawa of Denpasar by the Dutch in 1934,269 was 
appointed by the pemudas (due to his political status) as deputy of the BKR and I 
Nyoman Pegeg as its chief.270 Due to their lack of military training they had to find 
someone capable of organising an army.
On 16 October 1945 I Nyoman Pegeg as a representative of the Badung pemudas 
came to I Gusti Ngurah Rai in Carangsari to ask him to organise the BKR in Badung. Rai 
was chosen for his experience in the Dutch military school in Magelang and also his 
experiences as one of the leaders of the underground movement in Badung during the 
Japanese occupation.
The activities of the BKR were to spread the news regarding the proclamation of 
independence, to organise military training for the pemudas and also to encourage the 
people of Badung to defend their independence. On 5 October 1945, President Sukarno 
issued a decree changing the name of the BKR to the People's Peacekeeping Army or 
TKR (Tentara Keamanan Rakyai)?11
Prior to November 1945, the first meeting of the TKR was held in puri Satria. At 
this meeting it was agreed to expand the TKR throughout Lesser Sunda. In addition, each 
kingdom (Swapraja) sent a representative to Denpasar to agree that the TKR Lesser 
Sunda should have its headquarters in Denpasar. This meeting was attended by the 
Governor of Lesser Sunda, the chief of KNID Lesser Sunda, and all the Balinese rajas, 
except the raja of Gianyar. The raja of Gianyar continued to be opposed to the Republic 
and the Republican struggle. In fact, as noted above the raja of Gianyar had established 
the PPN in direct opposition to the TKR.272
Their different historical backgrounds explain why puri Satria encouraged the 
Republic on the one hand and puri Gianyar opposed the Republican struggle on the other.
269See: Chapter III.
270Ida Bagus Rama, "Struktur...", op. cit., p. 90.
271Proyek Penelitian dan Pencatatan Kebudayaan Daerah, Sejarah Daerah .... op. cit., p. 169.
272The PPN was established in the middle of November 1945.
While the puputan of Badung was seen as a dramatic and heroic event in Badung and still 
strongly influenced the attitude of the raja of Badung to continue his ancestor's struggle 
against the Dutch, there was no corresponding event in the history of Gianyar; the raja of 
Gianyar had already peacefully surrendered his kingdom to the Dutch six years before the 
puputan.
A meeting was held on 1 November 1945 in puri Satria to determine the leader of 
the TKR. That meeting was attended by officials from Badung, the PRI and the chief of 
KNID Badung. By acclamation, they chose I Gusti Ngurah Rai as the head of the TKR 
with the rank of Major. The TKR in Bali consisted of 13 battalions two of which were 
based in Badung. These two battalions were led by Cokorda Ngurah and I Putu 
Serangan.273
From this we see the incorporation of members of many diverse organisations 
into the nationalist cause, and also that their struggle at this time, was fully encouraged by 
puri Satria, puri Kasiman and puri Pamacutan. We can see too the importance of the role 
played by I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan as the deputy of the BKR when that 
organisation was established. Later, we shall see the key role played by the leaders of 
puri Satria, who allowed their purls to be used for TKR activities.
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E. The Role o f the Puris in The 13 December 1945 Movement
The oppression of the Japanese occupation encouraged the unity of the nationalist 
movement. In early 1945, the members of PETA organised an underground movement, 
but to little effect as the Japanese army surrendered to SEAC soon after. The Japanese 
army were careful to prevent the emergence of an anti-Japanese movement in Bali, as had 
emerged in Blitar in February 1945. News of the rebellion that had occurred in Blitar was 
kept secret by the Japanese.274 It seems that the Japanese were worried about the 
relationship between the Javanese pemudas and the Balinese pemudas and therefore
^ Interview  with I Putu Serangan on 13 February 1993.
274For reference, see: "14 February 1945: Blitar Is Shrouded in Gun Smoke", in Anton Lucas 
(ed.). Local Opposition and Underground Resistance to the Japanese in Java 1942-1945. (Melbourne: 
Centre of Southeast Asian Studies 1986), pp. 209-216.
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strongly controlled the relationship between Java and Bali to prevent the spread of 
rebellion.275
Despite the declaration of independence and the establishment of the Lesser Sunda 
government the aim of the Japanese continued to defend their power in Bali. Therefore, 
there were two governments in Bali, the Japanese military government and the Indonesian 
civil government under the authority of I Gusti Ketut Pudja. To attack the Japanese 
military government was impossible, because the TKR, the former Balinese PETA, did 
not have any weapons. These had been confiscated by the Japanese when PETA had 
surrendered during the war. This situation forced the Governor of Lesser Sunda, I Gusti 
Ketut Pudja, and the chief of the KNID, Ida Bagus Putra Manuaba, to ask the head of the 
Japanese government (Chookan) in Bali to resurrender to the Governor of Lesser 
Sunda.276 This demand was rejected by the head of the Japanese government, and the 
Balinese pemudas began to organise their struggle.
Another leader of the Badung pemudas, I Made Wijakusuma, tried to reach an 
agreement with the Japanese commander of South Bali (Sirei) to obtain weapons in late 
1945. But, the Japanese refused Wijakusuma's proposal. The Japanese explained that all 
weapons had already been registered by SEAC troops and that the Japanese were obliged 
to surrender their weapons to SEAC. The pem udas failure to get weapons from the 
Japanese army peacefully, resulted in a plan to get weapons by force. Plans were 
formulated during a meeting at TKR headquarters. The meeting was attended by I Gusti 
Ngurah Rai, Cokorda Ngurah Agung, deputy of the PRI, and the Pesindo. A second 
meeting was held in I Gusti Ngurah Rai's house in Kayumas on 11 December 1945.
The plan was to attack Japanese camps in Denpasar on 13 December 1945, so as 
to curtail Japanese intransigence. The pemudas fully recognised that such an attack could 
fail and whatever the outcome would result in a Japanese counterattack. The attack was to 
be led by I Gusti Ngurah Rai, Cokorda Ngurah Agung, I Made Wijakusuma, Anak 
Agung Raka Janur, I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan, I Putu Serangan and I Gusti Ngurah 
Pindha and was waged in the name of the PRI, Pesindo and the common people, 
although there were elements of the TKR in the various forces. This was done for
275Nyoman S. Pendit, Bali..., op. cit., p. 50.
276The Japanese had already surrendered to the SEAC on 14 August 1945. Ibid., p. 58.
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political reasons to avoid a direct confrontation between the government of the new 
Republic of Indonesia and the government of defeated Japan. The Badung pemudas' 
attack could not be in the name of the TKR or in the name of the army, but rather in the 
name of the common people.
Before attacking the Japanese camps, the PRI, Pesindo and the TKR conducted 
training sessions in the villages. Meanwhile, it seems that the Japanese discovered that the 
pemudas were planning to attack their camps. Therefore, they sent out spies to collect 
further information. They also kept a careful watch on the TKR camps. When the 
pemudas found out that the Japanese were aware of their plans, the question arose as to 
whether the attack should go ahead. I Gusti Ngurah Rai and I Gusti Putu Wisnu wanted 
to delay the attack, but Ida Bagus Tantra favoured going ahead with the plan. A meeting 
attended by I Gusti Ngurah Rai, I Gusti Putu Wisnu and I Wayan Ledang was held at the 
Headquarters of the TKR Lesser Sunda in order to decide the issue. They decided to 
carry out the attack.
On 12 December 1945, however, I Gusti Ngurah Rai received information that 
some Japanese had been killed by the pemudas in Pecatu, South Bali and he feared a 
Japanese reprisal. The next day, I Gusti Ngurah Rai sought out Cokorda Ngurah Agung 
for advice on whether or not to proceed with the planned attack. Cokorda Ngurah Agung 
suggested that the attack should continue, because the Japanese already knew of the plan 
and even if this plan would be delayed, the Japanese would capture them. As a result, I 
Gusti Ngurah Rai ordered the attack against the Japanese. But before the attack could be 
carried out, the Japanese began their own offensive, attacking the pemudas in Pecatu. 
They focused their attack on puri Satria, for several reasons. First, puri Satria was the 
political centre where Cokorda Alit Ngurah the raja of Badung, and principal adviser in 
the pemuda's struggle, lived. Second, at that time, puri Satria had become a centre of 
TKR activities. Third, puri Satria served as the meeting place between the TKR and the 
raja of Badung.277 At that time, the Badung pemudas were in a state of panic due to the 
approaching Japanese. The Japanese had little trouble expelling the pemudas from the 
puri.
277I Gusti Ngurah Pindha, Kirikutni Besar-Besaran Terhadap Kota Denpasar. (Denpasar: Yayasan 
Parisada Hindu Dharma Kabupaten Badung, 1973), p. 26.
On the afternoon of the attack, I Gusti Ngurah Rai ordered the pemudas to retreat 
to the mountains. The majority of the pemudas went back to their villages. Meanwhile, 
the leaders in the rebellion such as I Gusti Ngurah Rai, Cokorda Ngurah Agung, 
Cokorda Bagus Sayoga, I Gusti Putu Wisnu and I Putu Serangan, fled to puri Kasiman. 
The Japanese army captured several pemudas such as Nyoman Mantik and Bagus Lipur, 
as well as, I Gusti Ketut Pudja, the Governor of Lesser Sunda and Ida Bagus Putra 
Manuaba, the chief of KNID. Although Nyoman Mantik and Bagus Lipur were then 
tortured, shortly thereafter the Japanese set them free, fearing continued rebellion if the 
leaders were not released.278
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F. The Aborted Puputan in Puri Kasiman
The 13 December 1945 attack on the Japanese failed for several reasons. Many 
Balinese, who had been members of the former PETA and were opposed to the pemuda 
struggle, began to gather intelligence information for the Japanese. The Japanese, 
therefore, knew about the pemudas plan to attack their camps and moved to control 
centres of the pemuda movement.
According to I Made Wijakusuma, however, the attack on 13 December 1945 
against the Japanese, was not a failure. Although the primary aim had been to strip the 
Japanese army of their weapons, there had also been the secondary goal of unifying all 
the Balinese pemuda groups of the hinterlands in preparation for confronting the 
Dutch.279
To avoid being captured by the Japanese army, the raja's family in puri Satria, 
and the raja of Badung, Cokorda Alit Ngurah along with Rai's wife, Desak Putu Kari 
were evacuated to puri Kasiman. After the failed attack against the Japanese, Cokorda 
Ngurah Agung and his followers returned, discouraged, to Ubud Gianyar. Cokorda 
Ngurah Agung was further disheartened by what he saw in Ubud:
278I Gusti Ngurah Rai Mirsha (et al.). Cokorda Alit Ngurah..., op. cit., p. 57. See also: Rika 
Umar, Mr. I Gusti Ketut Pudja..., op. cit., pp. 5-6.
279I Gusti Ngurah Rai Mirsha (et al.). Cokorda Alit Ngurah...., op. cit., p. 87.
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I was very disappointed when I arrived in Ubud. The village streets were 
very quiet. Only a few people approached the Badung group, whereas 
hundreds of people were at a cock-fight. That was Ubud at that time.280
The Badung pemudas under the leadership of Cokorda Ngurah Agung returned to 
puri Kasiman. The leader of the TKR, I Gusti Ngurah Rai, the leaders of puri Satria, 
Cokorda Bagus Sayoga, the leader of puri Pamacutan, I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan 
and, the leader of puri Kasiman Anak Agung Ngurah Kusumayuda together with the 
leaders of the pemudas, I Made Wijakusuma, I Gusti Putu Wisnu and I Putu Serangan 
were also evacuated to puri Kasiman. Other pemudas went into hiding in Plaga with their 
families. All of these efforts were taken to avoid being encircled by the Japanese army.281 
I Gusti Ngurah Rai strengthened the forces of puri Kasiman by bringing in 
reinforcements from Singapadu. Thus, the pemudas established control over the pwr/.282
Meanwhile, pro-pemuda representatives from west Gianyar arrived in puri 
Kasiman to meet I Gusti Ngurah Rai in order to get his permission to attack the pro- 
Japanese forces of puri Gianyar. I Gusti Ngurah Rai asked Cokorda Ngurah Agung for 
his opinion regarding the plan to attack puri Gianyar. Cokorda Ngurah Agung283 
suggested not attacking puri Gianyar, because not only were there still a lot of Gianyar 
people who were loyal to their raja but they would also be able get support from the 
Japanese army.284
A strategy planning meeting was held in puri Kasiman. This meeting was attended 
by I Gusti Ngurah Rai, I Gusti Putu Wisnu, I Made Wijakusuma, Cokorda Alit Ngurah, 
Cokorda Ngurah Agung, Cokorda Bagus Sayoga, I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan, Anak 
Agung Ngurah Made Kasiman. I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan, perhaps in an effort to 
reassert his power as a descendant of the Pamacutan rajas, proposed a puputan  as 
happened in 1906. His proposal was rejected. During the meeting the Japanese army 
surrounded puri Kasiman. I Gusti Ngurah Pindha ordered the pemudas to attack the
280"Memoirs of...", op. cit., p. 8.
281Interview with I Kctut Danggaon 30 December 1992.
282Interview with I Dewa Made Oka on 4 January 1993.
283Cokorda Ngurah Agung notes, however, that the people of Western Gianyar, in general, 
supported the Republican government. Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", Chapter VI, op. cit., p. 
28.
284"Memoirs of ...", op. cit., p. 9.
Japanese if they should try to enter puri Kasiman. He also proposed, however, that the 
raja and the pemudas withdraw from Kasiman as it was impossible to defend their 
position. I Gusti Ngurah Pindha stated:
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I would not leave if our leaders remained there. If we were to go, all of 
us would have to go, if one of us did not go, none of us would go. We 
did not need a puputan, it would not have made sense, because the 
Japanese were not our real enemies. Our enemy was the Dutch who 
would soon arrive. We were fighting against the Japanese in order to get 
weapons. It was not important to fight against the Japanese because the 
Japanese had been defeated. If we could kill 100 Japanese and one of us 
was killed and we did not get weapons, it would be useless. Thus a 
puputan was useless.285
Some pemudas were still confused as to whether they should escape from the puri 
or not and Pamacutan's proposal to hold a puputan had caused some panic among them.
I Gusti Ngurah Pindha and I Gusti Ngurah Rai finally convinced Cokorda Alit Ngurah to 
leave as the Japanese were nearing puri Kasiman.
The pemudas abandoned puri Kasiman on 14 December 1945. After their 
withdrawal the Japanese attacked the villages surrounding puri Kasiman such as 
Abiankapas Kaja and Kedaton. The pemudas dispersed but agreed to meet again at Batan 
Gatep temple, Penamparan which had been made available for their use by Anak Agung 
Made Jabeg, Cokorda Ngurah Agung's uncle on 17 December 1945.286 Cokorda Alit 
Ngurah, Anak Agung Ngurah Kusumayuda, I Gusti Ngurah Pindha and I Made 
Wijakusuma retreated to Taensiat.287
Cokorda Ngurah Agung, Cokorda Bagus Sayoga, Anak Agung Raka Janur 
evacuated to the west of Badung to Padangsambian and eventually made their way to the 
Batan Gatep temple. Meanwhile, the Japanese kept a careful watch on the Carangsari 
region, where the leader of the pemudas, I Gusti Ngurah Rai, had been bom, perhaps in 
the belief that the pemudas would stop there on their way to the mountains.
In Padangsambian, about 50 pemudas met with the punggawa of Denpasar, I 
Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan, I Gusti Ngurah Rai and I Made Wijakusuma. It was
285I Gusti Ngurah Pindha, Gempilan Perjuangan Phisik Pasukan Induk Ngurah Rai. (Denpasar: 
PT Upada Sastra, 1990), p. 12.
286Interview with Ida Bagus Sayoga on 27 December 1992. See: "Memoirs of...", op. cit., p.
11.
n i Ibid.
decided that Rai would go to Java ask for help in acquiring weapons to strengthen the 
Balinesepemudas lacing the Japanese army. At that time, Cokorda Bagus Sayoga was ill 
and was being looked after by Anak Agung Raka Janur in the Batan Gatep temple and 
was unable to join the others when they decamped the next day. Cokorda Ngurah Agung,
I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan, I Gusti Ngurah Rai and I Made Wijakusuma continued 
through the rice fields of Padangsambian to a small farm house and the next morning they 
again discussed their plans to go to Java. A servant, I Putu Candri, was sent to puri Satria 
and puri Pamacutan to get some clothes.288 But after he arrived in puri Pamacutan, he 
was asked by I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan's wife about her husband. I Putu Candri 
told her about the meeting at Batan Gatep temple and the plan to go to Java to get 
weapons. It seems that this idea was unacceptable to I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan's 
wife and I Gusti Made Adi, a member of the Pamacutan family. They decided to go to 
Padangsambian.
On 18 December 1945,1 Gusti Made Adi and I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan's 
wife met him at the farm-house. They discussed what should be done at that time. 
Meanwhile, I Gusti Ngurah Rai, Cokorda Ngurah Agung and I Made Wijakusuma who 
were outside did not know what was being discussed. It seems that I Gusti Ngurah Gde 
Pamacutan agreed to his wife's demand that he cancel the journey to Java. After his 
discussion with his wife, I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan suggested that they all leave the 
farm-house as for some reason or other (he never explained why) that place was going to 
be attacked by the Japanese. He also informed them of his decision to cancel the journey 
to Java. Pamacutan's decision persuaded I Gusti Ngurah Rai, Cokorda Ngurah Agung, I 
Made Wijakusuma to leave in case there would be a Japanese attack. The Pamacutan's 
decision caused disappointment for I Gusti Ngurah Rai, Cokorda Ngurah Agung and I 
Made Wijakusuma. They returned to the Batan Gatep temple to pick up Cokorda Bagus 
Sayoga and Anak Agung Raka Janur.
There are possible several reasons for I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan's sudden 
about-face. It must have been a combination of factors perhaps including his 
disappointment at his failure to persuade his fellow Balinese into a puputan, but perhaps
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288Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", Chapter VI, op. cit., p. 29.
also bccuase of information that his wife must have brought him about the threat or a 
Japanese attack or maybe even some more personal threats or inducements the Japar :se 
may have offered to persuade him to change sides. I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan 
returned home with his wife.289 It seems that Pamacutan's wife and I Gusti Made Adi 
were somehow influenced by the Japanese to persuade I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan to 
delay his journey to Java. Thereafter, I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan began to distance 
himself from Cokorda Ngurah Agung and I Gusti Ngurah Rai and the struggle for 
independence.
After meeting Cokorda Bagus Sayoga and Anak Agung Raka Janur in Batan 
Gatep temple, I Gusti Ngurah Rai and I Made Wijakusuma went to Carangsari to 
organise the pemuda struggle. This, was the last time for Cokorda Ngurah Agung was to 
meet I Gusti Ngurah Rai before he was killed by the Dutch in Marga on 20 November 
1947.290
From the above we can see that while puri Satria, puri Pamacutan and the Badung 
pemudas were able to unite to plan and organise an attack on the Japanese camps, the 
failure of the attack and the subsequent rejection of Pamacutan's call for a puputan, 
exacerbated inter -puri rivalries, the consequences of which will be seen in the next 
chapter.
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289I Gusti Ngurah Rai Mirsha, Cokorda. 
290"Memoirs of...", op. cit., p. 14.
op. cit., p. 90.
V. PURI AND REV OLUTION
In this chapter, I will discuss the role of the puri in the period of the revolution. 
This period is significant because of the increasing rivalry between puri Satria and puri 
Pamacutan during this time. Cokorda Ngurah Agung notes that the revolution in Badung 
broke out when the 13 December 1945 attack against the Japanese failed to take place.291 
After the aborted puputan , puri Satria remained strongly opposed to the Japanese 
government, while puri Pamacutan began cooperating with the Japanese. The rivalry 
developed further with the fall of the Japanese and the return of the Dutch under the name 
of Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA). It seems that NICA succeeded in 
persuading the Pamacutan faction to cooperate with them. Conversely, puri Satria 
remained loyal to the Republic of Indonesia and continued to fight NICA.
A. The Widening Rift Between Puri Satria and Puri Pamacutan
As mentioned in Chapter IV, in the weak of the failed attack the rivalries between 
puri Satria and puri Pamacutan increased. While, the leaders of puri Satria were arrested 
by the Japanese, the leaders of puri Pamacutan were not. Yet leaders of both puri Satria 
and puri Pamacutan had organised the attack on the Japanese camps. It seems that I Gusti 
Ngurah Gde Pamacutan had begun cooperating with the Japanese after the aborted 
puputan.
The pemudas under I Gusti Ngurah Rai and the Satrians under Cokorda Ngurah 
Agung and Cokorda Bagus Sayoga agreed to continue their struggle against the Japanese. 
According to their agreement, I Gusti Ngurah Rai was to go to Java to get weapons, 
while Cokorda Ngurah Agung and Cokorda Bagus Sayoga were to continue the 
diplomatic struggle in the political arena. On the other hand, the leader of puri Pamacutan, 
I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan, whose wife and servant I Gusti Made Adi had been
291See: Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan Babad Badung", Unpublished Paper. Chapter VI. 
(Denpasar, 1983), p. 27. While Robinson states that “December 1945 then marks the beginning of the 
rural guerrilla phase of the resistance in Bali.” See Geoffrey Robinson, “State, Society and Political 
Conflict in Bali, 1945-1946”, in Indonesia, No. 45 (April). (Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1988), p. 
37.
influenced by the Japanese and had, in turn, influenced him, reached a compromise with 
the Japanese. He agreed to give up the armed struggle against them in exchange for 
indemnity over the camp attacks. I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan then conspired with the 
Japanese officials to facilitate the arrest of Satrian pemuda leaders and to put an end the 
armed struggle against the Japanese.292
Meanwhile, Cokorda Ngurah Agung, Cokorda Bagus Sayoga and Anak Agung 
Raka Janur went to puri Gaji (puri Delod), where their uncle lived. On 19 December 
1945,1 Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan ordered the perbekel of Padangsambian who was 
affiliated with puri Pamacutan to invite Cokorda Ngurah Agung and Cokorda Bagus 
Sayoga to come to puri Pamacutan, where the Badung pemudas were to hold a meeting 
the following morning, 20 December 1945.293
Meanwhile, the Japanese had begun their operation to capture the Badung 
pemudas and the meeting had to be cancelled. Cokorda Ngurah Agung and Cokorda 
Bagus Sayoga escaped to Poh Manis, Badung.294
Once the situation in Badung quietened down, Cokorda Ngurah Agung and 
Cokorda Bagus Sayoga returned to puri Satria. Soon after their return, Agung's father 
(the raja of Badung), Cokorda Alit Ngurah received a letter from the Japanese military 
government demanding that Cokorda Ngurah Agung and Cokorda Bagus Sayoga come to 
the Bali Hotel immediately in order to be interrogated by the Japanese.295 When they 
arrived, the Japanese arrested them and held them for one week. The Japanese were 
investigating attacks on Japanese, and were particularly interested in who had ordered the 
pemudas to kill the Japanese at Pecatu (South Badung).296 Unable to connect Cokorda 
Ngurah Agung and Cokorda Bagus Sayoga to the attack, the Japanese set them free. 
After this episode, Cokorda Ngurah Agung and Cokorda Bagus Sayoga concentrated
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292Robinson notes that the Japanese forces in Bali as of January 1946 numbered 3.136 men of 
whom 1,146 were navy and 1990 were army troops. Geoffrey Robinson, "State...", ibid., p. 36.
293"Memoirs of Cokorda Ngurah Agung", Unpublished. (Denpasar, 1988), p. 14.
294Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, “Lintasan...”, op. cit., p. 30.
295Interview with Cokorda Bagus Sayoga on 27 December 1992.
296"Memoirs of...", op. cit., pp. 15-16. It is hard to know how many Japanese had been killed by 
the pemuda at that time. The Dutch source also mentioned the murder and terror, conducted by the TKR. 
The peak of this rebellion was 13 December 1945, but this source did not explain clearly how many 
Japanese had been killed. For detailed information, see: S.L. van der Wal, Officielle Bescheiden Betreffende 
De Nederlands-Indonesische Betrekkingen 1945-1950, Vol. Ill, 1 January- 30 Maart 1946. ('s-Gravenhage: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 581.
their efforts on the political struggle for independence, while I Gusti Ngurah Rai and I 
Made Wijakusuma continued the military struggle from the mountains.
It is important to look at I Gusti Ngurah Rai's role within the context of his 
agreement with Agung. As the military struggle was partly his responsibility, he left for 
Java on 29 December 1945 to get weapons.297 Meanwhile I Gusti Wayan Debes and I 
Made Wijakusuma were made responsible for organising the Balinese pemuda to continue 
the struggle while Rai's group was in Java. Rai's group went to Munsiang via Celukan 
Bawang before finally arriving in Wongsorejo (Banyuwangi).298
In Banyuwangi, a Java-Bali command centre was set up under the authority of Ida 
Bagus Mahadewa.299 Later, I Gusti Ngurah Rai also went to Malang and from there to 
the centre of the Republic of Indonesia in Yogyakarta at the end of January 1946.300 
Rai's group was welcomed by President Sukarno and General Sudirman. At that time, 
Lieutenant General Urip Sumohardjo issued a number of orders to I Gusti Ngurah Rai. 
First, he appointed Rai as commander of TRI Lesser Sunda.301 This unit had previously 
been a regiment of Division VIII in Malang, administratively under the command of TRI 
Headquarters. Secondly, he authorised the provision of weapons and ammunition. 
Thirdly, he ordered the TRI (Navy division) to provide personnel to assist the Balinese 
pemudas. And finally, he ordered the TRI of Lesser Sunda, the PRI and the Pesindo^02 
to set up the Indonesian People's Struggle Council of Lesser Sunda (Dewan Perjuangan 
Rakyat Indonesia Sunda Kecil!).303
84
297Soemarlipoetro, "Sembilan Tahun 20 November: Keperwiraan-Kepahlawanan-Pengabdian”, in 
Damai, No. 13, III (17 November 1955) (Denpasar: Jajasan Kebaktian Pedjuang), p. 5.
298Rochmat Hardjawiganda (et al.). Operasi Lintas Laut Banyuwangi Bali. (Jakarta: Departemen 
Pertahanan Keamanan Pusat Sejarah ABRI, 1982), p. 44.
299Ibid, pp.45-46.
300Ida Bagus Rama, "Struktur Organisasi Perjuangan Dalam Revolusi Fisik di Bali 1945-1950". 
Unpublished Thesis. (Denpasar: Universitas Udayana, 1981), p. 99.
301t k r  (Tentara Keatnanan Rakyat) which later became the TRI (Tentara Republik Indonesia) or 
Army of die Republic of Indonesia was the national army until January 25, 1945. Its name was changed 
again from TRI to TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia) or Indonesian National Army on June 3, 1947. See: 
George McTuman Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1952), p. 145.
302The Pesindo (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia) and the PRI (Pemuda Republik Indonesia) were 
established in Bali on 13 November 1945. G. Robinson, "State...", op. cit., p. 6.
30^Rochmat Hardjawiganda (et al.). Operasi Lintas Laut..., op. cit., p. 57.
B. The Contest Between Japanese, NICA and Puri
The coming of SEAC to Bali in October 1945 was welcomed by the governor of 
Lesser Sunda, I Gusti Ketut Pudja. The Japanese had already made contact with the 
SEAC before I Gusti Ketut Pudja, preferring to deal directly with SEAC in the hope of 
reducing their punishment. I Gusti Ketut Pudja explained to SEAC's officials that in 
Lesser Sunda there already existed a national government of the Republic of Indonesia 
which was headed by a governor. He also emphasised that SEAC must not land Dutch 
troops in Bali. Pudja's request was granted by Major Husein who headed SEAC troops 
in Bali and he promised to land only British and Australian troops there.
Meanwhile, the Japanese army which was still armed had captured the pemudas 
and in this way it became easy for the Japanese to attack the government of the Republic 
of Indonesia. The security of Indonesia had been made the responsibility of the Japanese 
according to the terms of surrender until such a time as they could turn the country back 
over to the Dutch. Moreover, the Japanese wanted to weaken the links between the 
Javanese pemudas and their counterparts in Bali.
The Japanese also arrested I Gusti Ketut Pudja and Ida Bagus Putra Manuaba 
with the stated purpose of "protecting the Japanese people". The Japanese believed I 
Gusti Ketut Pudja, as the governor of Lesser Sunda should, automatically take 
responsibility for the deaths of the Japanese there.
Thus, the Japanese began to approach the Balinese rajas with an offer to return 
them to their former positions of power. The Japanese persuaded them to take back their 
authority which had been taken over by the national government of the Republic of 
Indonesia of Lesser Sunda. In Badung, the Japanese effort was not very successful, 
because the Japanese had left a bad impression on the people of Badung, due to their 
cruelty during the war: confiscating rice from the villagers, collecting "voluntary" 
labourers, murder, burning and kidnapping.^04 These Japanese actions, undermined the 
status of puri Satria, because the people of Badung remembered the weakness of their raja 
in facing the Japanese. He had done little to oppose them-probably out of a desire to 
retain his status.
85
304G. Robinson, "State...”, loc. cit.
At that time, there were so few SEAC troops and administrators in Bali that the 
day to day running of the government was left in the hands of the Japanese and Balinese 
bureaucracies. To undermine the power of the Republic of Indonesia government, 
perhaps in preparation for the return of the Dutch, and the reintroduction of the 
Zelfbestuurder system, the Japanese formed a body of which consisted of the former 
Balinese rajas, called the Chamber of Rajas or Dewan Raja-raja in January 1946.305 The 
task of this body was to develop a plan as to how the rajas would organise their regions.
The Japanese organised a general meeting between the Chamber of Rajas and the 
Indonesian National Committee or Komite Nasional Indonesia (KNI) on 21 January 
1946. Ida Bagus Putra Manuaba who had previously been the head of KNI was 
appointed the chairman of that meeting. Meanwhile, the former leaders of the national 
government of Lesser Sunda arrested by the Japanese had been set free the day 
before.366 The nationalist government of Lesser Sunda was weak because the former 
Balinese rajas retained their authority to administer their regions, Japanese repression, 
meant that it had not been able to extend its powers beyond those granted by the 
declaration of 17 August 1945.3D7 After I Gusti Ketut Pudja surrendered his authority to 
the Chamber of Rajas on 29 January 1946,308 the raj a 0f Buleleng, Anak Agung Nyoman 
Panji Tisna was appointed chief of the Chamber of Rajas (based on the government 
decree, No: 43, 1946, issued on March 1946),369 while the raja of Gianyar, Anak 
Agung Gde Agung, was appointed deputy of the Chamber of Rajas and chief of the 
People's Council (Majelis Rakyat).
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Pemerintah Daerah ..., op. cit., p. 26.
306panitia Peringatan Serangan Umum Kota Denpasar 11 April 1946: Mempertahankan 
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307Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Dari Negara Indonesia Timur Ke Republik Indonesia Serikat. 
(Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1985), p. 44.
308 After the Governor of Lesser Sunda surrendered his authority to the Chamber of Rajas, a 
Paruman Negara (legislative body) was established in every swapraja. The aim of these bodies was to 
determine regulations and take part in organising the government. Each swapraja was headed by a raja. 
Above the position of the Paruman Negara was formed Paruman Agung and its tasks were to make 
regulations. This body consisted of two councils: the Chamber of Rajas or Dewan Raja-raja and the 
Majelis Rakyat (People's Council). For a detailed description of Paruman Negara and Parutnan Agung, see: 
"Verslag Betreffende de Herbezetting van Bali van commanding officer Amacab (Van Beuge) over de periode 
2-15 Maart 1946", in S.L. van der Wal, OJjiciele Bescheiden..., Vol. III. op. cit., pp. 580-585.
309This regulation could not be continued, because of the landing of NICA or Gajah Merah in 
Sanur on 2 March 1946. See: "Sekretariat Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Daerah Bali". (Denpasar, 25 
September 1951), pp. 2-3.
Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung argues that after the landing of the SEAC troops, 
Lieutenant General Christison did not allow the Dutch to become involved in the 
government of Indonesia. In Lesser Sunda, however, the situation was much different, 
because NICA forces landed together with Australian troops and, the chief of Australian 
troops allowed NICA to establish civilian government in the regions which had been 
occupied by the Australians.310 Therefore, as Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung emphasises, 
the civilian government established under the protection of the Australians gave the Dutch 
political advantages.^11
Moreover, the SEAC did not accept Pudja's proposal of not allowing Dutch 
troops to land in Bali and on 2 March 1946, Dutch troops landed on the Sanur coast.^1  ^
This battalion consisting of around 150 trucks and jeeps under the protection of NICA 
and headed by Lieutenant Colonel F.H. Ter Meulen, then left for Denpasar. Thus within 
a few weeks NICA had replaced the SEAC forces and AMACAB (Allied Military 
Administration Civil Affairs Branch),313 which had landed on 18 February 1946 in 
Benoa, Denpasar.^lzl The Dutch troops in Bali were divided into three battalions, 
Gianyar, headed by Captain Cassa, Karangasem, Klungkung and Bangli, headed by 
Lieutenant Groet, and Tabanan, Negara, Badung315 and Buleleng, headed by Captain Ter 
Wilde.316
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31 ^de Anak Agung Gde Agung, Dari Negara..., op. cit., p. 36.
312Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung quotes from the commanding officer of AMACAB Bali (Allied 
Military Administration Civil Affairs Branch), J. van Beuge who stated that the Dutch troops who were 
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Me rah," landed in Sanur on 2 March 1946. See: Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Dari Negara..., ibid, p. 43, 
Cf. Anak Agung Putu Murya (et al.). "Sejarah Puri Pemecutan-Badung". Unpublished Paper. (Denpasar, 
1992), p. 88.
313Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", Chapter VI, op. cit., p. 32.
314Panitia Peringatan Serangan Umum, Serangan..., op. cit., p.4
313They seized Badung on 2 March 1946. See: Anak Agung Gde Putra Agung, Sejarah 
Revolusi..., op. cit., p. 54.
316They seized Gianyar on 3 March 1946, Singaraja on 5 March 1946, Tabanan on 7 March 1946 
and Negara on 19 March 1946. Ibid., p. 7.
On 3 March 1946, the Dutch under Lieutenant-Colonel Ter Meulen held a meeting 
with the Balinese rajas in puri Klungkung, which was also attended by the SEAC 
delegate, Controller Smith, who at that time was in charge in Klungkung.^17 Badung was 
represented at this meeting by the raja of Badung, Cokorda Alit Ngurah and his son, 
Cokorda Ngurah Agung. At that meeting, the Dutch acknowledged the Chamber of Rajas 
and Paruman Agung as holding formal authority in Bali. Nevertheless, the Dutch army 
remained responsible for security. The Dutch also offered the Balinese rajas medicines 
and clothes for those in need.
The raja of Badung, Cokorda Alit Ngurah, however, refused either to sign the 
agreement or to cooperate with the Dutch. All the other Balinese rajas, however, agreed to 
cooperate. SEAC then ordered the Badung pemudas who were in the mountains to return 
to the city of Denpasar. Cokorda Ngurah Agung stated that the Badung pemudas would 
return to Denpasar if they were given responsibility for security matters and if the 
Japanese army were expelled from Denpasar. It seems at that time, however, the raja and 
SEAC were unable to come to any agreement.
Consequently, Cokorda Ngurah Agung and Cokorda Bagus Sayoga were again 
arrested by the Japanese army on the orders of SEAC. Yet they were neither investigated 
nor inteiTogated by either Japanese or SEAC. Cokorda Ngurah Agung later attributed the 
ability of SEAC troops to land in Bali at that time to the absence of strong leaders such as 
himself, to oppose them. After the SEAC landing the Japanese released both Cokorda 
Ngurah Agung and Cokorda Bagus Sayoga. Of this matter Cokorda Ngurah Agung 
remarked:
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The situation in Badung became more volatile as time went on. The 
pemuda conducted a guerilla campaign against the Dutch troops, who came 
to Bali to restore the former Dutch government (before the Second World 
War). It seems that the efforts did not go smoothly. Many times, Ida 
Cokorda was invited to attend a meeting in order to be able to work 
together in the same way as before. But, he continued to refuse, because 
he was convinced that the struggle of the Republic of Indonesia would 
follow. Yes,... this belief had been voiced ever since the proclamation of 
the Indonesian state (17-8-1945). It was also time for the other rajas in Bali 
to unite in struggle. But, unfortunately in the end he was the only one who 
c o n s is te n t acted on his conviction. The others supported Dutch 
intentions.^
317S.L. van der Wal, Ofßciele Bescheiden .... Vol III, op. cit., p.584. 
^18Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", loc. cit.
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By contrast, it is interesting to note the official Dutch account which depicts a very 
different situation in Badung. As seen above the leaders of the puris in Badung were 
deeply involved in the struggle. On the contrary this Dutch account depicts the puris in 
Badung as weak and ineffectual, perhaps because they did not fully support the Dutch in 
Badung:
The raja Cokorda Alit Ngurah has always been a weak figure. The district 
head of the influential court of Pamacutan is also a weak authority, while 
the head of Kasiman, who in the past was an excellent head of district, is 
now merely a wreck and has now lost all his influence in his districts. 
After the events of 13 December 1945 the police ran off, so that the 
region was in complete chaos and it will be a considerable time before the 
machine of authority can function normally.319
The raja of Badung, Cokorda Alit Ngurah, appears to have used his authority to 
prevent cooperation with SEAC, because he knew that the Dutch were behind it. He 
would only agree to a cease-fire in the guerilla campaign if, first, the Japanese army 
pulled out of the Badung area, and secondly, if the control of security was surrendered to 
the pemuda.320 Cokorda Alit Ngurah's statement was transmitted by the raja of 
Gianyar, Anak Agung Gde Agung, to SEAC. Because Anak Agung Gde Agung 
supported the Dutch, he also claimed that Cokorda Alit Ngurah’s son, Cokorda Ngurah 
Agung, was the "chief of terrorists" (piinpinan perusuh).^  1
The handover of power in Bali took place in Denpasar on 8 March 1946 when the 
Japanese formally handed over power to the Commandant of the 5th Indian Division 
General E.C.Mansergh in Surabaya.322 After the AFNEI arrived in Singaraja, the capital 
of Lesser Sunda, they held a meeting with its governor, I Gusti Ketut Pudja and his staff 
to convince them to cooperate with the Dutch. On 11 March 1946,1 Gusti Ketut Pudja 
met with Ida Bagus Putra Manuaba to explain the results of the meeting. However, NICA 
troops headed by Captain Smith under the authority of Major General E.C. Mansergh, the 
SEAC leader in East Java, arrested I Gusti Ketut Pudja, Ida Bagus Putra Manuaba, and
319See: S.L. van der Wal, Ofßciele Bescheiden..„Vol. Ill, op.cit., p. 586.
320I Ketut Ardhana, "Biografi Cokorda Ngurah Agung". (Denpasar: Universitas Udayana, 1989),
p. 47.
321 Republik Indonesia: Sunda Ketjil. (Singaradja, 17 Agustus 1953), p. 55. See also: I Ketut 
Ardhana, "Biografi..., loc. cit.
322S.L. van der Wal, Ofßciele Bescheiden..„Vol. III, op. cit., p.580.
the other Republic of Indonesian government officials such as I Gusti Nyoman Wirya, 
Dr. Angsar, Dr. Katung and Sutomo and imprisoned them in Pekambingan. They were 
arrested, it was claimed, because I Gusti Ketut Pudja had been unable to secure Bali and 
many people had been killed by the p em u d a s .^ 2 3 As a result of I Gusti Ketut Pudja's 
capture, the Balinese rajas were forced to acknowledge the authority of the colonial Dutch 
in Bali on 29 March 1946.324 while they were there, the Dutch tried to persuade them to 
collaborate. This can be seen in Ida Bagus Putra Manuaba's account of the event in which 
he described these efforts on the part of de Berenbroek, Piet Het Hoen (Goedhart) and 
Major Polak.325
During that time, the Dutch began to develop a policy for securing Badung. They 
repressed the pemuda forcing many people to take refuge in the mountain areas. The 
NICA sought to capture the pemuda. Spies were sent to identify them and the houses of 
suspected pemuda were burnt down. Consequently nationalist organisations emerged in 
Badung organised by I Gusti Ngurah Anom Pacung, Receh and I Gusti Putu Arka. 
General Investigation Headquarters or Markas Penyelidik UMUM (MPU) were 
established in Denpasar under the leadership of I Made Regog. In addition, the Markas 
Besar Badung (the headquarters of the Badung pemuda) was established under the 
leadership of Ida Bagus Tantra.326
Meanwhile, it is important to look at Rai’s success in obtaining weapons from the 
Javanese pemudas. As explained above, the Republican government supported I Gusti 
Ngurah Rai who was appointed by the chief of General Staff of the Army,327 Lieutenant 
General Urip Sumohardjo328 as the chief of TKR Lesser Sunda with the rank of 
lieutenant colonel.
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Departemen Pendidikan dan Kcbudayaan, 1976), p. 53.
324After capturing I Gusti Ketut Pudja, the Dutch allowed him to flee to Yogyakarta in 1947 
until the acknowledgment of the Republic of Indonesia in 1949. For detailed information regarding the 
acknowledgment of Balinese rajas Dutch authority in Bali, see: N.V.G. Kolff & Co., Gadja Merah op Bali 
en Lombok. (Batavia: n.d.), p. 12.
325See: "Riwayat Hidup Ida Bagus Putra Manuaba 1908-1984". (The Collection of Pusat 
Dokumentasi Kebudayaan Bali), p. 6.
326Ida Bagus Rama, "Struktur ...", op. cit., pp. 102-103.
327Ibid., p. 99.
328At that time, Urip Sumohardjo was appointed to form an army general staff in Yogyakarta. 
See: Anthony Reid, The Indonesian National.Revolution 1945-1950. (Victoria: Longman Australian Pty. 
Ltd., 1974), p. 78.
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On 4 April 1946, I Gusti Ngurah Rai arrived in Yeh Kuning, west Bali with his 
followers and Javanese pemudas, Lieutenant Suparto, Lieutenant Mariyono, Lieutenant 
Maraku, Lieutenant B. Sutiyaning, and Ida Bagus Mahadewa.329 There he established a 
Republican Headquarters for Bali. Rai's group had left Java with the deputy chief of 
police in Banyuwangi, Ida Bagus Mahadewa. Other groups that left from Muncar, 
Banyuwangi travelling via Yeh Kuning to Munduk Malang failed to arrive in Bali. 
Cokorda Rai Gambir and Cokorda Darma Putra, for example, were captured and 
executed by the Dutch. The members of Rai's group who succeeded in landing in 
Munduk Malang were welcomed officially by I Gusti Wayan Debes who was the chief of 
TKR in Tabanan and I Dewa Nyoman Djehen on 8 April 1946.330
After I Gusti Ngurah Rai arrived in Munduk Malang on 10 April 1946, he 
arranged a meeting of the Balinese pemudas. Tabanan pemudas attended that meeting, 
although the Badung and west Gianyar pemudas were unable to come because they were 
preparing to attack NICA's camps in Badung.331
On 14 April 1946, I Gusti Ngurah Rai, I Gusti Putu Wisnu, Ida Bagus 
Mahadewa, I Made Wijakusuma, Debes, Mantik and Cokorda Ngurah formed a united 
front, called, The General Headquarters for The Indonesian Struggle of Lesser Sunda or 
Markas Besar Umum Perjuangan Rakyat Indonesia Sunda Kecil (MBU DPRI SK). This 
body joined TRI, PRI and Pesindo.332 MBU DPRI SK, which was headed by I Gusti 
Ngurah Rai and I Gusti Putu Wisnu, had around 800 members.333
In Badung, the attack which took place on 11 April 1946 was directed at NICA's 
camps in Kayumas, Kereneng and Satria under the leadership of I Gusti Bagus 
Sugianyar. The Kayumas camp was attacked from the east. This attack was headed by 
Ida Bagus Japa, the son of puri Kasiman's ruler, Anak Agung Ngurah Kusumayuda. Ida 
Bagus Japa was accompanied by Ida Bagus Ratja. Meanwhile, I Gusti Made Oka 
Erlangga, Nyoman Suwetja and Nyoman Sarja Udaya led the attack from the north. The
329I Gusti Ngurah Pindha Kirikumi Besar-Besaran Terhadap Kota Denpasar. (Denpasar: Yayasan 
Parisada Hindu Dharma Kabupaten Badung, 1973), p.7.
330Ida Bagus Rama, "Struktur...", op. cit, p. 105.
33 0  Gusti Ngurah Pindha, Kirikumi.... loc. cit.
3?2PRI and Pcsindo were the youth organisations at that time, see: R. Irsaf, "Pemuda dan 
Perdjuangan", in Damai, No.12, III. (Denpasar: Jajasan Kebaktian Pedjuang, 1 November 1955), p. 13.
3?^R. Djajoesman, "Biografi I Goesti Ngoerah Rai", Madjalah Sedjarah Militer Angkatan Darat, 
No. 3 A-7. (1960), p. 66.
NICA’s camp in Satria which was located close to puri Satria was attacked from two 
sides. The attack from the north was led by I Gusti Ngurah Pindha and that from the east 
by I Nyoman Diasa. The pemudas also attacked NICA police camps in Pekambingan, 
and the prison in Denpasar in order to set the war internees free. This was led by I Made 
Pugeg. In that attack four Badung pemudas were killed, Ida Bagus Japa,334 I Made 
Bongkol, Ida Bagus Gede and I Tegug Kaba-Kaba, while the pemudas killed 81 Dutch 
troops.335 In retaliation, NICA attacked the pemudas and as a result, the Badung and 
Gianyar pemudas were forced to retreat to the west and north in order to join up with the 
main group in Munduk Malang which was headed by I Gusti Ngurah Rai.336 At that 
time, the Buleleng pemudas were unable to join the other groups, because they were still 
engaged in fighting in Buleleng.
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Djapa". (1987), p.19.
335R. Djajoesman, "Biografi...", loc. cit.
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C  Puri Pamacutan and Puri Satria: The Path to Power and the Battle ofMarga:
The attack of the Badung pemudas against the Dutch (NICA) camps in Denpasar 
on 11 April 1946 made the position of the raja of Badung, Cokorda Alit Ngurah more 
difficult. After the attack, it seems that Cokorda Alit Ngurah became ill, probably out of 
fear that the Dutch would capture and exile him. The people of Badung however, believed 
that it was the raja himself who had planned and organised the attacks. While the people 
may have been overly confident of the abilities of their raja, the Dutch had a more realistic 
view:
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In the letter dated 16 April, No. 229/1 which you know about, Mr. van 
Beuge already reported that the autonomous ruler of the district of Badung 
was granted sick-leave for a period of three months. I regard it as a 
favourable circumstance that this Zelfbestuurder, who was not a leading 
light and from whom it may well be expected that, because of his fear, he 
may be led to actions contrary to our authority, in this way, at least for the 
time being, can be ruled out. The person deputising for the administrator, 
the Punggawa of Pamacutan I do not know personally, but what I have 
heard about him gives rise to the expectation that he will be able to bring 
about some order in the relationships and the political situation in Badung. 
The final solution of this question can be made in due course on the basis 
of his behaviour and the further course of events.337
The Dutch believed Cokorda Alit Ngurah to be a weak and ineffectual ruler and a 
potential threat to their interests because of his fear and due to his inability to put down 
the insurrection in Badung. In their opinion Cokorda Alit Ngurah could no longer be 
trusted. The Dutch used his illness as a pretence for easing him out of power and 
replacing him with someone they considered more suitable.
As a first step in their plan to replace Cokorda Alit Ngurah, in April338 the Dutch 
appointed I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan as the Deputy Raja of Badung. I Gusti Ngurah 
Gde Pamacutan received the title, "Cokorda", and became Cokorda Ngurah Gde 
Pamacutan. Robinson argues that I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan’s acceptance of the 
position of raja led to a weakening of the Republican cause in Bali and it seems that the 
rivalries it exacerbated between Satria and Pamacutan continued throughout the revolution 
and afterwards. In addition, Robinson notes as follows:
337S.L. van der Wal, Ofßciele Bescheiden Betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische Betrekkingen, 
1945-1950. Vol. IV, 31 Maart-16 Juli 1946. (VGravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 194-195.
338Anak Agung Putu Murya notes that Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan stopped as the Deputy 
Raja of Badung on 1 May 1947, because he was formally appointed as the Raja of Badung. See: Anak 
Agung Putu Murya (et al.), "Sejarah Puri Pemecutan...", op. cit., p. 90.
94
It is sometimes said that the Puri Pemecutan betrayed the Revolution after 
accepting the position of Raja in 1946. Others point out that the head of the 
puri (Cokorda Pemecutan) consulted with the main Republican leader, I 
Gusti Ngurah Rai, prior to accepting the position, because he feared that 
this move might undermine the resistance. According to this version of 
events, Ngurah Rai encouraged the Cokorda to accept the job so that he 
might help the resistance "from within".339
To lessen any ill-will among the Satrians which might have been engendered by 
their choice of Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan over the heir-apparent, the Dutch 
appointed Cokorda Ngurah Agung to the lesser position of Chief of Kasiman in May 
1946.340 Recruiting the Satrians into the Dutch bureaucratic system was seen as a means 
of ending the rebellion. Lijftocht who was the Assistant Controleur at that time and who 
had a strong influence on Cokorda Ngurah Agung, tried in vain to get him to change his 
ideas regarding his role in organising the Balinese pemuda struggle.341 Despite 
Lijftocht's entreaties, Cokorda Ngurah Agung continued his anti-Dutch efforts.
This can be seen in Agung's efforts to rid the Kasiman region of Dutch spies. To 
that end, he ordered the people of Kasiman to capture people who were not from the 
Kasiman area, in particular members of the Pemuda Pembela Negara (PPN)342 Gianyar 
who were in the Badung area. Secondly, he tried to convince the Dutch that the Kasiman 
region was free of resistance by holding entertainment activities which were attended by 
both the pemudas and by Dutch officials such as Lijftocht.
J.B. Th. König approached both Cokorda Ngurah Agung and Cokorda Bagus 
Sayoga in an effort to gain their support. Cokorda Bagus Sayoga remembers that König 
claimed that Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan proposed that the Dutch kill I Gusti Ngurah 
Rai as he was the only Balinese leader capable of organising the Badung pemuda.
339Robinson’s statement is based on interviews with Nyoman Pugeg, I Made Wijakusuma and 
Anak Agung Kecor. He did not interview with the royal family of puri Satria. See: G. Robinson, 
"State...", loc. cit.
340"Badung Government Decree, No. 39, 24 May 1946".
341Interview with Cokorda Ngurah Agung on 16 February 1992.
342To oppose local DPRI groups PPN (Pemuda Pembela Negara) or Youth Defending the State 
was formed by the raja of Gianyar, Anak Agung Gde Oka. Meanwhile, the rajas of Klungkung and 
Karangasem formed BKN (Badan Keatnanan Negara) Body for the Security of the State and AIM {Anti 
Indonesia Merdeka) Anti-Independent Indonesia. See: Max Lane, "Wedastra Suyasa in Balinese Politics 
1962-1972: From Charismatic Politics to Socio-Educational Activities", B.A. Honours-Thesis 
(Unpublished). (Sydney: Sydney University, 1972), p. 16. G. Robinson notes that "the four kingdoms in 
the eastern part of the island-Bangli, Karangasem, Klungkung and Gianyar-were not areas of widespread 
Republican sympathy". G. Robinson, "State...", op. cit., p. 4. The Pemuda Pembela Negara was 
dispersed on 20 June 1950, See: "Pemuda Pembela Negara Gianjar Bubar", in Penindjau, III, No.50. 
Wednesday 21 June 1950.
Otherwise, Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan has said he would be unable to bring peace 
to Badung. To avoid such a drastic measure, the Dutch made one final attempt to get Rai 
to mend his ways. On 13 May 1946 König sent a letter to I Gusti Ngurah Rai:
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Dear Rai. The Lieutenant Colonel and I (you will, of course, still 
remember us) know exactly the reason why it was necessary for you to 
lead the T.K.R. Therefore, I would like to speak with you. Try to contact 
Captain Cassa somewhere near Plaga village, and there we can speak. No 
matter what your decision is, after our discussion, you are free to go 
wherever you wish.343
After receiving Konig's letter, on 18 May 1946,1 Gusti Ngurah Rai responded to 
this request as follows:
Freedom!
We have received your letter. I give answer as follows: Security 
matters in Bali are our affair. Since the landing of your troops, the island 
has not been peaceful. The proof is obvious, it can no longer be denied. 
Look how the suffering of the people has increased. The safety of all of 
the people is threatened. In addition, the terrible economic conditions have 
the people by the throat. Security is disturbed because you violate the 
people's will. They have declared their freedom.
Negotiation we leave to the discretion of our leaders in Java. Bali is not 
the place for diplomatic negotiation. We cannot compromise. In the name 
of the people we seek only the complete withdrawal of the Dutch from 
Bali. Otherwise we vow to continue the struggle to achieve our aims. As 
long as you stay in Bali, the island of Bali will remain a place of bloodshed 
and conflict between us. Understand our situation. Once free, forever 
free!344
From Rai's letter we can see that the pemuda struggle in Bali depended on the 
Javanese struggle in Java. Thanks to the support from the Javanese pemudas as well as 
the strong support of the Balinese people, he did not have to surrender to the Dutch. Rai 
believed that he and the other Balinese pemudas would be able to liberate themselves from 
the Dutch. As a result, I Gusti Ngurah Rai together with the Balinese pemudas remained 
to manage the guerilla campaign.
The Balinese pemuda camp was centred in Munduk Malang (in the western part of 
Bali) although NICA was still strong in this area. Thus, it was hard to send weapons 
there. The Balinese pemudas therefore developed a new strategy, namely to shift Dutch 
attention to the eastern region of Bali. This was accomplished in part by means of a long
343Nyoman S.Pendit, Bali Berjuang. (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1979) p. 197. 
344//?/W., p.203.
march to Tanah Aron from 1 June to 18 July 1946343(the eastern region of Bali) which 
distracted the Dutch.
Three months after I Gusti Ngurah Rai returned from the long march, he 
reorganised the struggle in Bali. He appointed Kompyang Sujana leader of the Markas 
Besar (Headquarters) in Buleleng (North Bali). At that time, the son of the raja of 
Badung, Cokorda Ngurah Agung was not fighting in Denpasar, but centred his struggle 
in Gianyar with Cokorda Kresna346 and I Ketut Gde Darmayuda.347
On 20 November 1946, The Dutch attacked the pemudas in the village of Marga 
and set fire to the houses of suspected guerilla supporters in what become known as the 
battle of Marga.348 Outnumbered but possessed by the spirit of puputan and inspired by 
the leadership of I Gusti Ngurah Rai, the pemuda fought on. The Dutch were surprised by 
their tenacity and bravery as we see from this account of the battle by a Dutch soldier: 
"They did not want to surrender, Sir! They fought to the last man".349
Cokorda Bagus Sayoga believes that it was the intention of König, the leader of 
the Dutch troops, to take I Gusti Ngurah Rai alive and that he had given orders to that 
effect. Nevertheless, during the battle I Gusti Ngurah Rai was killed. In response to the 
massacre, I Made Wijakusuma called together the leaders of the Markas Besar of Badung 
and Tabanan on 22 November 1946. The meeting was attended by Cokorda Ngurah 
Agung, Ida Bagus Tantra from Badung and I Gde Alit Saputra, I Made Wijakusuma and 
Subroto Aryo Mataram from Tabanan. As a result, at that meeting Made Wijakusuma 
succeeded in forming a new MBU, the DPRI SK, was to be led by Wijana and Mataram. 
At the same time, Cokorda Ngurah Agung, Mantik, Ida Bagus Tantra established an 
intelligence service.3^
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345Ibid., pp. 180-187.
346Cokorda Ngurah Agung’s younger brother.
347Ida Bagus Rama, "Struktur...", op. cit., p. 118.
348 See: "I Goesti Ngoerah Rai Dan Teman2Nja Tewas", in Penjoeloeh Bali, 22 November 1946. 
The Resident of Bali and Lombok worried that I Gusti Ngurah Rai’s cremation ceremony could raise the 
spirit of rebellion among the people of Badung, so he suggested that a simple ceremony be held. See: the 
announcement of the Resident of Bali and Lombok on 26 December 1946, "Pemberi Tahoean Resmi", 
Penjoeloeh Bali, 7 January 1946.
349"Zij wilden zieh niet overgeven, Meneer! Ze hebben tot de laatste man gevochten", in 
"Puputan Sebagai Ungkapan Kepahlawanan". (The collection of Menzies Library, The ANU, n.d.), p. 14.
330Ida Bagus Rama, "Struktur...", op. cit., p. 119.
The loss of such an outstanding leader, at the battle of Marga led to a 
reorganisation of the leadership in Bali. I Gusti Wayan Debes was succeeded by Ida 
Bagus Tantra, the former leader of Markas Besar Badung. Ida Bagus Tantra in turn 
appointed Cokorda Ngurah Agung as the leader of Markas Besar Badung.351
Although, Cokorda Ngurah Agung wanted to take revenge for the killing I Gusti 
Ngurah Rai, he remained at his post to give the appearance of doing a good job so the 
Dutch would continue to trust him. This was a strategy of Cokorda Ngurah Agung's to 
balance the power of Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan. He was subsequently appointed 
chief of district (punggawa koto) in Denpasar.352 The appointment of Cokorda Ngurah 
Agung to this subordinate position exacerbated the rivalries between the two puris. Now 
it was the lower status puri Pamacutan leaders who held the position of raja while the 
former raja's family had been reduced to lesser officials.353 Therefore, it is quite true, as 
Robinson asserts that the sources of political conflict in Bali between 1945-1946 were 
based on the historical rivalries between those puris. The competition focused on social 
status, control of land and labour and temples.354 Robinson, moreover, emphasises as 
follows:
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In a strict sense, these rivalries often had little to do with the issues of 
nationalism or Indonesian independence, but in the period after August 
1945, they came increasingly to be framed in the idiom of this debate. The 
political mobilisation which occurred at this time, in the name of merdeka 
(freedom, independence), and (all-Indonesia) Republicanism on the one 
hand, and "Balinese autonomy" (from Java) and "loyalism" (to the Dutch) 
on the other, accentuated the conflict not simply between the noble houses, 
but also between their respective followers. New and often intense social, 
political, and ideological conflicts, were forged in the course of this 
mobilisation.355
During that time, Cokorda Ngurah Agung kept his promise to I Gusti Ngurah Rai 
before he was killed, to continue the struggle politically, while I Gusti Ngurah Rai and I 
Made Wijakusuma would do so diplomatically. After the battle of Marga, the Dutch 
finally considered Bali to be pacified.
351 Ibid., p. 121.
352"Badung Government Decree of 31 December 1946, No: 182".
353G. Robinson, " State...", op. cit., pp. 10-11.
354See: Chapter IV.
355G. Robinson, "State...", op. cit., pp. 7-8. I have found in my sources nothing to support 
Robinson's claim that Balinese autonomy from Java was an issue in these rivalries.
D. The Puri: Between the Republic and the NIT
At the Malino conference of 16 - 22 July 1946, -^<'6 the former Dutch East Indies 
were divided into the East Indonesian State and the Republic of Indonesia. Bali became a 
part of the East Indonesian State. At that conference, a member of the Paruman Agung, I 
Gusti Bagus Oka, stated that Bali wanted to become a state in the commonwealth of the 
Republic of Indonesia. In addition, he suggested that the red - white flag of Indonesia 
could be flown beside the Dutch flag and that the people might sing the Indonesian 
national anthem, "Great Indonesia" {Indonesia Raya ) together with the Dutch anthem, 
"Wilhelmus". On the other hand, another member of Paruman Agung , Cokorda Gde 
Raka Sukawati, proposed that Bali be united with "Great East" {Timur Besar) and his 
proposal was agreed to by the Paruman Agung the majority of which supported the 
Balinese rajas. Thus, the Paruman Agung agreed that Bali would be included in the East 
Indonesian State {Negara Indonesia Timur).
Accordingly, the Dutch, under H.J. van Mook, held a conference in Denpasar 
from 18 to 24 December 1946.^57 Bali was represented by Anak Agung Ngurah Ketut 
Djelantik, Cokorda Gde Raka Sukawati, I Gusti Bagus Oka, I Gde Panetja, Anak Agung 
Gde Agung, Made Mendra and Anak Agung Nyoman Pandji Tisna. The results of the 
Denpasar conference included: first, the forming of the East Indonesian State, second, the 
discussion of the plan of the East Indonesian State regulations and third, the election of 
the President of the East Indonesian State. Cokorda Raka Sukawati was elected President 
and Najamuddin Daeng Malewa the Prime Minister. It was decided that the capital of the 
East Indonesian State would be located in Makassar. According to article 14 of the 
agreement, the East Indonesian State would consist of 13 regions: South Sulawesi, 
Minahasa, North Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, Sangihe and Talaud islands, North 
Moloccus, Bali, Lombok, Timor, and the islands of Flores, Sumbawa and Sumba.358 
These islands were to be separated from the Republic of Indonesia, with its capital in 
Yogyakarta. This established the East Indonesian State as a rival state to the revolutionary
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356Anthony Reid, The Indonesian National..., op. cit., p.108. 
351Ibid.
358Nyoman S. Pendit, Bali..., op. cit., p. 229.
republic headed by Soekarno and Hatta. It would seem that the Dutch had succeeded in 
separating Bali from the Republic government in Java.359
Nevertheless, in Badung, Cokorda Ngurah Agung who was the head of the 
district of Denpasar remained to fight against the Dutch in support of the Republic of 
Indonesia which had been proclaimed on 17 August 1945. Cokorda Ngurah Agung 
together with I Gusti Putu Mertha and Dr. Suwamo struggled by means of their party, the 
Indonesian People's Party or Partai Rakyat Indonesia (Parrindo), which had been 
established on 4 December 1946.360 The aim of this party was to develop social, 
economic and political power in Bali.361 In Badung, this party was headed by the head of 
puri Satria, Cokorda Ngurah Agung. The aims of Parrindo in Badung were to eliminate 
illiteracy, and to demand that the Dutch apply democratic principles in government.362 
Cokorda Ngurah Agung founded the Council of People's Education or Majelis 
Pendidikan Rakyat (MPR) on 8 December 1946,363 the General High School or Sekolah 
Lanjutan Umum (SLU), and an infant school or Sekolah Taman Indria. Branches of 
Parrindo also spread from Badung to other parts of Bali including Tabanan, and 
Singaraja. The Dutch account depicts the situation in those three districts as follows:
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The resistance movement in the districts of Buleleng, Badung and Tabanan 
was the most difficult to handle because of its resistance and underground 
activity. This was noticeable particularly in the centres of Denpasar and 
Singaraja. Therefore, it is the more to be regretted that the (deputy) 
autonomous rulers of Badung and Buleleng are so weak in their attitude 
which has an adverse reaction on the civil servants in their departments.364
359See: W.A. Goudoever, Denpasar Bouwt Een Huis: Een Overzichtelijke Bewerking van 
Notulen en Tekstueele Redevoeringen Ter Conferentie van Denpasar 7-24 Desemher 1946. (Batavia: 
Regeerings Voorlichting Dienst, 1947), passim.
360 p a r i a i  Rakjat Indonesia (Parrindo) was established in the Hun Chiau Hoh Choh Hui 
(H.C.H.C.H.) Denpasar, the first meeting was attended by 200 people,including not only the government 
representatives, but also various organisations. At that meeting Dr. Soewamo emphasised that in order that 
the Great East should have the same position as the Republic in Java, Madura and Sumatra, it was 
necessary to establish the political organisation. See: "Oepatjara Peresmian Balai Pertemoean Parrindo di 
Denpasar", in Penjoeleh Bali, 4 February 1947. See also: "Nasehat Resident Bali Lombok dan Ketoea 
Gaboengan Keradjaan di Bali", in Penjoeloeh Bali, 28 March 1947. In opposition, the Dutch under Major 
Polak together with Balinese rajas: Anak Agung Ketoet Djelantik, (Karangasem), Anak Agung Gde Oka, 
(Bangli), Tjokorde Alit Poetera (Gianyar), Anak Agung Gde Ngoerah (Klungkung) established The 
Indonesian Democratic Party or Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PADI) which pro-federation on 9 March 
1947. See: "PADI Mendjehna Ditaman Soekasada: Terlahirnja Soeatoe Partai Politik Lagi Di Bali", in 
Penjoeleh Bali, 14 March 1947. Cf. Max Lane, "Wedastra Suyasa in...", loc.cit.
^61"Pembentoekan Partai Ra'jat Indonesia", in Penjoeloeh Bali, Djoem'at, 6 Desember 1946, 
Tahoen Ke I, No. 49. (Denpasar: Redactie en Administratie Bali Drukkerij), p. 1.
362Ihid.
363Republik Indonesia: Sunda Ketjil..., op. cit., p. 38.
-^ ,4S.L. van der Wal, OjJIciele Bescheiden Betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische Betrekkingen, 
1945-1950. Vol. VIII, 21 Maart-20 Mei 1947. ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), p. 246.
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In April 1947, the Parrindo held a general meeting which included the leaders 
from Tabanan, Jembrana and Singaraja. The aim of this meeting was to determine 
Parrindo's response to the conference of Linggardjati. First, Parrindo stated their 
solidarity with the Republic of Indonesia in the conference of Linggardjati. Secondly, 
they agreed to stabilise the situation in Bali. Thirdly, they demanded the release of all 
political prisoners. Fourthly, they sought amnesty or reduced sentences for the Balinese 
pemudas. Finally, they pressed for a decision by the Indonesia-Dutch on the status of 
Bali.
This party also took the struggle to parliament. They tried to get their pro- 
Republic members into the Paruman Agung (legislative body) of Bali.365 These were I 
Gusti Putu Mertha, I Ketut Mandra, I Nyoman Jelada and Ida Bagus Putra Manuaba who 
was the former leader of the KNID of Lesser Sunda. These members fought hard to unify 
Bali with Java based on paragraph 4, article 1, of the Linggardjati Agreement. In the 
parliament of NIT a parallel struggle was carried out by I Made Mendra, Mr. Gde Panetje 
and I Gusti Bagus Oka.366
Generally in Bali, in order to keep the pemudas' spirit in the struggle, the leaders 
of the pemudas tried to reorganise them. Cokorda Bagus Sayoga, Ida Bagus Mahadewa, 
and I Gde Puger established the City Centre Headquarters or Markas Kota Pusat (MKP) 
in 1947. The Dutch account "Officiele Bescheiden Betreffende de Nederlands- 
Indonesische Betrekkingen" mentioned the aims of Markas Kota Pusat:
1. To give moral, financial and material support to the pemudas.
2. To establish better contact with the M.B.O. D.P.R.I. (General Great 
Headquarters or Markas Besar Umum) centered in the mountains, Central 
Command Headquarters or Markas Besar and the City Centre 
Headquarters (Markas Kota) in order to take coordinated action.
3. The provision of intelligence information to the pemudas.
365The Paruman Agung (the legislative body of Bali) consisted of 40 members of which 34 were 
elected: 5 from Buleleng, 3 from Jembrana, 5 from Tabanan, 5 from Badung, 3 from Gianyar, 3 from 
Klungkung, 3 from Bangli, and 5 from Karangasem. See: "Pengoemoeman Resmi Gaboengan Keradjaan2 
Bali, No. 1/ 1947 (15 Augustus 1947)", p. 2.
366"poiitick Verslag van Resident van Bali en Lombok (Boon) over de Periode 1-5 April 1947", 
in S.L. van der Wal, Ofßcielle Bescheiden.... Vol. VIII, op. cit., pp. 246-247.
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4. To set up a large underground organisation for espionage, sabotage, 
strikes, acquisition of weapons, a campaign of terror and intimidation 
(against the Dutch troops).367
By agreeing to the conference of Linggadjati,368 the Republic of Indonesia 
acknowledged the de facto existence of the East Indonesian State. This was one reason, 
why Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan continued to support the Dutch under the East 
Indonesian State. Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan believed that it little or nothing would 
be gained if the Balinese pemudas continued to fight, because the Republic government 
itself acknowledged the existence of the East Indonesian State. Therefore, the royal 
family of Pamacutan believed that at that stage the republic government in Java did not 
sufficiently value the pemudas' struggle in Bali to seek to incorporate Bali into the 
republic.369
After the Republic acknowledged the existence of the East Indonesian State, the
Dutch continued to organise the legislative body of Bali which was to include the
Paruman Agung and Paruman Negara. The Pembentoekan Gaboengan Keradjaan-
keradjaan Bali of 26 February 1947, established the structure of government in Bali. The
government consisted of the Chamber of Rajas and the Paruman Agung. Therefore, the
rajas no longer served as members of the Paruman Agung but as members of the
Chamber of Rajas. In Badung the election for the members of the Paruman Agung/
Paruman Negara was held on 26 April 1947.370 One raja's account, published in the
Penjoeloeh Bali, explained the aim of the election as follows:
To make the island of Bali capable of adapting to the change into a 
democratic society 371
Although from this account we see that the Balinese rajas through their newspaper, 
Penjoeloeh Bali, declared that they wanted to create a democratic society, the truth was
367 Van der Wal. Ofßcielle Bescheiden Betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische Betrekkingen, Vol. 
IX, 21 Mei-20 Juli 1947. ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), p.344.
368Nyoman S. Pendit, Bali ...op. cit., pp. 288-294. See also: Anthony Reid., The Indonesian 
National..., op. cit., p. 111.
369Interview with Ida Bagus Saputra on 30 December 1992.
370The election of Paruman Agung/ Paruman Negara was held in Tabanan on 19 and 20 April 
1947, in Bangli and Klungkung on 21 April 1947, in Karangasem on 22 and 23 April 1947, in Buleleng 
and Gianyar on 23 April 1947 and in Jembrana on 25 April 1947. See: Republik Indonesia: Sunda ..., op. 
cit., p. 54.
371 See: "Peinilihan Anggauta2 Paroeman Agoeng dan Paroeman Negara di Bali: Bali Menjoesoen 
Masjarakat Demokratis", in Penjoeloeh Bali. (Denpasar: Redactie en Administrate Bali-Drukkerij, 29 
April 1947).
otherwise. From Badung, the following candidates were elected: Cokorda Ngurah Agung, 
Ida Bagus Mahadewa, I Gusti Putu Merta, I Gde Panetja, I Gde Poeger, Ketut Mandra, I 
Made Anom, I Gusti Gde Subamia, I Gusti Raka Batoe, Ida Bagus Ngurah, I Gusti Ketut 
Gde, I Made Rames, I Gusti Ngurah Oka Daun, I Gde Regoeg, I Gusti Agung Gde Oka, 
I Ketut Suwandi. However, once the list of elected members was submitted to the 
Chamber of Rajas and the Resident to be confirmed, there was disagreement over the 
results of the elections. As the majority of those elected were pemudas such as Cokorda 
Ngurah Agung, I Gusti Putu Merta, Ida Bagus Mahadewa called two special meetings of 
the Chamber of Rajas to be held in Tampaksiring on 9 June 1947 and in Denpasar on 10 
July 1947.
At the meeting, the Chamber of Rajas denounced the election process, particularly 
in Badung and Buleleng, as unfair. They claimed that the election had been repressed by 
the p emu da factions whom they termed extremists. The Chamber of Rajas made the 
following declaration:
1. The election of candidates to the Paruman Agung/ Paruman Negara in 
the kingdoms of Badung and Buleleng has been cancelled.
2. The formation of the Paruman Agung and the Paruman Negara in the 
other kingdoms will be delayed as free elections can not be held due to 
extremists.
3. During this time, the former Paruman Agung/ Paruman Negara will 
continue to function.372
The attempt by the Chamber of Rajas to implement their version of democracy did 
not succeed. They were unable to organise an effective government in the face of 
opposition by Cokorda Ngurah Agung. Meanwhile, Cokorda Alit Ngurah’s support of 
the Republican government can be seen from his delegating I Gusti Putu Merta, Ida 
Bagus Mahadewa, Cokorda Bagus Sayoga, Ida Bagus Manuaba to take letters of loyalty 
to the government of the Republic of Indonesia, in Yogyakarta in 1947. In those letters 
Cokorda Alit Ngurah, still nominally raja of Badung, recognised the existence of the 
Republic of Indonesia as successor to the East Indonesian State. In addition, Cokorda 
Alit Ngurah swore loyalty to President Soekarno. And finally, Cokorda Alit Ngurah 
warned Soekarno that he was the only raja among the eight rajas of Bali who remained
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loyal to Soekarno, the other rajas were cooperating with the East Indonesian Stated73 
Cokorda Ngurah Agung notes:
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My father was the only one who was pro-Republic of Indonesia and was 
loyal to President Soekamo. My father's letter of loyalty was brought to 
Yogya (at that time the capital of the Republic of Indonesia was in Yogya). 
Therefore, because of this refusal (to cooperate), the Dutch dismissed my 
father as king.374
Cokorda Alit Ngurah was dismissed as raja of Badung on 1 May 1947 and was
succeeded by Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan. Although it must be mentioned that some
authors refer to Cokorda Alit Ngurah’s "retirement" rather than dismissal. According to
Anak Agung Putu Murya for example:
Only after the retirement of Cokorda Alit Ngurah, was there a change in 
the head of state in Badung when Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan was 
appointed as his successor as the ruler in the kingdom of Badung on 1 
May 1947.375
Nevertheless "dismissal" is closer to the truth. Cokorda Alit Ngurah had been 
unable to control the pro-Republican organisation, Parrindo, which was considered by 
the Dutch to be a serious threat to security. The failure seemed magnified by the fact that 
Cokorda Alit Ngurah's son, Cokorda Ngurah Agung was one of the principle leaders of 
Parrindo.376
Because the Dutch considered both the Parrindo and MKP organisations 
dangerous, they were watched closely. The Dutch tried to stop the aggressive activities of 
both these organisations, which in their opinion included their educational activities such 
as the literacy program called PBH (Pembrantasan Buta Huruf or the elimination of 
illiteracy). The Dutch believed this program was merely provided a cover for the planning 
of terrorist activities, and called the program Perkumpulan Banteng Hitam or the "Wild 
Black Oxen Groups", a veiled reference to its true nature.377 The Balinese rajas 
suggested a meeting in Tampaksiring which was attended by the Minister of Internal
373Until now, this loyalty document has not been yet found. Interview with Cokorda Bagus 
Sayoga on 27 Desernber 1992. See also: I Ketut Ardhana, "Biografi...", op. cit., p. 29.
374Bre Redana and Raka Santeri, "Puri Sebagai Kekuasaan Dunia: Antara Puri Golkar dan Puri 
PDI", in Kompas (Sunday, August 2, 1992), p. 2
375Anak Agung Putu Murya (et al.). "Sejarah Puri Pemecutan...", op. cit., p. 90. Anak Agung 
Putu Murya is a member of the royal family of Pamacutan.
31()Republik Indonesia: Sunda ..., op. cit., p. 55.
377See: "Memoirs of...", op. cit., p. 26.
Affairs of the NIT, Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, the Resident of Bali and Lombok, Dr. 
Boon and the Assistant Resident of Bali and Lombok, Major Polak. With the exception of 
Cokorda Alit Ngurah the Balinese rajas supported the Dutch efforts to ban Parrindo. It 
was decided at that meeting to ask the Governor-General to ban the Parrindo and their 
branches such as MPR and PBH in all parts of Bali.378 As a result, based on the 
Lieutenant Governor's Decree No. 2 on 14 June 1947, Parrindo was declared illegal in
Bali.379
The Dutch called together the leaders of Parrindo. On 20 June 1947, Dr. Boon 
called on Cokorda Ngurah Agung to cease Parrindo and allied activities. However, 
Cokorda Ngurah Agung still refused to disband this organisation as long as it still had 
members. In addition, Cokorda Ngurah Agung emphasised that this organisation did not 
have a strong relationship with the pemudas based in the mountains. Ida Cokorda Ngurah 
Agung recalled later:
Thus, on 25 June 1947 we were called by Resident Boon (of NICA), to 
his office. The two of us then, held negotiations. Boon wanted us to 
disband the party which we headed, The Indonesian People's Party and 
also to eliminate the literacy program which he supposed were controlled 
by the "Wild Black Oxen groups." Of course, we refused NICA's 
demands, because there was no reason to disperse the party, and also 
because we had already become NICA's prisoners, and were temporally 
imprisoned in the court of Pamacutan.380
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In Badung, Republican support was centred in puri Satria. In order to counter the 
insurgency in this area, the Dutch under Dr. Boon and Lijftocht cooperated with the ruler 
of Badung, Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan in the capture of Cokorda Ngurah Agung, 
Cokorda Bagus Sayoga,381 Ida Bagus Mahadewa, I Gde Subamija, Putra Kamayana, I 
Made Tamba, Sugita and Ketut Kaot on 25 June 1947,382 because they were believed to 
be a threat to the security of Badung. On 25 June 1947, Cokorda Ngurah Agung was 
arrested by the Dutch and imprisoned in the NICA's barracks in Karangasem.383 That 
night, Cokorda Bagus Sayoga was also captured by the Dutch and put in a Dutch military
31sIbid.
379R. Nalenan, Arnold Mononutu: Potret Seorang Patriot. (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1981), p. 
181. Cf. Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Dari NIT..., op.cit., pp. 230-279.
380See: Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", op. cit., p. 33.
381 Cokorda Bagus Sayoga was set free by the Republic government in Bali in December 1949. 
Interview with Cokorda Bagus Sayoga on 27 December 1992.
382"Memoirs of ...", op. cit., p. 28.
383 Ibid.
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camp in Dcnpasar. On 29 June 1947 Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung or Kresna (younger
brother of Cokorda Ngurah Agung),384 was killed by the Dutch in Ayunan, while
viewing Rai who was lying in state in Marga. Cokorda Ngurah Agung explains the
reason for his own imprisonment as follows:
I did something which opposed the political system of NIC A (Swapraja's 
Badung government), consciously. But, I thought my duty to fulfil my 
promise to Ngurah Rai, was more important than any other duty. No 
matter what happened, I would face up to (it). ...After that, it was clear, 
that the Swapraja of Badung was playing with me and in order to support 
his puppet government he asked for NICA's help. As I opposed him, I 
was imprisoned in puri Pamacutan...385
From Cokorda Ngurah Agung's account we can see clearly how Cokorda Ngurah 
Gde Pamacutan, as Swapraja of Badung, cooperated with the Dutch in return for their 
support. By dismissing Cokorda Alit Ngurah as the raja of Badung and by capturing and 
exiling his sons, Cokorda Ngurah Agung and Cokorda Bagus Sayoga and by raising the 
status of puri Pamacutan under the Dutch, it can be said that the Dutch succeeded in 
taking over both puris, Satria and Pamacutan. Although the Dutch succeeded in imposing 
their power on Bali, the pemudas struggle was far from over.
While Cokorda Ngurah Agung was in Karangasem in June 1947, the Dutch 
offered to transfer him to Makasar to get a job or continue his education there, but he 
refused the offer and was subsequently transferred to Karangasem where captured 
pemudas were imprisoned. After that, Cokorda Ngurah Agung was released but he was 
not permitted to return to Denpasar. Nyoman Oka helped Cokorda Ngurah Agung to 
report to the raja of Karangasem that he was free. The raja of Karangasem helped him and 
he remained in exile in puri Karangasem. Meanwhile, Cokorda Ngurah Agung sent a 
letter to Denpasar in order to tell his family that he was free. His family including Sagung 
Anom, Dewa Ketut and Ni Rapeg also invited Cokorda Ngurah Agung there.
Three months later, Cokorda Ngurah Agung was ordered by the vice regent of 
Badung, Ngurah Konta, to appear before the Chamber of Rajas where it was decided that 
he would be moved to Singaraja as a "city internee" on 1 February 1948. In Singaraja, he 
was given a job in a Swapraja office. The raja of Buleleng, Jelantik preferred not to
384Ilis father was Cokorda Alit Ngurah and his mother was Anak Agung Putu Adi who came 
from Jroan Kasiman, see: Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", op. cit., p. 33.
385"Memoirs of op. cit., pp. 26-27
accept him. This is easy to understand, as Jelantik was loyal to the Dutch. Cokorda
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Ngurah Agung was set free on 31 March 1950.
E. Puri Pamacutan and The General Surrender
The success of the colonial Dutch in including Bali in the East Indonesian State 
(NIT) affected the activities of the Balinese puris. At this time, the Dutch began to 
collaborate with the Pamacutan puri and dismissed the former raja of Badung in puri 
Satria. The power that puri Pamacutan usurped in the final stages of Dutch control 
continued into the period of revolution and independence. The cooperative strategy of 
puri Pamacutan took place, when Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan changed his strategy 
towards the Dutch.
The Satrian faction continued to support the Republic government, while puri 
Pamacutan seemed to give their full support to the Dutch. However, the account of this 
period from puri Pamacutan present a different picture. Anak Agung Putu Murya for 
example, who was affiliated with puri Pamacutan mentions that the height of the rebellion 
was the battle of Marga of 20 November 1946 under the leadership of I Gusti Ngurah 
Rai. Murya tried to defend the position of puri Pamacutan by saying that at that time, 
Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan also secretly took part, even though it seemed that he 
remained in the city. Murya adds that Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan conducted this 
strategy in the city, because he believed that the struggle against the Dutch could not be 
conducted only through guerilla tactics in the mountains without pemuda base camps in 
the cities which could support the struggle in the village in particular by providing 
information and other help which was considered essential.386
After the Dutch considered Bali to be peaceful and orderly after the battle of 
Marga, they tried to restructure their policy in Badung. In addition, the Dutch were still 
worried about the role of Cokorda Ngurah Agung and Cokorda Bagus Sayoga in 
Badung. Their activities in political parties were considered very dangerous by the Dutch, 
therefore, they tried put them far away from Badung or put them in prison. Eventually,
386Anak Agung Putu Murya (et al.). "Sejarah Puri Pemecutan...", op. cit., p. 89.
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they exiled Cokorda Ngurah Agung to Karangasem, where he organised the struggle 
against the Dutch.
The death of I Gusti Ngurah Rai created a power vacuum in the Balinese pemuda 
struggle. Furthermore, I Made Wijakusuma, the leader of the pemudas held a meeting in 
Buahan (Tabanan), which was attended by Ida Bagus Tantra and Cokorda Ngurah Agung 
{Markas Besar Badung), I Gde Alit Saputra, Bundar, Subroto Aryo Mataram ( Markas 
Besar Tabanan). Together they established MBU DPRI Sunda Kecil.387
The pemuda who were in the MBU DPRI, which had been established in 1946, 
were not strongly influenced by the Republican government's statement and 
acknowledging the existence of the NIT, this did not prevent them from continuing their 
struggle to unify into one front with the Republican group.
The MBU DPRI, which was founded on 22 November 1946 in Buahan, Tabanan 
failed to organise the pemuda struggle, because the pemuda front was not unified, but 
spread all over Bali. On 21-23 May 1948, the leaders of MBU DPRI conducted a meeting 
in Munduk (Pengastulan, Buleleng), in order to determine the fate of the pemudas in Bali.
Meanwhile, the Dutch and the Republicans had come to an agreement at 
Linggadjati on 12 November 1946.388 Paragraph 1 of this agreement stated that the Dutch 
recognised the authority of the Republic in Java, Madura and Sumatra.389 The Dutch and 
the Republic of Indonesia governments agreed to establish a Federal United States of 
Indonesia on 1 January 1949. This was to consist of the Republic of Indonesia, Borneo 
and the East Indonesia State. Bali itself was included in the East Indonesian State. Bali 
was separated from Java and the East Indonesian government took responsibility for 
security in Bali. Therefore, the pemuda struggle in the mountains in support of the 
republic suffered, because the Republic government itself had acknowledged that Bali 
was included in the East Indonesian State. With the Lingggardjati agreement the pemuda 
struggle in the mountains, therefore, would get no further assistance from Java and 
would have to surrender. Panji Tisna in his leaflet also proposed that if the pemudas 
surrendered they would not be punished. But, if they continued to struggle, which in the
387Nyoman S. Pendit, Bali..., op. cit., p.226.
388Anthony Reid, The Indonesian National .... op. cit., p. 110. See also: Nyoman S. Pendit, 
Bali..., op. cit., pp. 288-294.
3*9Ibid., p. 289.
Dutch view was the main obstacle to the agreement of the Lingggardjati, the Dutch would 
consider the pemudas as rioters and robbers.
A contemporary Dutch account notes that Ida Bagus Mahadewa, Cokorda Bagus 
Sayoga, I Gde Subamija, I Way an Dana, I Gde Sumantra and I Gde Poeger had been 
supplying financial and material aid to the guerillas for several months. This aid was used 
to establish administrative, military, communications and intelligence organisations, the 
latter including the U.G.I. (Underground Istimewa), a special branch of the MBO 
DPRI.390
Due to the repression of the NIT government and based on the statement of Anak 
Agung Nyoman Pandji Tisna, head of the Chamber of Rajas, the leader of the pemudas in 
Badung under the leadership of I Made Wijakusuma decided to surrender (Penyerahan 
Umum). Terms of surrender were conducted by I Made Wijakusuma through the 
Chamber of Rajas to the Dutch Commission (NICA) which held complete power in 
Bali.391 While 834 pemudas surrendered, 700 pemudas headed by Ida Bagus Tantra 
(Poleng) continued fighting in the mountain areas.392
In Badung, the process of general surrender was headed by Cokorda Ngurah Gde 
Pamacutan. Major Polak had earlier approached him to assure him that Bali was not a part 
of the Republic of Indonesia393 and, urged him not to support the struggle of the Balinese 
pemudas because they were involved in fomenting rebellion in the villages.394 Cokorda 
Ngurah Gde Pamacutan came to Peninjoan and other villages to give circular letters to ask 
the pemudas to surrender and later prepared his puri Pamacutan to accommodate the 
pemudas who surrendered.39-^ After they were captured, they were tortured by the 
NICA, so that many of the pemudas died. From this picture, it seems that the Dutch 
succeeded in using puri Pamacutan as the medium for dealing with the pemudas who had
108
390S.L. van der Wal. Ofßciele Bescheiden..., Vol. IX, op. cit., p. 344.
391Nyoman S. Pendit, Bali.... op. cit., p. 302.
392I Made Wijakusuma (et al.). "Laporan Mengenai Penurunan MBU DPRI Sunda Kecil 24 Mei 
1948". (Denpasar, 7 Februari 1987), pp.3-4.
393Interview with Ida Bagus Saputra on 30 December 1992.
394P.J. Drooglever and M.J.B. Schouten, Officiele Bescheiden de Nederlands-Indonesische 
Betrekkingen 1945-1950, Vol. XIV, 5 Juni-31 August 1948. (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), p. 
143.
395Interview with I Made Kara on 16 February 1993.
surrendered. On 24 May 1948,396 the pemuda leaders who surrendered to the Chamber 
of Rajas were: I Made Wijakusuma, I Ketut Wijana, I Wayan Noor Rai.397 Some of the 
pemudas came to the puri to surrender and others were captured and brought to puri 
Pamacutan including, I Made Wijakusuma, I Made Pugeg, Ida Bagus Raca, I Nyoman 
Sarja Udaya, Ida Bagus Anom Ngurah, I Gusti Ngurah Pindha, Tiaga, Anak Agung 
Kusumayuda, Anak Agung Sumandi, I Gusti Ngurah Matra. Some were arrested and put 
in prison in Pekambingan for one year. Ceger from Kelandis for example, was given a 
death sentence.398 Others, such as I Putu Mudera were exiled to Ambon. I Nyoman 
Gara, Dewa Putu Jasa (Wijana), Bagus Putu Mertha, Gusti Bagus Teken (Kaprawi) were 
given life sentences.399
There were also some pemudas, headed by Ida Bagus Tantra (Poleng) who would 
not surrender to puri Pamacutan. Before the general surrender, Ida Bagus Tantra had the 
idea of setting up a special headquarters or Markas Besar Istimewa (MBI) which was 
established in 1947. This organisation was united with Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia 
Merdeka (GERIM) or Free Indonesian Movement which was established on 15 July 1948 
in Singaraja under the name of Lanjutan Perjuangan. It was organised by Ida Bagus 
Tantra, Cokorda Anom Sandat, Ida Bagus Tamu and I Nengah Tamu.400 On 4 January 
1950, the Lanjutan Perjuangan became Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia Sunda 
Kecil Resimen Ngurah /to/.401 (PDRI) or the Temporary Government of The Republic of 
Indonesia.
Meanwhile, at the national level, the Dutch attacked the Republican government in 
Yogyakarta on 19 December 1948. This was the second action of the Dutch military. The 
Dutch captured Sukarno and Hatta. The Prime Minister of the NIT, Ide Anak Agung Gde 
Agung, resigned in protest against the Dutch policy.
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See: George McTuman Kahin, Nationalism and..., op. cit., p. 145.
397Nyoman S.Pendit, Bali..., op.cit., p. 301.
398Interview with Ida Bagus Ratja on 29 February 1993.
399Ibid., p. 326. For reference, see: Sana, "Kawanku di Pendjara," in Damai, II. No. 24, 1 March 
1955), p. 16. See also: R. Irsaf, "Ruangan Pemuda: Pemuda dan Perdjuangan," in Datnai, III, No. 12, 1 
November 1955), p. 13.
400Max Lane, "Wcdastra Suyasa in...", op. cit., p. 19.
401 Anak Agung Gde Putra Agung, Sejarah..., op. cit., p. 96.
On 27 December 1949, the Dutch acknowledged the sovereignty of the Federal 
Indonesian Republic or the Republik Indonesia Serikat4^2 at the Round Table (Meja 
Bundar) conference, held in Holland on 23 August 1 9 4 9 .403 This meant that the Dutch 
acknowledged the independence of Indonesia. Sukarno became the president of the 
Federal Indonesia Republic. At that time, the East Indonesian State and East Sumatra 
State or Negara Sumatra Timur were included in the Federal Indonesian Republic.
In integrating the NIT into the Republic of Indonesia, Simatupang who was the 
chief of staff of the army appointed Lieutenant Colonel Mokoginta as the head of the East 
Indonesia military. To deal with the Balinese pemudas who were still in the mountain 
areas, Mokoginta appointed Captain Andi Yusuf to consult with the PDRI, which was 
headed by Ida Bagus Tantra. On 15 January 1950, MBU DPRI Regiment Lesser Sunda 
under the authority of Ida Bagus Tantra conducted the second phase of the guerilla 
surrender or "Penurunan Gerilya Tahap II" which took place in puri Satria.404 The 
pemudas preferred to surrender in puri Satria which had supported the rebellion rather 
than in puri Pamacutan which had not.
Based on regulation No. 44 of 15 June 1950, the regency of Badung remained a 
Swapraja. Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan was appointed by the Federal Indonesian 
Republic government, as the head of the Swapraja Badung and a legislative body of 
Badung, called the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Swapraja Badung was established. 
Therefore, it can be said that the Federal Indonesia Republic government also used 
Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan to rule Badung. This was no doubt an effort on the part 
of the national government continuity at the regional level. Pamacutan was a strong and 
influential leader in Badung and, despite his anti-Republic stance of the previous years, 
the government hoped he would be an effective representative of the Republic before the 
people of Badung.
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403For a detailed description, see: Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Renville: Als Keerpunt in De 
Nederlands-Indonesische Onderhandelingen. (Wassenaar: A.W. Sijthoff, December 1979), p. 307.
404 On 10 November 1950, the battalion of Arjuna was legitimised as the Indonesian National 
Army or Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) by president Soekamo. Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I Bali 
Kabupaten Daerah Tingkat II Badung, Data-data Sejarah Perjuangan 1945 di Masing-masing Desa 
(Kabupaten Daerah Tingkat II Badung, 1967), p. 17. See: "Pasukan Ardjuna Dilatih Di Singaradja", in 
Penindjau, No.62, III. (Rabu, 19 Juli 1950).
On 17 August 1950, the official change of government took place when the 
Federal Indonesia Republic became the Republic of Indonesia. Cokorda Ngurah Gde 
Pamacutan remained the head of the Swapraja of Badung until he was retired on 1 
February I960.405
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F. The Key Figures o f Puri Satria in Exile and the Birth o f the Balinese National 
Indonesian Party:
In the East Indonesian State period (1948), puri Satria was dominated by Cokorda 
Ngurah Agung who was in exile in puri Karangasem. This was because the Dutch had 
dismissed his father Cokorda Alit Ngurah, due to his role in supporting the Badung 
pemudas. But, in the Dutch point of view the dismissal of Cokorda Alit Ngurah was not 
due to his role in cooperating with the pemudas but because, he was believed to be too 
old to organise the administration in Badung. Meanwhile, the Republican government in 
Java did not acknowledge Cokorda Alit Ngurah after it had acknowledged the existence 
of the East Indonesian State. Cokorda Ngurah Agung notes as follows:
After he was pensioned off, there was nothing for Ida Cokorda to do. 
What was strange was that after he retired the Central Government paid no 
attention to him. Though the royal family of Denpasar had been on the 
side of the struggle of the people of the Republic of Indonesia and though 
he was the only raja Bali to do so from the beginning of the establishment 
of the glorious Republic, he was never remembered by the government in 
Jakarta once its time came.406
From Agung’s account we see that the Republican government were not fully able 
to support the puris in Bali. This can be accepted because, Bali itself was a part of the 
East Indonesian State. Furthermore, the basic struggle in Bali was much different from 
that in Java.407 The resistance in Bali was less organised. This was caused by two 
factors. Before the acknowledgment of the NIT, the Balinese struggle was fully 
encouraged by Java, but after the acknowledgment and support of the NIT by the
405Anak Agung Putu Murya, "Sejarah Puri Pemecutan...", op. cit., p. 92.
406Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung notes that the inner heavily repressions ended in the day of his 
death on 18 November 1965. See: Ida Cokorda Ngurah Agung, "Lintasan...", op. cit., p. 34.
407G. Robinson depicts "the fighting in Bali as ‘much worse’ than in Java, after December 
1945", see: Geoffrey Robinson, "State...", op. cit., p. 2.
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Republic, it seems that the encouragement and support dried up. Second, before the 
Marga battle, the struggle in Bali was united under the leadership of I Gusti Ngurah Rai. 
However, after I Gusti Ngurah Rai was killed in the battle of Marga, there was no leader 
capable of organising the struggle, so that the Balinese pemudas were disunited and in 
disarray.
At that time, Cokorda Ngurah Agung, Bagus Ketut Beratha and Budhita 
established an independent branch of the Indonesian National Party or Partai Nasional 
Indonesia (PNI). Budhita was appointed party leader and the deputy leader was Cokorda 
Ngurah Agung. They were assisted by Nyoman Tirtha and I Gusti Bagus Sugriwa.
Moreover, the emergence of the PNI in Bali was followed by that of other 
political organisations such as Masyumi, the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) and the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). From the PNI itself there emerged the Indonesian 
National Youth Association or the Kesatuan Pemuda Nasional Indonesia (KPNI) which 
was established on 14-17 April 1950. A congress was held at that time to unite all 
pemuda organisations.408
On April 1950, Cokorda Ngurah Agung was moved by the Swapraja government 
to Denpasar. In Denpasar, Cokorda Ngurah Agung still organised the PNI and he was 
even a leader of the Badung branch of PNI. In Badung, Cokorda Ngurah Agung held a 
meeting which was attended by about 800 people. At that meeting Cokorda Ngurah 
Agung explained the aims of PNI.409 At that time, the East Indonesian State was still 
powerful under the control of the Dutch, though, in May 1950 it became a part of the 
Republic of Indonesia.410 According to paragraph 17 article 5 of this regulation, the 
chief of Swapraja was elected by the Chamber of Rajas which was assisted by Dewan 
Pemerintah Dae rah Swapraja. This body came under the authority of Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat Daerah Swapraja.
The chief of Swapraja Badung was Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan, (the former 
deputy raja appointed by the Dutch).411 He was assisted by the Dewan Pemerintah
408Nyoman S. Pendit, Bali..., op. cit., pp.345-346.
409See: "Berita Daerah Usaha PNI", in Penindjau, III (Monday, 12 June 1950). See also: S.L. 
Van der Wal, Ofßciele Bescheiden..., Vol III, op. cit., p. 581.
410Anthony Reid, The Indonesian National..., op. cit., p. 162. See also: Max Lane, "Wedastra 
Suyasa in...", op. cit., p. 20.
41 According to "Undang-Undang No. 44 NIT/ 1950 Paragraph 17 Article 5".
Daerah Swapraja whose members were chosen by the former pemudas in order to 
represent their ideologies. Meanwhile, the appointment of the members of Dewan 
Pemerintah Rakyat Daerah Swapraja was conducted by Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah 
Swapraja. At that time, the members of Dewan Pemerintah Daerah Swapraja Badung 
were Cokorda Ngurah Agung from the PNI and I Gusti Ketut Arka from the PSI. These 
parties also had puri affiliations. As we have seen above, the PNI was organised and 
supported by Cokorda Ngurah Agung in puri Satria. Conversely, the PSI was supported 
by the other traditional elites such as I Gusti Ketut Reti Rujana, from Celagi Gendong (a 
part of puri Pamacutan) who became a leader in the PSI. 412
Finally, after the forming of Dewan Pemerintah Daerah Swaparaja Badung, 
Cokorda Ngurah Agung proposed to Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Swapraja that Daerah 
Swapraja be disbanded.413 It seems that Cokorda Ngurah Agung was disappointed with 
Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan as the chief of Swapraja Badung. After the Dutch 
acknowledged the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia in 1949, the republic 
government continued to make use of Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan as the chief of 
Swaparaja Badung until he was retired on 1 February 1960. It seems that at that time, 
Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan was quite powerful and had considerable influence 
among the people of Badung. Therefore, administratively, Cokorda Ngurah Gde 
Pamacutan remained a strong power in Badung society. Thus, Pamacutan remained the 
dominant puri in Badung. We can see that the Republican government considered the puri 
to have a significant role to play in Balinese society. The consistent view of puri Satria as 
the base of the PNI in Badung and the vacillating strategy of puri Pamacutan in facing 
every new government, exacerbated their conflicts.
This is one reason why Cokorda Ngurah Agung wanted to disband the Daerah 
Swapraja to eliminate a product of Dutch colonialism. In fact, we can see that these 
actions were attempts to crush not only the products of colonialism, but also of 
feudalism. This can be seen from an account of how Balinese viewed their society in the 
post-revolution period :
412I Gusti Agung Cakrawati, "Perkembangan Partai Sosialis Indonesia di Bali". Unpublished 
Thesis. (Denpasar: Fakultas Sastra Universitas Udayana, 1988), pp.41-46.
414See: "Rantjangan Konstitusi Negara Kesatuan", in Peniridjau, III, No. 50, Wednesday, 21 June
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Besides that we do not want to see only peace and order in our society as 
previously, but as a matter of great urgency we need to change the 
structure of society which reeks of colonialism and feudalism. ...In all 
honesty we have to acknowledge that our society still reeks of feudalism. 
This makes it understandable Mr. Susanto wanted to abolish the titles of 
the Balinese noblemen (triwangsa) in Bali when he was the Governor of 
Lesser Sunda. Mr. Susanto realised that as long as these titles exist, 
development would be obstructed. ...The non-triwangsa groups should 
be aware, that they themselves have the same rank as the higher caste 
people. We should measure the high and low quality of people not 
according to their caste, but according to proper behaviour and their 
personalities.414
From this account we can see that the revolution undermined the position of the 
puri in Balinese society. The puri pemudas had fought not only in the name of puri but 
also in the name of the people of Badung.
The people of Badung believed that Satria had played a dominant role in 
formulating and achieving the goal of independence and thus, Satria retained their 
support. Nevertheless, this support did not mean a return of the rajas to their pre-puputan 
positions of power. The people of Badung wanted the equality promised by the struggle 
for independence: equality free from the strictures and restrictions of the caste system.
414See: P.Sh., "Masarakat Bali Sesudah Repolusi: Masih Ada Ketinggalan Bekas Masarakat 
Fccxlal", in Bliakti (Madjalah Untuk Umum-Non Party). No. Margharana, Th. 1 (20 Nopernber 1952), p. 
1 .
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the expansion of the Majapahit dynasty to Bali in the 14th century, the 
descendants of that dynasty have established Balinese puris, centred originally in Gelgel 
and then in Klungkung. The ary as succeeded in legitimising the Balinese puris as centres 
of power. This also took place in Badung, South Bali, where the emergence of the 
Badung rajas began after the founding of puri Denpasar around 1800. In the succeeding 
years this puri developed and then divided into three puris: Denpasar (later Satria), 
Pamacutan and Kasiman. In the 19th century puri Kasiman became the leading puri in 
South Bali due primarily to its economic ties to Europe.
The arrival of the Europeans, especially the Dutch, heavily influenced the Balinese 
puris in Badung. This process was intensified after the fall of those puris to the Dutch in 
the 1906 "puputan  Badung". The fall of the Balinese puris resulted in a substantial 
decline in their political power. However, this did not destroy their political influence 
altogether. The Dutch introduced a new governmental system which consisted of Dutch 
officials and also involved the former Balinese ruling class. This was the indirect rule 
system, an important concept of the Pax-Neerlandica.
The Dutch introduced a new governmental system. This meant that the Dutch not 
only needed the people from all castes to run the bureaucracy, but these people needed a 
modem education. In other words, through the process of modernization, social change 
occured. The Dutch assumed that they could easily implement their policy in Badung. In a 
broad sense, the Dutch still depended on the former Balinese ruling class's cooperation to 
govern Bali.
Nevertheless, the Dutch still worried about the heir of puri Denpasar who survived 
the puputan. Therefore, believing him to be a dangerous threat capable of fomenting 
rebellion, they captured and then exiled him with his family to Lombok in 1907, in order 
to put him far away from the centre of Dutch power in Badung. Conversely the Dutch did 
not exile I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan of puri Pamacutan whom they did not consider 
to be a serious threat. Second, as he was not a formal heir of puri Denpasar, that is he was 
not a direct descendant of the former raja of Pamacutan who was killed in the puputan, the
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Dutch assumed that I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan would not have any significant 
influence on the people of Badung. Therefore, the Dutch believed they would be able to 
handle I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan.
The exiled heir of puri Denpasar, I Gusti Alit Ngurah, received a Dutch education. 
In this way, the Dutch hoped to recruit him, and through him the people of Badung, to the 
Dutch cause. The people of Badung strongly hoped that their raja could be returned to Bali 
in order to lead and protect them, as his father and his uncle, the former rajas of Denpasar 
had before him. The Dutch returned I Gusti Alit Ngurah to Bali in 1917 and appointed 
him as an official within the Dutch bureaucratic system. The Dutch subsequently gave I 
Gusti Alit Ngurah several influential positions. He was appointed chief of public works in 
1918, police assistant (mantri politie ) in 1924, a sedahan agung in 1926, Regent of 
Badung in 1929, clerk in the Dutch office in 1930 and, at the pinnacle of his career, he 
was appointed autonomous ruler of Badung (Zelfbestuurder) in 1938 and received the title 
"Cokorda".
Although Cokorda Alit Ngurah was a Zelfoestuurder, the people of Badung still 
referred to him as raja. This did not mean that he held the real power of a pre - puputan 
raja, because above the position of raja there were Dutch officials such as Controller, 
Assistant Resident and Resident who controlled the raja. The decision-making, was, 
therefore, carried out by the Dutch officials and not by the raja. The function of the raja 
had been changed. Although he remained socially strong, for the most part, his political 
power was eclipsed. Cokorda Alit Ngurah became the raja of Badung as a tool to 
implement the Dutch policies.
Cokorda Alit Ngurah himself, recognized that his position as raja was weak as a 
result he was forced to seek out new strategies to influence the people of Badung. 
Cokorda Alit Ngurah understood that as long as the Dutch retained the power in Badung, 
he would remain as raja. Indeed, he did not want power transferred to other puris such as 
Pamacutan which had been quite strong before the puputan, or to the ruler of Kasiman 
which had been was most powerful puri in Badung in the 19th century. Therefore, to 
maintain the diminished power of his puri, Cokorda Alit Ngurah, himself educated in
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Dutch schools had his sons, Cokorda Ngurah Agung and Cokorda Bagus Sayoga, 
educated in Java to prepare them to succeed him as raja of Badung.
In contrast, I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan who did not finish his primary school 
education. This educational disparity between the leaders of puri Satria and puri 
Pamacutan exacerbated traditional rivalries between the two puris. In addition, there was 
the temple competition. Satrian rebuilt pura Satria while Pamacutan rebuilt pura 
Penambangan Badung. Pamacutan claimed that pura Panambangan Badung was the royal 
temple of Badung. The Dutch saw Pamacutan's efforts with respect to the rebuilding of 
the temple as a means of arousing the spirit of nationalism among the people.
The out break of the Second World War and the arrival of the Japanese army 
caused great changes in the political situation in Badung. The defeated Dutch against 
Japanese made Cokorda Alit Ngurah support the Japanese who declared themselves to be 
the "liberators" of the Balinese from Dutch colonialism. The Japanese also made use of 
Cokorda Alit Ngurah to implement their policy by appointing him raja (Shu-cho) in 
Badung.
Initially, three of Cokorda Alit Ngurah’s sons, Cokorda Ngurah Agung, Cokorda 
Bagus Sayoga and Cokorda Gde Agung (Kresna) sided with the Japanese. But, after the 
Japanese succeeded in defeating the Dutch, they still had to face an Allied counter attack 
which consisted of American, British, Dutch, French and Australian troops. The Japanese 
exploited the people of Badung and it was not long before the people of Badung realised 
that the Japanese were no different from the Dutch though crueller.
After the Japanese surrendered to the Allies, Indonesian independence was 
announced. Puri Satria welcomed that proclamation. In this period, the ruler of Satria 
made use of puri Satria as a defence base. Satrians founded the TKR which raised the 
status of I Gusti Ngurah Rai to that of key Figure of the pemudas.
On 13 December 1945, puri Satria and puri Pamacutan united to attack the 
Japanese camps. The Japanese, who still held weapons, repulsed that attack. In response 
to the failure of this attack, Pamacutan submitted his plan for a puputan, but this idea was 
rejected by Cokorda Bagus Sayoga and the leaders of Badung pemudas who went to 
Padangsambian to plan a new strategy. As a part of this new strategy, I Gusti Ngurah Rai
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went to Java to get weapons, while Cokorda Ngurah Agung and Cokorda Bagus Sayoga 
returned to Denpasar to continue the diplomatic struggle. At that time, I Gusti Ngurah Gde 
Pamacutan did not agree to go to Java. It seems that he had been influenced by the 
Japanese through his wife and servant to put end to his part in the struggle. I Gusti 
Ngurah Gde Pamacutan therefore, returned to his home in Pamacutan.
Meanwhile, while both Cokorda Ngurah Agung and Cokorda Bagus Sayoga were 
captured by the Japanese, I Gusti Ngurah Gde was left untouched. This led to further 
conflicts between the two puris themselves.
Meanwhile NICA forces landed. This situation caused political rivalries between 
the Japanese, NICA and the puris. Understanding the importance of Cokorda Alit 
Ngurah, the Dutch tried to convince him to give up his struggle and return to Pamacutan. 
Cokorda Alit Ngurah, on the other hand was unwilling to surrender and continued his 
struggle from Satria.
Relations between Java and Bali were strengthened, after I Gusti Ngurah Rai 
promised to continue the military struggle, while the Satrian pemuda under the leadership 
of Cokorda Ngurah Agung and Cokorda Bagus Sayoga continued the political struggle 
through Parrindo and the MKP.
In Bali, the Dutch succeeded in convincing the Balinese rajas to cooperate with 
them. This is evidenced by the conference of Denpasar on 18-24 December 1946 which 
led to the emergence of the East Indonesian State. In Badung, the Dutch convinced I Gusti 
Ngurah Gde Pamacutan that as Bali had already been incorporated into the East 
Indonesian State which was recognised by the Republic, there was nothing to be gained 
by continuing the struggle. Thus Bali was no longer a part of the Republic of Indonesia. 
As a result, I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan perceived that there was no point in 
continuing the struggle in Bali, if the Republican government in Java acknowledged the 
existence of NIT. Therefore, I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan considered that the 
Republican government did not take the Balinese struggle seriously. Meanwhile, I Gusti 
Ngurah Gde Pamacutan saw many victims of the revolution in Badung. Due to the lack of 
support from Java and the death of so many pemuda leaders, Pamacutan saw cooperation 
with the Dutch as the only means of saving his people from further suffering and
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bloodshed. Thus, just as he had joined with the Japanese at the end of the war to protect 
the interests of his people, he now joined with the Dutch even though he himself 
recognised this position would be threatened and criticised by his local antagonists, the 
Satrians. From the Satrian point of view, what puri Pamacutan had done was to oppose 
the idea of revolution in Badung.
As we can see, puri Satria no longer supported the colonial authorities. Even the 
raja of Badung did not acknowledge the existence of the East Indonesian State in Bali. 
However, the raja lacked the full open support of the Republican government in Java. 
There was no reason for the Republican government to support Bali at that time, because 
they had acknowledged that Bali was a part of the East Indonesian State. Nevertheless, 
they could, and did offer covert support for the pemudas' guerilla war.
The raja of Badung ordered the Badung pemudas to take his letter of loyalty to the 
Republican government in Yogyakarta. Meanwhile, the Dutch continued to approach 
Pamacutan to convince him to accept the position of raja of Badung if Cokorda Alit 
Ngurah continued to support the Badung pemudas. As the Satrians were unwilling to 
cooperate with the Dutch, an opportunity arose for Pamacutan to capture the position he 
so coveted - raja of Badung. In Pamacutan’s view he alone could still protect the people of 
Badung from killing, kidnappings and robberies. Thus I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan 
took it upon himself to protect the people of Badung. He was afraid that if neither puri 
Satria nor puri Pamacutan cooperated with the Dutch, power would fall automatically to 
the Badung pemudas as there were no strong purls in Badung other than Satria and 
Pamacutan. This could lead to a social revolution. From this view, it seems that I Gusti 
Ngurah Gde Pamacutan recognised the necessity of maintaining his power.
The strong involvement of Cokorda Alit Ngurah's sons in the struggle and his 
letter of loyalty to the Republican government in Yogyakarta led to his dismissal as raja in 
mid-1946. The Dutch then appointed I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan raja of Badung. 
Thus I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan became Cokorda Ngurah Gde Pamacutan. This was 
the end of puri Satria's hold on power in Badung under Dutch rule.
Satria lost its power struggle with Pamacutan upon the death of I Gusti Ngurah 
Rai in a dramatic and tragic event which took place in Marga, on 20 November 1946.
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Puputan Marga as it is called, resulted in the death of 96 Balinese. I Gusti Ngurah Gde 
Pamacutan's idea to kill I Gusti Ngurah Rai became a reality. The Badung government 
prohibited the grand cremation ceremony of I Gusti Ngurah Rai which should have been 
obligatory considering Rai's rank and importance. They believed that such a ceremony 
would disturb the security of Badung society. The additional death of Cokorda Ngurah 
Agung’s younger brother, Cokorda Gde Agung (Kresna) reduced the will of the Satrian 
pemudas to fight. Therefore, the deaths of I Gusti Ngurah Rai and Cokorda Gde Agung 
effectively ended Satrian struggle. As a result, the Dutch believed that Bali was "rust en 
orde" (at peace and in order). The Dutch succeeded in separating the military struggle of 
the pemudas in the mountains from the political struggle of the Satrians. Despite the loss 
of their political power, the Satrian puri was still able to mobilise the people in the struggle 
for the republic.
After the death of I Gusti Ngurah Rai who was a leading figure in the pemuda 
struggle, the Dutch not only imprisoned Satrian leaders, but also exiled them. In this way, 
the Dutch tried to distance the influential Satrian figures from the struggle. They were sent 
to Singaraja where they could be watched closely by the raja of Buleleng, I Gusti Jelantik 
who was pro-Dutch. In Badung, the Dutch, through the Balinese ruling class who 
cooperated with them asked the pemudas to surrender. Those who surrendered to 
Pamacutan were investigated and then imprisoned. But not all of the Badung pemudas 
surrendered and some organised to continue the fight under the leadership of Ida Bagus 
Tantra.
The surrender did not mean an end to the political struggle in Bali. Cokorda 
Ngurah Agung, for example, although in exile in Singaraja, was nevertheless able to 
establish a branch of the PNI there in 1950. This party was actually an embryo of the 
national political party at the local level in Bali. After the Dutch acknowledged Indonesian 
sovereignty, the Republican forces took power and released all prisoners of war including 
Cokorda Ngurah Agung and Cokorda Bagus Sayoga. Cokorda Ngurah Agung then 
cooperated with the Republican forces in organising their struggle through the PNI.
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From the preceding analysis, a number of conclusions can be drawn. The power 
structure in these two puris changed markedly after the puputan. The rulers of puri Satria 
and puri Pamacutan no longer had any autonomy to govern their people. Their 
independence gone, the two puris depended on the Dutch for their authority. Fearing the 
prQ-puputan power of the rajas, the colonial Dutch eliminated the position of raja. 
Thereafter, Bali was ruled by a Dutch Resident of Bali and Lombok. Twenty three years 
after the puputan, assured of their position, the Dutch appointed I Gusti Alit Ngurah, son 
of Cokorda Alit Ngurah Pamacutan and nephew of Cokorda Ngurah Gde Denpasar both 
former rajas of Badung, as Regent of Badung. Nevertheless, this did not mean a return to 
the power structure that existed prior to the puputan. The Regent of Badung was 
answerable to the Dutch Resident of Bali and Lombok.
However, the rulers of Badung had a particular role under the colonial Dutch. The 
Dutch used Cokorda Alit Ngurah and I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pamacutan to implement their 
policy and to control the people of Badung. With the passage of time, as the rising 
education level and resultant growth in a national consciousness made this more difficult, 
the Dutch were able to exploit the historic rivalries between the puris to maintain their 
position power.
The shock of the puputan had left the people of Badung leaderless and powerless 
to resist Dutch colonialism. As a new generation of leaders emerged in the years of the 
puputan, a generation educated by the Dutch and accustomed to their ways, there evolved 
several strategies for confronting the Dutch. In the 1930s these strategies were primarily 
political. However, the return of the Dutch after the Second World War resulted in a 
divergence of strategies which placed a further strain on inter -puri relations as those who 
championed armed rebellion (centred in puri Satria) opposed those in favour of 
cooperation and accommodation (centred in puri Pamacutan). The Dutch were quick to 
take advantage of the growing rift between the two puris but were unable to reestablish 
complete control and were eventually forced to give up their colony.
Because puri Satria had played a dominant role in formulating and achieving the 
goal of independence, it retained the support of the people after independence. However, 
having fought hard for their freedom, the people of Badung were not willing to return the
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rajas to their pre - puputan position of power. Nor were they willing to adhere to a system 
of social stratification which limited their social and political development. However, there 
have been other obstacles to progress.
The historical rivalries which began in the nineteenth century and culminated in the 
battle of Marga did not end there. The effects of these inter - puri rivalries are still to be 
seen today in a Bali poised to enter the 21st century.
A. THE LIST OF KEY FIGURES
A. Satria, Pamacutan and Kasinwn
Agung, Ida Cokorda Ngurah: Cokorda Alit Ngurah's son. He was born in 
puri Belaluan-Kanginan, Badung in 1921. He attended primary 
school(Vervolg school) and completed HIS (Holland Inlandsche 
School)in 1935. Afterwards he attended MULO (Meer Uitgebreid Lager 
Onderwijs) (1935-1939) and then MOSVIA (Middelbare Opleidings 
School voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren). In the period of the Japanese 
occupation, he was ordered by his father to serve in the police office, and 
later he was moved to the law court (Raad van Kerta). He married Anak 
Agung Sagung Putri from puri Pamacutan in October 1942 and Luh 
Sukerti (Jro Jandrawati) in 1953. He was appointed as an assistant of the 
Regent in Denpasar on 1 January 1943, and on 31 December 1945 he 
was appointed Punggawa of Denpasar. In 1950, he established a branch 
of the Indonesian National Party in Singaraja, Bali.
Agung, Anak Agung Gde: Cokorda Ngurah Agung's younger brother: 
Cokorda Kresna was killed in Ayunan, Mengwi on 29 June 1947.
Agung, Cokorda Ngurah Made: Gusti Gde Ngurah Denpasar: the raja of 
Badung 1902-1906. He was killed in the puputan of 1906.
Jambe, Gusti: the raja muda of puri Pamacutan 1810-1817 (?).
Kasiman, Gusti Ngurah Gde: Gusti Ngurah Made Pamacutan: Anglurah 
Agung of puri Kasiman. The raja of Badung from 1829-1861. He died 
in 1861.
Kasiman, Gusti Gde Ngurah: a son of Anglurah Agung of puri Kasiman, the 
raja of Badung from 1861-1863.
Kasiman, Anak Agung Ngurah Made: Anak Agung Ngurah Mayun Putera's 
son and the punggawa of Kasiman from 1927-1954.
Kusumayuda, Anak Agung Ngurah: Anak Agung Ngurah Made Kasiman's 
son.He was born in puri Kasiman, Badung in 1925. He graduated from 
HIS in Denpasar and later attended MULO in Surabaya. In the period of 
the Japanese occupation, he returned to Denpasar and then became a 
member of the Japanese army, Shu-Dancho (Lieutenant II). After the 
battle of Margarana, he was secured in puri Pamacutan between 1946- 
1948. In 1948, he studied at MULO in Makassar. Later at Sekolah 
Menengah Atas (SMA) for three years. He died in 1989.
Ngurah, I Gusti Alit: Cokorda Alit Ngurah Pamacutan's son: Cokorda Alit 
Ngurah. He was born in Badung in 1896. After the puputan Badung in 
1906, he was exiled to Lombok until 1917. In 1918, he was appointed 
by the Dutch to work at Bouw Werkplaats. Later, he was appointed as 
Police Assistant in Carangsari, Badung on 24 February 1925. 
Thereafter, he was appointed as the Sedahan Agung on 7 September 
1926. In 1929, he was appointed as Regent in Badung and at the peak of 
his career he was appointed as the Zelfbestuurder of Badung on 1 July 
1938. In the period of the Japanese occupation, he was appointed as 
Shu-cho (the Raja of Badung). He was dismissed by the Dutch as 'Raja' 
of Badung in mid-1946. He died on 18 November 1965.
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Oka, Anak Agung Gdc: Kyai Anglurah Pamacutan's son from puri Kanginan- 
Pamacutan.
Pamacutan, I Gusti Ngurah Made: the first raja of Denpasar from 1800-1813. 
He died in 1813.
Pamacutan, Gusti Ngurah Gde: the raja of Denpasar from 1810-1817. He died 
in 1817.
Pamacutan, Gusti Ngurah Made, see also: Gusti Ngurah Gde Kasiman: the 
Anglurah Agung of puri Kasiman from 1800-1829, and later became the 
raja of Badung from 1829-1861.
Pamacutan, Gusti Ngurah: Gusti Ngurah Denpasar: the raja of puri Denpasar 
from 1817-1829. He died in 1829.
Pamacutan, Gusti Ngurah: the raja of puri Denpasar until 1829. He succeeded 
Gusti Ngurah Pamacutan.
Pamacutan, Gusti Gde Ngurah: the raja of Badung in 1863. He died in 1890.
Pamacutan, Cokorda Gde Ngurah: the raja of puri Pamacutan: I Gusti Ngurah 
Gde Pamacutan. He was born in Badung in 1906. He did not complete 
his primary school education (Sekolah Rakyat). In 1930, he took part in 
establishing the Taman Siswa in Badung. He was the Punggawa  of 
Denpasar from 1934 to 1945. He was appointed Deputy Raja of Badung 
by the Dutch, after the Dutch dismissed Cokorda Alit Ngurah in mid- 
1946.
Pamacutan, Cokorda Alit Ngurah: Cokorda Gde Ngurah Pamacutan's son: 
Gusti Gde Ngurah Denpasar: He died in 1902.
Pamacutan, Kyai Agung Lanang: Anak Agung Ngurah Made from puri 
Kanginan-Pamacutan.
Pamacutan, Cokorda Ngurah Gde: Anak Agung Ngurah Gde Pamacutan: Kyai 
Anglurah Rai's son: the deputy of the raja of Badung from 1946-1950.
Putera, Anak Agung Ngurah Mayun: the leader of puri Kasiman who was 
killed by Ida Bagus Brego before the puputan in 1906.
Rai, Kyai Anglurah: Kyai Agung Lanang Pamacutan's brother.
Sayoga, Cokorda Bagus: Cokorda Alit Ngurah's son. He was born on 2 
February 1926. He graduated at HIS (Kayumas) in Denpasar in 1932. 
Later, he continued his education at the MULO in Surakarta, Central Java 
from 1939 to 1940. He returned to Bali in 1941, due to the war. He 
worked at the Dutch air force (LBD or Lucht Bescherming Dienst) from 
1941-1942. In 1943, he established the Anti-Fascist Movement or GAF 
{Gerakan Anti Fascist), during the NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil 
Administration) (1946). In 1947, he formed PBH (Pasukan Banteng 
Hitam) and MKP (Markas Kota Pusat).
B. Pemudas and Republicans
Dangga, I Ketut. He was born in Kesiman in 1925. He graduated from the 
primary school (Vervolg School) in 1935.
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Dcbcs, I Wayan: the chief of TKR Tabanan.
Kara, I Made. He was born in Taensiat, Badung in 1922. He completed 
primary school (Vervolg School) in 1938. In 1940, he worked for the 
Dutch air force (LBD or Lucht Beschenning Dienst) in Dcnpasar. During 
the Japanese occupation, he worked at Taiwan Chikusan.
Mantik, I Nyoman: Mangkur: Agus Sumantri. He was born in Karangasem in 
1921. He graduated from the second class at AMS ( Algemeen 
Middelbare School) in Yogyakarta. Because of the war, he returned to 
Bali and in 1944 he got a job at MBK (Mitsui Bushan Kaisa) in 
Klungkung. He was a member of the Indonesian People’s Party (Partai 
Rakyat Indonesia) in Denpasar and a member of the intelligence staff at 
MBU DPRI Lesser Sunda. After I Gusti Ngurah Rai was killed, he was 
appointed one of the leaders of the MBU DPRI Lesser Sunda and the 
head of the Secret Movement of The Republic of Indonesia or GBRI 
{Gerakan Rahasia Republik Indonesia).
Mertha, I Gusti Putu. He was born in 1914. He was the former head of 
Parrindo in Denpasar.
Oka, I Dewa Made. He was born in Kasiman in 1930. He finished primary 
school {Vervolg School) in 1943.
Pindha, I Gusti Ngurah. He was born in Penatih (Kesiman) in 1924. He 
graduated from primary school or Sekolah Dasar in Bali and the 
secondary school in Makassar. During the Japanese occupation he joined 
the Japanese army and held the rank of Lieutenant II {Shu Dancho) from 
1943-1945.
Pudja, Mr. I Gusti Ketut. He was a son of I Gusti Nyoman Raka, who was 
the Punggawa of Sukasada in Singaraja. He was bom in Sukasada on 19 
May 1908 and was educated at HIS in Singaraja (1922), MULO in 
Malang (1926), AMS in Bandung (1929) and at the Law School or RHS 
{Rechts Hoge School) (1934). In 1935, he was working at the office of 
the Resident Bali and Lombok. In 1936, he got a position at the court or 
the Raad van Kerta. In the period of the Japanese occupation, I Gusti 
Ketut Pudja was appointed as a member of the Raad van Kerta in 
Badung, Denpasar. He was asked to help the Japanese to organise their 
government in Bali. He was given the task of setting up the civil 
government. Thereafter, he was appointed by Captain Kanamura to work 
at the Chookan office as Redjikan Dairi. In August 1943 he was 
appointed a member of Syu Kaigi and was later appointed administrative 
adviser to the Japanese, a position he held from 22 July 1942 to January 
1944.
Pugeg, I Made. He was born in Denpasar on 2 August 1924 and was 
graduated from the primary school in Kayumas, Denpasar in 1932. 
Later, he continued his education at the Taman Siswa in 1937. In 1940, 
he formed the Persatuan Pemuda Rakyat Indonesia Mulia (PPRIM). This 
organisation was disbanded in 1943. In the period of the Japanese 
occupation, he joined the Japanese army {Shu-Dancho). After the 
proclamation of independence, he became a member of BKR and later 
TKR.
Putra Manuaba, Ida Bagus. He was born in Tabanan on 15 February 1908. He 
graduated from the Teacher’s High School in Bandung in 1931. After the 
Japanese invasion, he was appointed as the chief of the Agricultural 
Cooperation Council, where he was responsible for collecting cows and 
pigs which were then exported to Java for the Japanese army. In 1944,
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Ida Anak Agung Gde Agung ( Cokorda Gde Agung Kresna ), killed in Ayunan 
on 29 June 1947. (Courtesy of Puri Satria Family, Denoasar).
G LO SSA RY
afdeling: an administrative territorial unit administered by an Assistant Resident
Ambachtschool: technical school
anak agung: title of Balinese prince
bhagawanta: Balinese priest
bouw werkplaats: public works
Budi Utomo: high endevour, an early Javanese political organisation 
bupati: regent, administrative head of kabupaten 
chocan: governor, resident 
chuo sangi in: central advisory council
cokorda: the Balinese titles for their ruler, particularly in Badung. 
controleur: controller, lowest rank in European B.B., European civil servant in Bali 
on the regional level
daidan, daidancho: battalion, battalion commander in PETA.
dewan perjuangan: struggle council, resistance council
Dewan Raja-raja: Chamber of Princes
geria: the house of priests
gusti: title for member of third or wesya caste
heiho: auxiliary soldier
Hoogere Kweekschool: teacher training school 
ida: title of a member of the first Balinese caste, the Brahmins 
Indonesia Raya: Greater Indonesia, the national anthem 
jaba: outside: "outsider", a commoner
kabupaten: regency, administrative district, the regency as an administrative unit, 
the regent’s house 
kaigun: navy
keibodan: vigilance corps, auxiliary police
kelihan subak: the people who submitted taxes to Sedahan Agung
kenpetai: military police
kerajaan: royal government
kris: large knife
korte verklaring: short declaration of obedience to N.I. government
ksatria: warriors, aristocracy: the second caste
Kweekschool: Teacher Training School
landraad: government law court
landrente: land revenue, land rent, land tax
landschap: district
lasjkar: popular militia
majelis luhur : "glorious council": organisational council of the Taman Siswa 
mantri politie: police assistant
onderafdeling: sub-district (administered by controleur)
Parindra: Partai Indonesia Raya: Greater Indonesia Party 
Parrindo: Partai Rakyat Indonesia: Indonesian People's Party 
Pesindo: Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia: Indonesian Socialist Youth 
Paruman Agung, Paruman Kertanegara: legislative body
patih, pepatih: grand vizier, chief adviser to ruler, high native official next in rank to 
the regent
pedanda: Balinese priest
pemuda: youth, especially politicized youth: member of movement of young men 
fighting for Republican cause in Indonesian Revolution 
perbekel: administrative official above village headmen
perjuangan: struggle, resistance, strategy emphasising armed resistance as means to 
achieve independence
Prayoda: a Corp of Balinese soldiers incorporated within the Dutch army, 
punggawa: administrative head of district in earlier times, usually relative to ruler 
puputan: mass-suicide of a defeated Balinese dynasty the end, finished
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pura: temple
puri: royal palace, court, kraton, Balinese term for palace 
pusaka: sacred heirloom 
raja: ruler
rakyat: people, common people, the masses 
Regent: highest level native official
Resident: senior Dutch official between Governor and Assistant Resident 
romusha: (forced) labourers
sedahan: head of a group of irrigation-associations or subak 
sedahan agung: head of all irrigation-associations or subak 
seinendan : youth corps, youth organisation
shu dancho: the commandant of a battalion: platoon commander in PETA 
subak: irrigation association 
sudra: the lowest caste 
syu: province
swapraja: autonomous area or region
Taman Siswa: Garden of Pupils; nationalist school system founded by Ki Hadjar 
Dewantoro
triwangsa: Balinese noblemen above Sudras
volkschool: People’s (vernacular) school, primary school, up to the third class 
wesya: the third Balinese caste 
zelfbestuurder: autonomous ruler
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